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This cumulative doctoral dissertation aims to measure multidimensional outcomes of 
redistributive regional policies such as structural investment funds and fiscal equalization 
policies. The thesis at hand consists of four stand-alone research papers that are jointly authored 
(sections 2 to 5). An overview on this papers and my own contribution is given in table V1. In 
addition, in section 1, I discuss the motivation, the research settings, as well as research 
questions and objectives, and give a short methodological introduction. Section 7 summarizes 
the main findings of the research conducted, draws policy implications and discusses limitations 
and future research perspectives.  
Table V1: Overview of papers in the cumulative dissertation  
 Title Journal Co-Author Own 
contribution 
1 How to improve the quality of life in 
peripheral and lagging regions by 
policy measures? Examining the effects 
of two different policies in Germany 
Journal of Regional 
science (2020), 60, 






2 Measuring the regional, multifaceted, 
direct and indirect Effects of European 
Cohesion Policies 
Submitted to: 







3 Who benefits from structural investment 
policy? An empirical analysis of the 
German structural fund GRW on 
regional wage structures 
Submitted to: 







4 Analyzing the spatio-temporal diffusion 
of economic change –Advanced 














The place a person lives in significantly affects the living standards and life chances of this 
person. Peripheral and economically weak regions within highly developed countries appear to 
offer their residents fewer opportunities, due to economic constraints, such as unemployment 
and lower wages, weaker regional amenities (e.g. such as weaker infrastructure and educational 
opportunities) or social challenge, such as increased risks for social marginalization, poverty 
and premature mortality. These constraints affect the daily lives of people living in these 
regions. Thus, peripheral and structurally lagging regions tend to appear less attractive and 
economic and social disparities to primarily dynamic metropolitan areas foster social 
polarization. Socioeconomic trends such as structural change, the new geography of jobs or 
ageing tend to reinforce within-country inequalities. The theoretical considerations in this thesis 
illustrate that reducing regional disparities and promoting spatially equivalent living conditions 
is an important topic in regional science because of its economic, social and political 
implications.  
Regional redistributive policy such as structural investment funds and fiscal equalization 
schemes aim to make less developed regions more attractive and to increase economic and non-
economic life-chances. But how effective are those policies? While there is a long tradition of 
examining economic growth effects of regional policies, there is a lack of scientific research 
and knowledge on effects that are not directly related to the economic output growth, such as 
the regional quality of life. This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on the efficacy of 
regional policy interventions dedicated to less developed regions by presenting novel empirical 
findings that focus on regional outcomes measures beyond regional economic output growth. 
To this end, four research questions are posed: 
1. How can individual well-being and the dynamic development of multidimensional 
regional inequalities be measured in a suitable way beyond economic parameters? 
2. Which policy measures are proving particularly effective to reduce dimensions of 
regional inequalities? 
3. Are there differences in the regional effects between those policy measures that directly 
affect public institutions and the municipal budget (e.g. formula-allocations in fiscal 
equalizations) and those that directly support private actors (e.g. structural funds)? 
4. Are there regional differences in the effectiveness of funds, for example between rural 
and urban areas? Can regional factors be identified that have a particular (positive or 
negative) influence on the impact of policy measures in the selected areas of life (e.g. 
population density, demographics or economic strength)? 
Spatial vectorautoregressive panel models (SpVARs) are used to empirically assess the effects 
of regional policy measures. These models have the advantage of being flexible, accounting for 
indirect effects between variables, time lags between subsidies payments and regional effects 
and allowing for the evaluation of multidimensional policy outcomes within the same model. 
Another goal of this thesis is to further develop the SpVAR approach into an explicitly spatial 
design that adequately accounts for spatial spillovers and spatial interdependencies between 
variables and allows to estimate additional impulse response functions that estimate effects 
occurring in neighboring regions. 
This cumulative dissertation contains four stand-alone research papers in addition to an 
overarching introduction and a concluding chapter. The first paper analyzes the effects of the 
German Fiscal equalization scheme and the structural fund GRW at the level of German labor 
market regions. The paper shows, that fiscal equalization scheme grants have a significant 
positive effect on regional net migration rates for persons under 50 years of age. This 
particularly applies for regions with low endogenous fiscal capacities, which can be described 
as structurally lagging behind. It is argued that the dynamic development of net migration rates 
can be used as an indicator of the development of the individually perceived quality of life in 
the regions. By preventing out-migration from structurally lagging regions, it is found that 
equalization grants contribute to the goal of spatial equity, although no evidence for promoting 
regional economic growth is found. This is not found for the GRW policy. 
The second paper analyzes the multifaceted effects of European Structural and Investment 
Funds (ESIF’s) in European NUTS-2 regions. The paper finds that the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) can support regional productivity and employment growth as well 
as household income growth, which should have a positive impact on the people’s material 
living standards. The effects of ERDF subsidies are particularly present in less developed 
regions, while no robust regional responses to subsidies are found for the European Social Fund 
(ESF) and the Cohesion Fund. In contrast to the first paper, no effects on net migration rates 
are found. 
The third article focuses on GRW effects at the regional level of German counties and 
independent cities. It emphasizes wage developments at different quantiles of the wage 
distribution as possible effects from GRW subsidies in order to investigate the extent to which 
possible productivity and income effects of GRW subsidies are transmitted to employees. 
Industry subsidies are found to have partially positive effects at different levels of the wage 
distribution in East Germany, while effects in the West are limited to the upper end of the wage 
distribution. Infrastructure subsidies appear to have higher efficacy on wages than firm 
subsidies in the industrial scheme, but are also limited to East Germany and to the service sector.  
The empirical findings suggest that the policies under investigation in this thesis have different 
transmission channels. The occurrence and strength of effects is heterogeneous and differs 
across policies. All three empirical findings suggest that effects are higher in less developed 
regions. Thus, they seem to depend on regional preconditions as well as on the policy 
frameworks. 
The final paper presents a novel spatio-temporal panel vector autoregressive approach as an 
extended spatial econometric method to correctly analyze spatial spillover effects in the SpVAR 
systems used in this thesis. The paper does not primarily aim to provide new empirical insights, 
but to extend the spatial dimension of SpVAR models by capturing the full cross-regional 
interdependencies and spatial spillover between variables over time, which allows to estimate 
policy effects in neighboring and economically connected regions. It is shown, that positive 
responses of variable shocks in regions can induce negative effects in neighboring regions 
through substitution effects.  
The findings presented should be of particular interest to policy makers, as relevant policy 
implications can be drawn. Based on the empirical findings, spatially redistributive policies can 
support the regional development of less developed regions and thus the quality of life and 
material living standards in these regions under certain circumstances. First, unconditional 
policy grants from fiscal equalization appear to be more effective than structural investment 
funds in increasing regional net migration rates and promoting non-material living conditions. 
Second, the high conditionality of effects in favor of regions with low economic strength 
indicates that policies should be even more tailored to these regions to be most effective. 
Finally, policymakers and researchers need to consider spatially indirect effects, since positive 





Der Ort, an dem eine Person lebt, beeinflusst maßgeblich den Lebensstandard und die 
Lebenschancen dieser Person. Periphere und wirtschaftlich schwache Regionen innerhalb 
hochentwickelter Länder bieten geringere Möglichkeiten, denn wirtschaftliche 
Voraussetzungen wie Arbeitslosigkeit und ein geringeres Lohnniveau, sozioökonomische 
Bedingungen und schwächere sozioökonomische Infrastrukturen beeinflussen die 
Lebensqualität in diesen Regionen negativ und wirken sich auf das tägliche Leben und die 
Perspektiven der in diesen Regionen lebenden Menschen aus. Dies betrifft beispielsweise 
Bildungsmöglichkeiten, Infrastrukturen der Daseinsvorsorge oder soziale Herausforderungen 
wie erhöhte Risiken für soziale Marginalisierung, Armut und vorzeitige Sterblichkeit in diesen 
Regionen. So erscheinen periphere und strukturschwache Regionen tendenziell weniger 
attraktiv und die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Gegensätze zu sich dynamisch entwickelnden 
Metropolregionen fördern die ökonomische und soziale Polarisierung. Die theoretischen 
Überlegungen in dieser Arbeit verdeutlichen, dass der Abbau regionaler Disparitäten und die 
Förderung räumlich gleichwertiger Lebensverhältnisse aufgrund ihrer vielfältigen 
Implikationen ein wichtiges Thema innerhalb der Wirtschaftsgeographie ist. 
Regionale Umverteilungspolitiken wie Strukturfonds und regionale Finanzausgleichssysteme 
zielen darauf ab, weniger entwickelte Regionen attraktiver zu machen und die wirtschaftlichen 
und sozialen Lebensbedingungen zu verbessern. Die Grundlage dafür ist das Streben nach 
gleichwertigen Lebensverhältnissen, die in Deutschland im Grundgesetz und in der 
Raumordnung verankert sind. Aber wie effektiv sind diese Politiken? Während es eine lange 
Tradition gibt, die Auswirkungen dieser Politikmaßnahmen auf das Wirtschaftswachstum zu 
untersuchen, fehlt es an wissenschaftlicher Forschung über Effekte, die nicht unmittelbar mit 
der regionalen Wirtschaftsleistung zusammenhängen, so wie die empfundene Lebensqualität in 
der Region. Diese Arbeit zielt darauf ab, einen empirischen Beitrag zur Literatur zu leisten, die 
sich mit der Wirksamkeit regionalpolitischer Maßnahmen beschäftigt. Es sollen neue 
empirische Erkenntnisse präsentiert werden, die sich auf Effekte jenseits regionalen 
Wirtschaftswachstums konzentrieren. Zu diesem Zweck werden vier übergreifende 
Forschungsfragen gestellt:  
1. Wie kann die Entwicklung regionaler Ungleichheit jenseits ökonomischer Parameter, 
insbesondere die Entwicklung der empfundenen Lebensqualität in geeigneter Weise auf 
regionaler Ebene gemessen werden? 
2. Welche der untersuchten politischen Maßnahmen erweisen sich als besonders geeignet, 
um die regionale Ungleichheit zu reduzieren? 
3. Gibt es Unterschiede in den regionalen Effekten zwischen solchen Politikmaßnahmen, 
die direkt öffentliche Institutionen und den kommunalen Haushalt begünstigen (z.B. 
Schlüsselzuweisungen im Rahmen des kommunalen Finanzausgleichs) und solchen, die 
in erster Linie private Akteure fördern (z.B. Subventionen im Rahmen der GRW)? 
4. Gibt es regionale Unterschiede in der Wirksamkeit der Förderung, z.B. zwischen 
ländlichen und städtischen Räumen? Lassen sich regionale Faktoren identifizieren, die 
einen besonderen (positiven oder negativen) Einfluss auf die Effekte politischer 
Maßnahmen in den ausgewählten Lebensbereichen haben (z.B. Bevölkerungsdichte, 
Demographie oder Wirtschaftskraft)? 
Zur empirischen ökonometrischen Analyse der Effekte regionalpolitischer Maßnahmen werden 
räumliche vektorautoregressive Panelmodelle (SpVARs) geschätzt. Diese Modelle haben den 
Vorteil, dass sie flexibel sind, indirekte Effekte zwischen Variablen sowie Zeitverzögerungen 
zwischen Subventionszahlungen und regionalen Effekten berücksichtigen. Zudem ermöglichen 
sie die Bewertung mehrerer Ergebnisvariablen innerhalb desselben Modells.  
Ein weiteres Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, den SpVAR-Ansatz so weiterzuentwickeln, dass 
räumliche Spillover und räumlich indirekte Effekte zwischen Variablen adäquat berücksichtigt 
werden und es dadurch ermöglicht wird, zusätzliche Impuls-Antwort-Funktionen zu schätzen, 
die Effekte in benachbarten Regionen schätzen können. 
Diese kumulative Dissertation enthält neben einer übergreifenden Einleitung und einem 
abschließenden Kapitel vier eigenständige Forschungspapiere. Der erste Artikel analysiert die 
Auswirkungen des kommunalen Finanzausgleichs und des Strukturfonds GRW auf der Ebene 
der deutschen Arbeitsmarktregionen. Das Papier zeigt, dass die Zuwendungen aus dem 
Finanzausgleich einen signifikant positiven Effekt auf die regionalen Nettowanderungsraten 
von Personen unter 50 Jahren haben. Dies gilt insbesondere für Regionen mit geringen 
regionalen Steuereinnahmen, die auf Strukturschwäche und einen begrenzten regionalen 
Handlungsspielraum hindeuten. Zudem wird herausgearbeitet, dass die dynamische 
Entwicklung der Nettowanderungsraten als geeigneter Indikator für die Entwicklung der 
individuell wahrgenommenen Lebensqualität in den Regionen herangezogen werden kann. 
Daraus kann geschlossen werden, dass der kommunale Finanzausgleich durch die 
Verhinderung von Abwanderungen aus strukturschwachen Regionen zum Ziel der räumlichen 
Gerechtigkeit beitragen kann, obwohl keine Anzeichen für eine Förderung des regionalen 
Wirtschaftswachstums durch den Finanzausgleich gefunden werden können. Für die GRW 
können keine Effekte auf regionale Wanderungsraten gefunden werden. 
Der zweite Artikel analysiert die Auswirkungen der Europäischen Struktur- und 
Investitionsfonds (ESIFs) auf der Ebene der NUTS-2 Regionen. Der Artikel kommt zu dem 
Ergebnis, dass der Europäische Fonds für regionale Entwicklung (EFRE) das regionale 
Produktivitäts- und Beschäftigungswachstum sowie das Wachstum des verfügbaren 
Haushaltseinkommens privater Haushalte unterstützen kann, was sich positiv auf den 
materiellen Lebensstandard der Menschen auswirken sollte. Die Effekte von EFRE-
Subventionen sind besonders in weniger entwickelten Regionen sichtbar, während für den 
Europäischen Sozialfonds (ESF) und den Kohäsionsfonds keine robusten regionalen 
Reaktionen auf Subventionen gefunden werden. Im Gegensatz zum ersten Artikel werden keine 
Auswirkungen auf regionale Wanderungsraten gefunden. 
Der dritte Artikel konzentriert sich auf Effekte der GRW Förderung in deutschen Kreisen und 
kreisfreien Städten. Es werden dabei die Effekte auf die Lohnentwicklung auf verschiedenen 
Stufen innerhalb der regionalen Lohnverteilung untersucht, um herauszufinden, inwieweit 
Beschäftigte von möglichen Produktivitäts- und Einkommenseffekten durch GRW-
Subventionen profitieren können. Es zeigt sich, dass Industriesubventionen in Ostdeutschland 
teilweise positive Effekte auf verschiedenen Ebenen der Lohnverteilung haben, während die 
Effekte im Westen auf das obere Ende der Lohnverteilung beschränkt sind. 
Infrastruktursubventionen scheinen eine höhere Wirkung auf Löhne zu haben als 
Unternehmenssubventionen, sind aber ebenfalls auf Ostdeutschland und dazu vor allem auf den 
Dienstleistungssektor beschränkt.  
Die empirischen Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass die in dieser Arbeit untersuchten 
Politikmaßnahmen unterschiedliche Übertragungswege besitzen. Ob Effekte auftreten und wie 
stark diese sind, unterscheidet sich zwischen den Politikmaßnahmen. Alle drei empirischen 
Befunde legen nahe, dass die Effekte in strukturschwachen Regionen höher sind. Regional 
messbare Effekte scheinen also sowohl von regionalen Voraussetzungen als auch von den 
politischen Rahmenbedingungen abzuhängen. 
Im letzten Forschungsartikel wird eine Erweiterung des in dieser Arbeit SpVAR eingesetzten 
Ansatzes präsentiert, der die Möglichkeit bietet, räumliche Spillover-Effekte korrekt zu 
analysieren. Der Artikel zielt nicht primär darauf ab, neue empirische Erkenntnisse zu liefern, 
sondern die räumliche Dimension von SpVAR-Modellen zu erweitern, in dem die vollständigen 
räumlichen Spillover im Zeitverlauf der geschätzten Impuls-Antwort-Funktionen erfasst 
werden. Dies ermöglicht die Schätzung von Effekten, die lokale Politikmaßnahmen in 
benachbarten oder ökonomisch stark verbundenen Regionen auslösen. Die Analysen zeigen, 
dass ökonomische Schocks positive Reaktionen in der Ursprungsregion und gleichzeitig 
negative Substitutionseffekte in benachbarten Regionen auslösen können. 
Die vorgestellten Ergebnisse können insbesondere für politische Entscheidungsträger von 
Interesse sein, da relevante politische Implikationen abgeleitet werden können. Basierend auf 
den empirischen Erkenntnissen können räumliche Umverteilungspolitiken die regionale 
Entwicklung strukturschwacher Regionen, insbesondere die Lebensqualität und den materiellen 
Lebensstandard in diesen Regionen unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen unterstützen. Erstens 
scheinen die nicht zweckgebundenen Mittel aus dem Finanzausgleich eine effektivere 
Maßnahme als strukturelle Investitionsfonds zu sein, um die regionalen Wanderungsraten zu 
verbessern und damit einhergehend scheinbar die nicht-materiellen Lebensbedingungen zu 
fördern. Zweitens deutet die hohe Abhängigkeit der Effekte von der geringeren Wirtschaftskraft 
der Regionen darauf hin, dass die politischen Maßnahmen noch stärker auf eben diese Regionen 
zugeschnitten sein sollten, damit eine möglichst hohe Effektivität erreicht wird. Schließlich 
müssen politische Entscheidungsträger und Forscher auch mögliche räumlich indirekte Effekte 
berücksichtigen, da positive Effekte in geförderten Regionen negative Effekte in benachbarten 
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1. General Introduction: Regional inequalities and the need for a more differentiated 
analysis of regional policy effects 
“Our goal is to achieve equivalent living conditions in urban and rural areas throughout 
Germany. (…) A new all German support system for structurally weak regions, cities, 
municipalities and counties addresses growing inequality between cities and regions and serves 
the goal of creating equal living conditions in Germany." (CDU, CSU & SPD, 2018, p109; 
p116). 
With these words, the German coalition agreement from 2018 between the governing parties 
CDU/CSU and SPD dedicated political measures in the following years to the goal of equivalent 
living conditions, which is in fact synonymous with the objective of reducing disparities 
between German regions that affect the people’s everyday lives. It proves that the discussion 
about regional inequalities within and between highly developed countries has not only become 
an important topic in the field of economic geography and regional science, but is also taking 
place in the political debate. The findings and proposals of an expert commission under the 
direction of the German ministry of the interior were presented in “Our Plan for Germany” in 
July 2019 (Federal ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, 2019). A key finding of 
the report is the recognition that existing structural policy measures need adjustments to support 
structurally lagging regions more efficiently. 
Those policy measures have in common that they directly support underdeveloped regions, 
aiming to reduce interregional disparities at different regional levels. Germany’s current 
structural and regional redistribution policies were primarily designed to support the 
reunification process between East and West Germany that started in 1990 and is still ongoing, 
as it can be seen in Figure 1.1. This historical dimension, as well as the political topicality and 




interesting case study in the scientific discussion around tackling regional inequalities with 
regional policy measures.  
However, economic and social developments tend to increase dissimilar living conditions 
within countries in Europe and the world and pose new challenges to regional and structural 
policy measures that are not limited to Germany, such as the European Cohesion Policy. The 
first challenge arises from long-term structural change. The ongoing economic development 
towards a globalized and digitalized information- and knowledge-based high-tech economy 
causes a concentration of innovation and jobs in metropolitan areas, especially high-wage jobs 
in knowledge intensive business services, that is discussed as the “new geography of jobs” 
(Moretti, 2012). Hence, attractive cities that are integrated into dynamic global networks, such 
as London, Paris or Berlin, are growing fast, accumulating human capital and knowledge and 
Figure 1.1: GDP per capita in German Cities and County districts 2016. Data 







becoming increasingly expensive. Conversely, the number of jobs created in rural and 
peripheral areas is declining with lower average payment and selective out-migration of high-
potentials (Stockdale, 2006). This economic divide becomes apparent in Figure 1.1. In addition, 
traditional industrial and manufacturing areas are still struggling with long-term decline due to 
structural change and the accompanying local problems such as high unemployment rates, low 
competitiveness and municipal tax revenues. This development causes a divide between 
dynamic metropolitan areas and their suburbs on the one hand and rural and old industrial areas 
on the other hand which is expected to widen in the future (Iammarino, Rodriguez-Pose & 
Storper, 2019).  
 
Figure 1.2: Average age of population in German cities and county districts 2017. Data Source: Official Federal 




The second major challenge for regional development is the demographic change. The ageing 
of society mainly affects rural regions, since young people leave to take advantages of the 
broader opportunities offered by cities (Stockdale, 2006). In consequence, the populations of 
these areas are ageing faster than those that are attractive to young people and the population 
density of the regions that experience out-migration declines. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, 
especially the rural parts of East Germany that experienced substantial out-migration since 1990 
are ageing fast, while cities, even those in the East, have the youngest population. As shown by 
the federal population forecast, future migration and natural population trends will even 
increase the differences between regions with shrinking and growing population (Schlömer et 
al., 2015). 
A constantly shrinking population has manifold socio-spatial consequences that overlap each 
other. Mitze et al. (2017) find negative effects of ageing populations to regional labor markets 
that result in long-term labor-market marginalization of regions. Moreover, shrinking 
populations put supply structures and local infrastructure under pressure. The capacity 
utilization of necessary physical and social infrastructures such as grocery stores, public 
transport or health-care, educational and community life institutions decreases and makes them 
less profitable at simultaneously declining municipal tax revenues that limit public budgets 
(Steinführer et al., 2014). Beyond that, lower returns on housing due to declining demands 
compared to other regions may inhibit private capital investments in residential construction, 
modernization projects and related infrastructure. This underinvestment deteriorates the quality 
of housing supply in the long term (Couch & Cocks, 2013). Those factors have direct impact 
on the quality of life of the remaining residents in less attractive regions and will probably lead 
to further population losses, as the regions become more and more unattractive to live in and 
manifest interregional disparities. Hence, the dynamics of regional economic, demographic and 




The development of growing regional inequalities is a global phenomenon. For example, 
Ghanong and Shoag (2015) find that the inequality in average personal income between US 
metropolitan areas has increased by 30% between 1980 and 2016. Furthermore, Eurostat data 
reveals, that the total GDP at current market prices in London increased by more than 50% 
between 2002 and 2018, while the increase amounted to only 16% in North-West England that 
includes cities with a strong industrial tradition like Manchester and Liverpool as well as rural 
areas (NUTS-1) (Eurostat, 2021). A similar trend applies to Germany (Figure 1.3). Average 
disposable household incomes grew considerably faster in urban areas than in rural areas 
between 2000 and 2017. In addition, as it is shown in more detail in section four, average gross 
wages on the top of the regional wage distribution grew significantly in German regions 
between 2000 and 2010, while wages below the median did not grow at all in this period (see 
Figure 4.1). Thus, disparities do not only rise between regions, but also within regions, which 
increases overall economic inequalities. 
Figure 1.3:  Development of average disposable household income in German cities and counties by region 
type. Own calculation on the basis of data by the German Federal Statistical Office. Regional Classification: 




However, inequalities experienced on a daily basis are much more extensive and not limited to 
the economic dimension. They strongly affect the everyday quality of life of the residents by 
determining for example the material living standards, access to social and educational 
infrastructure, local supply of goods, the accessibility of traffic infrastructure and public 
services, availability of high-speed internet, health care infrastructure or other regional 
amenities that affect the resident’s utilities. Figure 1.4 illustrates the regional characteristics of 
some interesting indicators on the level of cities and county districts in Germany and reveal 
notable disparities. It becomes obvious that people in economically weak regions face a higher 
risk to die at a young age, maybe as a result of weaker health and emergency infrastructure. In 
addition, rural regions, especially in the east have a low share of households for which a 
broadband internet connection is available. Moreover, availability of supermarkets and primary 
schools among other indicators is unequally distributed. Thus, the region a person lives in 
determines the individual living standards, opportunities and restrictions in the everyday life.  
 
 
Figure 1.4: Regional inequalities among German cities and county districts in 2017. Data sources: a) Broadband 
Atlas of the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure; b) Federal and State deaths statistic; c) and 






Does this knowledge about interregional disparities result in the need for political interventions? 
Common theories of regional growth, such as the New Economic Geography, endogenous 
growth theory or evolutionary economic geography, suggest that geographical concentration 
and agglomeration of economic activities bring positive externalities like increasing returns, so 
that the total output of a region or country should be larger in the presence of regional 
inequalities (Krugman, 1991; Baldwin et al., 2003; Boschma & Frenken, 2011; Vazquez-
Barquero, 2002). High-productive and high-income regions such as agglomerations and 
regional clusters increase the total efficiency by concentrating physical and human capital and 
promoting the capabilities to build networks, increase knowledge and innovation and therefore 
increase the economic standard of the whole country, while those who live in low-income and 
low-opportunity regions opportunities are free to move to high-income areas and spatial 
spillovers ensure the spatial dispersion of wealth to a certain point. Thus, investing in 
agglomerations and front-runner cities should be the best way to enhance total growth and 
material living standards (Glaeser, 2011). In consequence, policy interventions that tackle 
economic inequalities may harm total economic growth (Champornowne & Cowell, 1998; 
Baldwin et al., 2005).  
However, this is only half the story. First, the capabilities to migrate and participate on growth 
are not given automatically. Personal income and movement costs limit the individual 
possibility to move. Second, individual circumstances such as families and partnerships, 
immobile properties and obligations, social relationships or job securities work as migration 
frictions that explain the maintenance of regional inequalities against spatial equilibrium 
assumptions (Heise & Porzio, 2019). Migration frictions are treated in more detail in chapter 2. 
In general, people or families with higher incomes and educational levels have higher 
capabilities to move into regions that promise higher personal incomes and opportunities 




would have negative impact on the living standards of those left in peripheral areas. Third, 
empirical studies question the basic assumption of a positive relationship between regional 
inequalities and economic growth for high-developed regions (Brueckner & Lederman, 2015). 
In addition, empirical studies investigated the long-term economic, social and political 
consequences of rising inequalities and economic decline. Economic implications are of rather 
direct nature. Lower incomes and high unemployment rates limit wealth and material living 
standards below the level of other regions. Moreover, low incomes alleviate educational 
standards within the population through persistent outmigration of well-educated persons and 
missing scopes for individual potentials result in social marginalization of people due to their 
place of residence. Reduced educational supply due to limited public budgets will even increase 
this problem. Further social inequalities are rather indirect outcomes. US regions in economic 
decline are found to have higher premature mortality (in line with Figure 1.4) and lower fertility 
and marriage levels and more children raised in poverty (Autor et al., 2019). As shown by 
Chetty et al. (2014) the place of birth also impacts intergenerational income mobility and 
restricts social advancement opportunities in the US. Thus, regional inequalities cause a lack of 
perspectives, economic and social life opportunities and life expectancies at birth in structurally 
lagging regions. Hence, regional inequalities have enormous consequences to the society and 
lead to a polarization of individual opportunities (Storper, 2018). Regional policies are therefore 
a way to increase equity in life chances across regions.  
Another thread of studies highlights the political outcome of regional inequalities and rising 
political discontent in disadvantaged regions that are named by Rodriguez-Pose (2018) as 
“places that don`t matter”. These regions are those peripheral or old industrial regions that once 
were rather prosperous but suffer from economic decline and now concentrate rising protests 
and populist and anti-establishment votes in many developed countries (see also McCann, 2016 




regional socio-economic trends and reflects the divide between dynamic regions and declining 
and lagging behind regions that offer rising lack of perspectives. For example, Frey (2021) 
shows that in the US presidential elections 2020, Donald Trump could win 2588 of 3319 
counties (82.4%). However, these are home to only 39.7% of the population, as Trump voters 
mainly came from more rural and economically weak regions in the US’ geographic center, 
while large cities voted in favor of Joe Biden. Similar trends and urban/rural divides could be 
seen for example in the Brexit votes in 2015 and in national votes all over the world, including 
France, Germany, Austria or Thailand (Rodriguez-Pose, 2018; Essletzbichler et al., 2018). 
Hence, regional decline may threaten long-term social cohesion and political stability leading 
to votes for populist parties and “regional inequality is becoming too dangerous to ignore” (The 
Economist, 2016, 17th December, pp 70 – 71). 
It therefore appears as a new task in regional studies and economic geography to develop 
strategies for regional development in the obvious conflict of objectives in regional policy-
making that can be summarized as promoting efficiency versus tackling inequalities and 
ensuring socio-economic stability. Hence, Iammarino et al. (2019) argue that place specific 
policies tackling regional inequalities are social policies before economic policies, although 
their instruments are mainly of economic nature. Thus, policy can be effective even if the total 
visible economic outcome is limited. Ferrara and Nisticò (2019) highlight that measuring the 
effects of redistribution policies should not be evaluated solely on the basis of effects on the 
regional GDP, but jointly consider effects on material as well as on non-material living 
standards and regional well-being. This is even more the fact as most regional policy goals are 
not limited to economic growth. So has the European Commission highlighted the importance 
of social progress as a key objective of European Cohesion Policies by launching a new EU 
“Social Progress Index” in December 2020 that aims to measure regional development “beyond 




This thesis aims to make substantial contributions to the topic of regional inequalities, the 
ongoing political debate and the widespread scientific literature on the efficacy of policy 
interventions that are dedicated to less developed regions, by presenting novel empirical 
findings of regional policy effects on socio-economic indicators that are more aligned with 
individual quality of life and well-being and go beyond measuring GDP effects. While there 
are a lot of studies dealing with effects on economic growth, these indicators have hardly been 
considered in the scientific debate so far. Moreover, the thesis aims to present cutting-edge 
empirical spatial econometric methods in quantitative policy evaluation and to contribute to this 
research by extending the recently more often used SpVAR approach to an explicitly spatial 
research design that includes effects in economically linked regions and accounts for spatial 
spillovers in the estimated effects over time (see Section 1.3 & section 5). This thesis consists 
of an overall introductory framework that gives a brief introduction into research questions, 
research settings and regional policy designs (Sections 1.1 to 1.3) and four individual research 
papers that are published or currently under review in international journals in the field of 
regional science (Section 2 - 5). Section 1.4 gives a brief introduction and overview on the 
conducted research papers. The thesis closes with a general conclusion that connects the most 
important findings of the conducted empirical research (Section 6). 
1.1 Research questions and contribution  
A large amount of money is spent in place-based policy measures that can be described as 
spatial redistribution policies and aim at a more even spatial development. For instance, almost 
a third of the total EU budget 2014 – 2020 has been spent for Cohesion Policy measures 
(European Commission, 2014). In the new deal in December 2020 the member states agreed on 
a policy budget of more than 330 billion euros in seven years, despite the financial challenges 




country redistributions, such as the German GRW policy and interregional financial 
equalization (see Section 1.2). 
However, while there is a long tradition of dealing with economic growth effects of regional 
policy, there is a lack of scientific research and knowledge about effects that are not directly 
related to economic growth. A main reason why this is more or less ignored is the lack of 
objective, accurate and available indicators as well as data quality to measure non-economic 
living-standards (Ferarra et al., 2020). Well-being and quality of life are, in contrast to GDP, 
not an exactly definable and objectively measurable indicator, but have many dimensions and 
are highly subjective. Every citizen can emphasize and weight its individual values to determine 
its individual perceived well-being and quality of life (see Section 2). Moreover, constructing 
a reliable composite index is very challenging and vulnerable to personal views of the 
researchers (Dialga & Thi Hang Gang, 2017). Furthermore, Bond and Lang (2019) and 
Odermatt and Stutzer (2019) highlight problems with the consistency of self-reported well-
being indices especially in a multi-region setting. 
However, the question of measuring socio-economic progress is of growing political interest. 
Recently, several national or regional strategies have been developed to foster social progress 
and well-being, which becomes for example apparent in the mentioned European Social-
Progress-Indicator. Moreover, Scotland’s first minister Nicola Sturgeon dedicated well-being 
as an objective as important as economic growth to Scotland’s development (Sturgeon, 2019). 
Scotland, Iceland and New Zealand joined the “Wellbeing Economy Governments” that have 
set themselves the goal to focus on well-being instead of GDP measures. It shows that economic 
growth, especially the value of GDP, as all-in-one indicator for economic and social progress 
and the dimension of regional inequalities is declining. 




1.  How can individual well-being and the dynamic development of multidimensional 
regional inequalities be measured in a suitable way beyond economic parameters? 
This is necessary to estimate the impact of regional and structural policies on these attributes. 
Many studies have discussed the multidimensional expression and possible operationalization 
of individual well-being and proposed a variety of new indicators (e.g. Stiglitz et al., 2009; 
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung & Conseil 
d'Analyse Économique, 2010; Held et al., 2018; Ferarra & Nisticò, 2019; Ferarra et al., 2020). 
These indicators include multiple dimensions that determine and ensure social integration and 
social participation opportunities for every individual, including material living standards, 
employment, health care, education, child care, personal activities, work, political voice and 
governance, social connections and relationships, physical environment, culture, housing, 
public services, free time, political & physical insecurities, personal relations, environment and 
ecology and more.  
However, in the context of dynamic model building and estimating the multiple regional effects 
of regional policies, the indicators need to fulfill additional criteria that influence the selection 
of appropriate indicators. These need to be quantifiable on a regional level, available with high 
and reliable data quality and dynamic, to see effects of regional policy interventions within the 
quantitative data analysis. Moreover, substantial local developments (such as increasing local 
infrastructure quality) have to be reflected in aggregated indicators on a regional level. This is 
also discussed in the Chapters 2 and 3. As a result, it is concluded in this sections that regional 
dynamics in the net migration rates are a convenient indicator to estimate the economic and 
non-economic quality of life and regional amenities. Chapter 4 treats the case of individual 
living-standards and social fairness of structural policies in estimating the effects on average 
regional wages. It first investigates the transmission of subsidies to workers and second 




subsidies when poor people in rich regions contribute to support rich people in poor regions, 
(Oates, 1972). To the best of my knowledge these potential outcomes have not been assessed 
in this context before. 
The second key question evolving from this research setting is:  
2. Which policy measures are proving particularly effective to reduce dimensions of 
regional inequalities? 
Regional policy measures are very different. Structural Policies in Germany such as the GRW 
fund subsidize particularly individual firms and economic infrastructure. Moreover, there are 
funds concentrating on research and development, urban or rural development or equalization 
schemes that redistribute a part of regional tax revenues across regions to secure interregional 
fairness. European regional and development funds (ESIFs) work on a similar basis also 
fostering regional development and aiming at regional cohesion with subsidizing regional 
projects in very different fields of regional development. Due to their different settings, regional 
policies are expected to have conditional effects, depending on the strength of the regional 
economy or other regional determinants that impact possible transmission channels (Iammarino 
et al., 2019). This prompts two additional research questions: 
3. Are there differences in the regional effects between those policy measures that directly 
affect public institutions and the municipal budget (e.g. formula-allocations in fiscal 
equalizations) and those that directly support private actors (e.g. structural funds)? 
4. Are there regional differences in the effectiveness of funds, for example between rural 
and urban areas? Can regional factors be identified that have a particular (positive or 
negative) influence on the impact of policy measures in the selected areas of life (e.g. 




These questions are individually discussed in every chapter. The mode of action of regional 
policies is generally discussed in chapter 1.2 und is presented according to the respective 
research setting. 
As stated above, a second objective of this dissertation is to apply cutting-edge econometrical 
research settings to answer the developed research questions. The existing literature on the 
statistical evaluation of regional policy measure uses manifold statistical and econometric 
methods. However, as shown by Hagen and Mohl (2009) in the context of European Cohesion 
policies, these approaches face manifold advantages but also notable drawbacks, that result for 
example from the type of incorporation of the policies in the model, the use of territorial units, 
within-region heterogeneity, spatial spillover effects or biases of the used statistical model. 
Another problem is that a model should also measure indirect effects. For example, if a policy 
fosters economic growth, which then affects other regional indicators of interest, this should be 
detected in the model. Thus, this dissertation additionally aims to apply and develop spatial 
econometric models that fit best to the research question and contribute to the development of 
econometric methods in this field. The general methodological approach is discussed in chapter 
1.3. An advanced spatial econometric method that contributes methodologically to the field of 
spatial econometric is presented in chapter 5. 
1.2 Regional policy settings 
The thesis at hand focusses on three regional policies, the German structural fund GRW, the 
German municipal equalization scheme and the European Cohesion Policy framework. They 
have been selected, because they all have the overall objective to contribute to the reduction of 
regional disparities due to spatial redistribution of financial means, have a substantial financial 
volume that should make a measurable contribution to the regional development, but differ 
substantially in their strategies, objectives, modes of action, funded institutions and expected 




expected that policies contribute to the individual quality of life through different transmission 
channels. Each research paper in this thesis deals with the effects of one or more of these 
policies. 
In general, all three policies redistribute financial means from economically wealthier to 
economically or geographically disadvantaged regions and aim to foster regional developments 
and counterbalance constraints that persons, firms and institutions in these regions face in terms 
of economic strength and personal perspectives such as income levels or work opportunities. 
Thus, all policies should promote economic or social catching-up processes that contribute to 
the quality of life in these regions and increase individual perspectives and opportunities. 
First GRW, a German structural investment fund with strong economic focus that directly 
subsidizes private investment projects and firm settlements in economically lagging regions 
and public infrastructure projects of economic importance, especially in East-Germany. Since 
its introduction in 1969 GRW has become the most important regional policy instrument to 
support economic growth and reduce spatial economic inequalities in Germany (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2014). The key objectives are to foster economic growth, competitiveness and job 
creation. Subsidies are earmarked to specific projects and due to its co-funding approach the 
policy additionally aims to spur private investments in those regions. Sections 2 and 4 
investigate GRW effects and deal with the policy settings in more detail.  
The European Cohesion policy has similar mechanisms and is closely related to GRW policy, 
especially the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The European Structural 
Investment Funds consists of five distinct funds (ERDF, European Social Fund (ESF), 
Cohesion Fund (CF), European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)), from which the first three belong to the strand 
of Cohesion policy that mainly aim at the objective of regional convergence in the European 




include more social investments and societal objectives such as sustainability and social 
progress. Section 3 delivers more insights on the mode of action of European Cohesion policies. 
The last policy under investigation is the financial equalization scheme on municipality level 
in Germany. In regional financial equalization schemes, public financial means such as tax 
revenues are spatially reallocated to municipalities in structurally weaker regions in order to 
provide additional financial resources and ensure financial flexibility, capacities to act and 
provision of public goods (Lenk et al., 2013). Despite its large financial volume, effects of 
financial equalization are not investigated very often compared to the other policies 
(Wardenburg & Brenner, 2020; Lehmann & Wrede, 2019). Equalization grants are not project-
bound, but directly enhance the public budget of disadvantaged regions, which makes them the 
largest source of income for regions with low revenues (Buettner & Holm-Hadulla, 2008). 
While availability of GRW und Cohesion policy subsidies depend on the regional eligibility 
status, the distribution of equalization means is formula based. The objectives of financial 
equalization policies are not of economic nature in the first place, which leads to the hypothesis 
that policy outcomes and transmission channels substantially differ from the other two policies. 
Section two compares regional outcomes of the financial equalization scheme to GRW 
structural funds.  
1.3 Empirical methods and econometric approach 
In order to gain new empirical insights to the subject of regional policy analysis, it is important 
to focus on the best available research methods to empirically estimate the multifaceted effects 
of regional policies. As stated before, the discussion and the use of empirical methods in studies 
with similar research questions is widespread from case studies to spatial econometric analysis 
that results in a variety of methodological approaches. This thesis focusses on spatial vector-
autoregressive multi-equation panel model approaches (SpVARs). These are hardly used in this 




evaluation in recent years (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019; Mitze et al., 2018; Marquez et al., 2014; 
Ramajo et al., 2014)   
SpVAR models offer a number of advantages that make them very appropriate for empirical 
analysis in this context. The first important point is that the method allows to focus on more 
than one outcome variable within the same model, which allows to reflect in the models that 
the outcome of a complex and heterogeneous policy such as Cohesion policy is not limited to 
one variable or transmission channel and is able to measure economic and quality-of-life-
indicators effects at the same time (Mitze et al., 2018). Moreover, while single equation 
approaches focus only on direct relationships between dependent and independent variables, 
SpVARs are able to capture mutual indirect effects and interdependencies between variables. 
This is important, since the relationship between subsidies and outcome variables is not 
necessarily direct, especially in the case of non-economic outcome to structural policy 
interventions. For example, if the policy leads to economic growth that rises wages or causes 
in-migration at a later point in time, this is not reflected in a single equation approach, but in 
the SpVAR model.  
Furthermore, the flexibility of estimators allows to integrate flexible time-lags of dependent 
and independent variables that reflect the dynamic regional development within the 
econometric models and allows for the inclusion of space-time lagged variables that control for 
spatial spillovers across regions, as well as statistical components such as fixed-effects. These 
spatial spillovers are an important additional indirect outcome of policies. However, current 
models underestimate those spillovers. Therefore, section 5 deals with the further advancements 
to empirical integration of spillover into the SpVAR approach.  
The exact empirical strategy, use of variables and data is explained separately in every research 
paper. Each model in this thesis is developed on the basis of individual theory in the specific 




1.4 Thesis outlook 
The empirical part of the thesis starts with a focus on regional policy effects on quality of life 
in Germany (Section 2). The theoretical approach argues that migration is a reasonable indicator 
to measure the quality of life. The paper focusses on two policies, GRW and the municipal 
equalization scheme. The second paper (Section 3) sheds light on the European Cohesion policy 
and investigates the combination of economic effects and effects in migration dynamics in 
European NUTS-2 regions. The third paper deals with the aspect of material living standards. 
GDP growth and wages are not necessarily linked on the regional or national level (Schwellnus 
et al., 2017). Therefore, the paper concentrates on the transmission of economic growth to 
employee wages. Moreover, by investigating effects on the wage distribution it focuses on 
regional policy effects on intraregional economic inequalities and asks “Who profits from 
structural policy interventions?”. The last research paper deals with the stated drawbacks of 
SpVAR models in the inclusion of spatial spillover effects and proposes an advanced 
econometric method to include spillover effects into the estimated policy effects. Section 6 
combines the findings from these individual parts and concludes.  
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Population and economic development in the world are highly polarized, with strong 
differences between countries as well as within countries. In most countries we find prosperous 
cities and peripheral regions falling short of this development. Especially rural and more 
peripheral regions have to deal with manifold challenges that affect regional quality of life, such 
as structural weakness, unemployment, smaller private incomes, demographic change and 
insufficient public infrastructure, whereas most metropolitan areas experience population 
growth and appear highly attractive as a place to live. As a result, we observe rising inequalities 
between those well-performing regions and declining, mostly peripheral regions. Governmental 
policy instruments therefore aim at reducing regional disparities by redistribution of financial 
funds or fiscal equalization transfers to underperforming or structural disadvantaged regions 
and firms, such as the European Cohesion Policies and manifold national policies. These kinds 
of policies can be denoted as place-based policies (Iammarino et al., 2019). Germany is an 
adequate case to study the effects of place-based policies, as it is facing significant disparities, 
especially between the former separated West and East. Politics is tackling regional inequalities 
with two very different policies that redistribute high amounts of money.  
The economic efficiency of regional development policies has been frequently examined in the 
German case (Alecke, et al., 2013; Brachert, et al.; 2019; Eberle et al., 2019 and others), as well 
as in the case of European Cohesion Policy. Pieńkowski and Berkowitz (2016) provide an 
extensive summary on this issue. However, referring to the insight that regional inequalities 
have manifold social and political implications for society instead of being solely economic, 
the evaluation of regional policies should not only consider economic efficiency, but also social 
and regional justice (Storper, 2011). Various recent studies find that the global phenomenon of 




more and more suspended from economic and social development (Rodriguez-Pose, 2018; 
Dijkstra et al., 2020).  
This paper can make a substantial contribution to the discussion on regional inequalities within 
high developed countries by investigating the effects of two regional equalization policies 
within Germany, the fiscal equalization scheme on the municipality level and the “Joint Task 
for the Improvement of the Regional Economic Structures” (“Gemeinschaftsaufgabe 
Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur”, henceforth GRW). The central aim of this 
paper is to investigate whether both policies contribute to the reduction of regional inequalities 
and the perceived development of the regional quality of life. In order to reach this aim, we use 
a flexible spatial vector-autoregressive (SpVAR) approach that is an emerging method in spatial 
policy evaluation (Eberle et al., 2019; Mitze et al., 2018). We use regional migration balances 
to measure the region's appeal and utilities to inhabitants and migrants, which gives a good 
impression on the development of regional quality of life in a region. This will be explained in 
section 2.3. 
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first enhancing an econometric spatial vector-
autoregressive process to investigate the complex interactions of economic and socioeconomic 
variables in a spatial context. This allows us to gain new knowledge about the mechanisms 
behind regional policies and the complex mutual dynamics of economic and spatial 
socioeconomic variables. Our results suggest that fiscal equalizations on municipality level 
have a positive impact on regional net migration rates especially in regions with low 
endogenous tax income, while GRW funding reveals no significant effects on net migration 
rates in total, but significant short-term effects in rural regions. We conclude that the former is 
able to reduce regional inequalities. 
The remainder of the paper succeeds as follows. We start with a presentation of the examined 




disadvantages of our measurement approach. In section 2.4 hypothetical effects of all policies 
based on theoretical consideration are developed. Our data and econometric model are 
presented in sections 2.5 and 2.6. Section 2.7 provides the empirical results and their discussion. 
Section 2.8 concludes.  
2.2  Policy Setup and Literature Evaluation 
This paper investigates the impact of two German regional redistribution policies aiming at 
regional development and cohesion. They are of particular interest as both policies provide 
financial support for structurally lagging regions, but differ strongly in their funding strategy, 
thematic focus and amount of payment. This might provide new knowledge on the instruments 
efficacy regarding socioeconomic regional development. 
2.2.1 Fiscal equalization scheme 
Financial equalization schemes are used by many countries, redistributing tax revenues from 
regions and municipalities with high tax incomes to those with low fiscal capacities in order to 
reduce spatial disparities (see Blöchliger & Charbit (2008) for an overview on OECD 
countries). 
We focus on the German equalization scheme implemented on the municipality level including 
vertical fiscal transfers from federal states to local jurisdictions and de facto horizontal transfers 
across municipalities within federal states. These grants (In German: “Schlüsselzuweisungen”) 
are institutionally separated from the horizontal equalization scheme on the federal state level 
(“Länderfinanzausgleich”), although distributed vertical means can result from this 
superordinate equalization level. The amount of support grants from the German equalization 
scheme is formula-based. The calculation design varies across the federal states, descriptions 
of the different calculation setups in the federal states are given by Lenk et al. (2013). In general, 




endogenous fiscal capacities. The common basic understanding allows us to assume that 
appropriate analysis across federal states is possible (Eberle, 2019; Lenk et al., 2013).  
The granted funds are unconditional and not earmarked to a specific project. The main purpose 
is to enhance the public budget of economically weak regions and allow municipalities with 
low fiscal income to fulfill their municipal tasks and provide public services and public goods 
at an adequate level. Average annual grants to municipalities amounted to 23.8 billion € in the 
period 2000-20141. Thus, it is the by far largest regional redistribution policy and the most 
important income source for regions with comparatively low tax income (Lehmann & Wrede, 
2019). The majority of formula-based grants is paid to municipalities in the Eastern German 
regions, but besides the city states of Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen every municipality received 
equalization payments in the investigated time period (see Figure 2.1 for the spatial distribution 
of grants). 
The economic consequences of regional fiscal equalization schemes in general have been 
discussed over a long time period and for several countries (e.g. Buchanan, 1950; Buchanan & 
Wagner, 1970; Feldstein, 1970; Oakland, 1994; Albouy, 2012). The most common finding is 
that fiscal equalization towards less productive regions appears to be inefficient with respect to 
total national productivity, but promotes equity by providing necessary financial capabilities to 
regions with low tax capacities. As high economic productivity is linked to spatial 
concentration, redistribution of resources to structurally weak regions challenges the overall 
economic efficiency. Martin (1999) and Baldwin et al., (2005) refer to this as the inevitable 
trade-off between the equity and efficiency goals of public policies. 
In contrast to its large volume and its economic and political relevance, scientific evidence on 
consequences of the German redistribution scheme is small. Henkel et al. (2018) estimate an 
equilibrium model for a scenario of abolished total fiscal redistribution (federal state and 
                                                          




municipality level, also including structural funds) and find evidence for increasing spatial 
disparities and the relocation of approximately 3.2 million inhabitants mainly from rural former 
recipient regions to urban areas within Germany. In this scenario national labor productivity 
would rise by 5.8% and real GDP per Capita by 3.7%, while negative growth effects in 
overcrowding cities inhibit total welfare gains. Eberle (2019) estimates a Panel VAR approach 
and finds that enhancing the fiscal equalization payments has significant effects on the regional 
employment rate, but not on other economic variables. Lehmann and Wrede (2019) confirm the 
common conclusions that the equity criterion of the equalization scheme is satisfied, while total 
efficiency is hampered by the Bavarian redistribution scheme, adapting the approach from 
Albouy (2012). 
2.2.2  GRW 
The structural fund GRW, the largest German regional economic development policy, was 
implemented in 1969 referring directly to the aim of regional equivalent living conditions 
(Bundesregierung 1969; Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). Its goals and functionality are closely 
related to the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) including financial means from 
the European policy. In contrast to the fiscal equalization scheme, the program’s main purpose 
is to explicitly procure primary and secondary effects on economic growth and employment by 
attracting mobile factors of production and stimulating private sector investments in regions as 
a kick-off for long-term local economic development. 
Subsidies are split into two funding schemes. First, industrial investments of firms, especially 
labor costs and equipment capital, are subsidized. Second, municipalities are subsidized to 
improve economic relevant infrastructure, for instance traffic or communication infrastructure. 




Figure 2.1: Spatial distribution of yearly average support grants from the fiscal equalization scheme and GRW 
funding intensity from 2000 – 2014 in € per GDP in % 
1.32 billion were paid within the industrial scheme2. Both industry and infrastructure 
investments are earmarked to specific investment cases and limited to 35 – 60% of total 
investments to reduce windfall gains and stimulate further private investments (see Deutscher 
Bundestag (2014) and Alecke et al. (2013) for more details on GRW functionality). Subsidies 
are solely given to regions with high rates of unemployment and low gross salary levels. 122 
of 258 labor market regions did not receive any GRW funds in the period considered, especially 
the economic stronger regions in the south. About 77.5% of the money was spent in East 
German regions, which are inhabited by just 15% of German population3 (see Figure 2.1 for 
spatial distribution of GRW funds).  
                                                          
2 Calculation based on Funding Data from the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) 
3 Own Calculations based on Funding Data by Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) and 




Eberle et al. (2019) provide a detailed summary on the broad existing literature examining the 
economic effects of GRW funding. The majority of studies find some evidence that GRW 
grants support regional productivity, GDP growth and/or employment. However, up until now 
no study focusses explicitly on socioeconomic effects of the GRW funding scheme. Von 
Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) find positive effects on income and migration balances for historic 
equivalent funds for West German regions neighboring the Iron Curtain 
(“Zonenrandgebietförderung”), but also arising negative externalities of higher land rents and 
negative effects to neighboring regions. For the comparable EU structural funds, a small 
number of studies estimates effects on migration flows. Egger, Eggert & Larch (2014) find in 
a theoretical model that structural funds reduce net migration from economic weak to strong 
countries in the EU-15 over the period 1986-2004. Thomas (2013) finds analogous results for 
an econometric model of internal migration in Poland in the period 2004-2009.  
2.3 Quality of life, appealing regions and interregional migration  
Regional equalization implies the reduction of regional inequalities. Therefore, policies should 
contribute to compensate the disadvantages that peripheral and less economic developed 
regions face in terms of economic perspectives such as availability of jobs and wage level as 
well as non-economic factors that contribute to the quality of life in those regions. Thus, such 
policies should strengthen the regions’ attractiveness for its current population and possible 
immigrants from other regions.  
According to the utility maximization framework, places offer specific individual and 
subjective perceived utilities for its residents that depend on the fit of the places’ values and the 
residents’ individual goals and values plus their individual local social integration such as 
family and social contacts (Wolpert, 1965; Biagi et al., 2011). Residential choices rest upon 
expectations towards beneficial place utilities of alternative residences and perceived 




places. Individual utility maximization behavior results in substantial migration flows, if place 
utilities are not evenly distributed in space and additional expected place values are larger than 
the total migration frictions and costs. 
Cebula and Vedder (1973) found first that net benefits of individual migration behavior are not 
necessarily economic and get influenced by further residential amenities that determine the 
individual perception of living conditions in many ways. Gottlieb (1995, p. 1413) defines these 
amenities as “(…) place specific goods or services that enter the utility function of residents 
directly”, such as regional advantages in natural or cultural conditions. Thus, migration 
decisions are reactions to perceived unequal distributions of regional economic strength as well 
as individual weighted further amenities. 
It follows that regional net migration balances provide worthwhile information on the 
attractiveness of regions as a place to live. Faggian et al. (2012) refer to this as people “voting 
by their feet” for the best quality of life. Their study uses net migration as an indicator for the 
regional quality of life respectively well-being. This indicator has several advantages against 
other measurements by taking into account individual demands, preferences and subjective 
perception of living conditions and ensuring independency from researcher’s preferences on 
objective indicators. Effective regional policies that improve the quality of life in regions by 
increasing its economic or non-economic utilities should have a direct impact on regional 
migration rates. Hence variations in the regional net migration rates become an appropriate 
indicator to measure the effects from regional redistribution and development policies on the 
perceived quality of life in a region. 
Mobility frictions in the spatial behavior hamper migration flows, due to migration costs, 
insecurities in the relocation process, local social commitments or immobile possessions that 
create a long-term relationship between regions and their residents and alleviate the disposition 




dimension of spatial inequalities. Heise & Porzio (2019) describe this as the “home bias” of 
migration, which makes migration decisions inertial and less rational than stated above and 
supports the persistence of spatial inequalities. Therefore, individual migration decisions have 
to be provoked by changes in the personal environment that raise the perceived inequalities 
above a subjective threshold level. These can be either linked to specific individual chances in 
the destination area such as job offers, earnings, higher education opportunities and 
relationships, or are reactions to constraints in the current residence, such as the regional 
unemployment and income level, availability and quality of social infrastructure, public goods 
and public services. Individual weightings of amenities depend on life-cycle aspects as well as 
personal circumstances, such as employment status, income, education, marital status, sex or 
health (Greenwood, 1985).  
Weaknesses from using net migration as an indicator for quality of life arises from various 
sources. Mobility friction and costs may bias the “voting with your feet” behavior towards the 
more educated and wealthy parts of the population as their mobility is higher than those who 
cannot afford costs and risks of migration. Thus, preferences of the former have higher impact 
on migration rates (Faggian et al., 2012). In addition, interregional migration patterns are also 
determined by developments in common preference, such as changes in attitudes towards cities 
or the development of fashionable locations that trigger interregional migration. Life-cycle 
aspects can alter the individual weighting of amenities and change place utilities without 
altering the regional conditions. At the same time, this aspect of using migration as an indicator 
provides a chance for a more detailed analysis, since migration behavior of specific 
demographic groups allows to draw further conclusions on which amenities triggered variations 
in the regional net migration.  
In addition, all regional policies pursuing regional equity should aim at influencing migration 




negative local migration balance affects in particular the presence of skilled workforce, which 
are crucial for local innovative activities and endogenous regional growth potentials (Lucas, 
1988; Romer, 1990). Out-migration causes further problems, such as real estate vacancies, 
investment backlogs and declining supply of public infrastructure, while workforce inflow and 
growth are self-enforcing in prosperous regions, which amplifies the polarization of regional 
development. This brings further interest to our analysis and migration rates become a reliable 
and comparable indicator stabilizing endogenous regional potentials and monitoring policy 
success. 
2.4 Theoretical considerations and research hypothesis 
A broad literature focusses on explaining interregional migration dynamics. Since we are 
interested in variations in the migration balances of individual regions, we focus on its local 
determinants and ignore more detailed approaches explaining complex migration patterns and 
interactions between regions. Internal net migration for a specific region can be modelled within 
the utility maximization framework as the regions’ place specific average household utilities 
minus the national average utilities for the average household and monetary and non-monetary 
mobility costs and frictions. (Rappaport, 2004; Faggian et al., 2012). The utility function of the 
individual depends on the personal weighting of locational utilities and disutilities that affect 
the individual quality of life. These utilities can be categorized into economic incentives, natural 
amenities and cultural (man-made) residential amenities (Rodriguez-Pose & Ketterer, 2012). 
They will be explained in more detail in Section 2.4.1. Migration risks and costs are assumed 
to be constant over time and homogenous across regions, reducing the net migration of regions 
by the same unknown factor.  
Place-based redistribution and development policies are set to affect its residents’ quality of life 
by changing the composition of dynamic location utilities in a direct or indirect way. 




differences in productivity and non-economic regional characteristics, such as Partridge et al. 
(2008), Biagi et al. (2011) and Rodriguez-Pose & Ketterer (2012), are good starting points to 
identify relevant amenities. However, these approaches are disadvantageous to investigate 
dynamic changes in migration flows as they consider mainly time-invariant amenities such as 
environmental conditions (climate, landscape) or distance to urban agglomerations. These 
factors cannot explain variations in migration rates over time and are not plausibly affected by 
regional policies. Investigating the impact of regional redistribution policy on the appeal of 
regions to migrants, we concentrate on dynamic local characteristics that are potentially 
affected by policy implementations and determine changes in the migration dynamics of regions 
by working as time-variant push and pull factors.  
2.4.1 Factors of regional utilities 
Economic incentives and potential economic returns based on employment opportunities and 
regional wage differences are well-known as key determinants of internal migration in high-
developed countries, especially in Europe (Greenwood, 1975; Hunt & Mueller, 2004; 
Rodriguez-Pose & Ketterer, 2012). Economically growing labor markets will increase the 
probability to find a job in a region. In addition, human capital incentives in growing markets 
offer additional monetary returns to skills. Thus, regional economic growth can enhance the 
personal utility function of less and high-skilled workers in a direct way (Arntz, 2010). Vice 
versa, shrinking local economies with high unemployment rates lose high and less skilled 
population to thriving markets due to income maximizing behavior. Especially the high 
educated labor force is more sensitive to income inequalities and benefits from knowledge 
spillovers (Borjas et al., 1992; Hunt & Mueller, 2004; Arntz, 2010). These mobility patterns 
manifest long-term inequalities and labor market imbalances (Kanbur & Rapoport, 2005; 
Granato et al., 2015). Hence, we use regional productivity, employment and household income 




In contrast, it has to be considered that regional income benefits are potentially offset by higher 
prices in high-income regions that likely compensate for additional amenities (Glaeser & 
Gottlieb, 2008). Especially housing prices should be added to the utility function as they can 
displace people from attractive cities, while shrinking regions in many cases cannot offer 
adequate housing supply due to lower returns of investments for owner and developer, resulting 
in investment backlogs.  
In addition, migration can be affected by multiple residential socioeconomic or cultural 
amenities such as the public infrastructure (public transport, traffic infrastructure, education 
infrastructure), public services (medical care, child care) or leisure opportunities (recreational 
areas, public libraries, museums, public pools, sport facilities) that may enter the individual’s 
utility function. They possibly arise as major pull-factor, in particular for urban areas if the 
supply of these amenities becomes insufficient in rural areas. Maintenance of public 
infrastructure is a serious problem in many regions that are challenged by demographic change 
and outward migration. In line with the strong impact of the “home-bias” (Heise & Porzio, 
2019), it seems reasonable that additional supply of local amenities and public infrastructure 
increases the number of “stayers” especially in those regions and offsets lower income 
opportunities to a certain point. Moreover, education infrastructure is a key settlement factor 
for families and high-potentials determining future earning potentials, offering individual 
development potentials and creating freedom to pursue individual life-goals. 
In contrast to the time constant natural environment, public or industrial construction projects 
might have positive or negative impacts on the constructed environment. Especially additional 
land sealing by industry investments can have negative effects on perceived quality of life in a 
region.  
Converting the considered aspects into a reliable model is limited by three aspects. First, the 




cultural amenities as migration determining factors. Second, it is practically impossible to 
display the specific heterogeneity of individual migration decisions into an universal migration 
utility function on a regional level. Thus, omission of variables from the individual’s function 
is unavoidable. Third, variable selection is limited to data availability. Available regional data 
is especially limited concerning the quality and dynamic development of regional infrastructure, 
public services, cultural amenities as well as the constructed environment. Variable selection 
will be explained in section 2.5. 
2.4.2 Research hypothesis on policy impacts 
Overall, policy funding should enhance local factors and generate variations in the regional 
migration flows towards recipient regions provoked by adjustments in regional amenities. One 
basic assumption of this study is that the policies are not the actual key factor for individual 
migration decisions, but single structural improvements in the personal environment initiated 
by policy interventions can become decisive in both directions by altering the individual’s 
regional utility function. The different strategic orientations and intended goals of policies result 
in different funding specifications and cause distinct research hypotheses. Summarized 
expectations towards policy effects are displayed in Figure 2.2. Discussed regional factors are 
based on the literature on internal migration, concentrating on dynamic economic incentives 
and further time-variant residential amenities as presented in section 2.4.1. To derive detailed 
hypotheses on policy effects, we match the identified utilities with their expected reaction to 
both policies. 
Structural funds, such as GRW, are designed to reduce the productivity gap between 
economically prosperous and lagging regions and provide incentives for firms and their 
employees to locate in regions with lower productivity (Kline & Moretti, 2014). The majority 
of studies confirm economic efficiency of GRW with regard to per capita output and 




Productivity growth should enable firms to raise wages. Considering that unemployment and 
income opportunities are the main reasons for labor migration, GRW funding should create 
economic incentives to stay, respectively move to funded regions. The growth effects should in 
particular affect the high skilled and educated workforce, but less often those who already 
started a family, since families make migration decisions more rigid and economic returns to 
migration decrease over time (Hunt & Mueller, 2004). Hence, we should observe clear positive 
effects of GRW funding for the age groups 18-30 years, lower effects on groups above 30 years 
and no effects on retired persons.  
Predictions on specific economic consequences of the equalization scheme are difficult, due to 
the lack of respective studies in the literature. The findings from Eberle (2019) suggest that 
regional employment effects are existent, which should have slightly positive effects on 
migration balances. As the policy is not designed for triggering economic growth, direct effects 
on prosperity cannot be expected to be large.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Expected reaction of important push & pull factors for interregional migration in Germany to the 






Forming hypothesis on policy effects on non-economic amenities is more heterogeneous and 
less profound by existing literature. Fiscal equalization transfers should enable local 
governments to ensure long-term affordability and maintenance of public sourced social and 
socioeconomic infrastructure, regardless of their local economic situation and possible tax 
income crises (Kline & Moretti, 2014). German municipality task and expenditure structure is 
split into obligatory public tasks (e.g. fire protection, waste disposal, energy, water supply and 
school authority) and optional tasks (e.g. public transport, traffic infrastructure, public social 
infrastructure, and cultural infrastructure). Local governments can decide about the amount of 
expenditures for the latter and, in theory, abolish their supply if financial capacities are 
exhausted, so that financial capabilities should make a difference on the quality and quantity of 
optional tasks. Moreover, we assume that an increased municipality budget from equalization 
transfer potentially improves local school infrastructure. Although the educational system is 
basically comparable within Germany, spatial inequalities arise from the federalistic 
organization and local availability of certain types of schools. While federal states bear the costs 
for the teaching staff, municipalities are school authorities paying for public school 
infrastructure. Accordingly, local financial capabilities become important (Brückner & Böhm-
Kasper, 2010). The local quality, reputation and distance to primary and secondary schools can 
be a large settlement factor for couples and young families. Concurrently, it is feasible that 
higher levels of education result in increasing out-migration from recipient regions in the long-
term, due to higher skill-returns in donor regions (Zukowska-Gagelmann, 2017). 
In total, equalization transfers should affect the individual’s utility function in favor of regions 
with less financial resources. GRW is bound to funding economic activities, so that it does not 





H1: Fiscal equalization transfers do not affect economic disparities in a significant way, but 
improve regional quality of life by enabling regions to maintain an adequate quality and supply 
of public infrastructure and public services. Especially regions with low fiscal income 
capacities are expected to profit from this. Effects are not limited to certain age groups. 
H2: GRW subsidies reduce the economic gap between regions. Potential labor market and 
income effects cause significant effects on the net migration balance in the age groups 18-30 
years in funded regions, lower effects on 30-50-year-olds and no effects on retired persons. 
2.5 Data and descriptive statistics 
We test the identified research hypotheses in an econometric analysis using a balanced panel 
data set on the spatial level of 258 German labor market regions.4 In this structural unit 
administrative districts are bundled due to economic ties and commuting flows. Their main 
advantage is that short distance movements driven by life-cycle phenomena, such as 
suburbanism, are excluded from the analysis. To enhance the informative value, based on the 
theoretical considerations, it is adequate to include only migration acts that involve extensive 
personal relocations. Concurrently, the chosen regional units are small enough to expect 
measurable effects from local policy input. 
Our main outcome variable is the annual regional net migration rate from the official German 
migration statistics. This includes all registered interregional inflow and outflow of persons 
moving within Germany. We exclude abroad movements, as immigrant location decisions are 
known to be driven by different factors, such as chain migration and ethnic networks in the host 
country (Barthel, 1989; Haug, 2008). The net migration rate at different age groups is used in 
comparative analysis to additionally explore the relationship of the policies and internal 
migration at different stages of the life cycle. While 18-24-year-olds are expected to move in 
                                                          
4 Official Classification of labor market regions by the German Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban 




majority by educational reasons, labor market is decisive for many 25-29-year-olds. Reasons 
for middle-aged are heterogeneous, persons between 50-64 can be expected to move in 
preparation to retirement. Registration behavior brings some weakness to the dataset. The 
census of 2011 revealed mismatches and time lags between registered and real movements. 
Assuming that the occurring error is equally distributed over years, this produces negligible 
errors on the annual variation. Administrative second-residences registrations cause bias, if they 
are actually used as first-residence5. Finally, we had to omit the Göttingen region due to a major 
data bias. As the administration for their matters is located in this area, ethnic German late re-
settlers from former soviet states get registered near Göttingen first. Their distribution all over 
Germany afterwards causes constant implausible statistical within-German out-migration from 
the region. The time period from 2000 to 2014 is chosen, because the first strong wave of 
relocations from east to west after German reunification was abated in 2000 and from 2015 
onwards the increasing refugee migration would cause problems. 6 
The two considered policies are investigated in separate estimations and normalized by the 
regional GDP. Furthermore, we incorporate variables that are expected to influence 
interregional migration decisions based on the considerations in section 2.4. We include three 
economic variables: 1) the regional employment rate to account for increasing/decreasing 
numbers of jobs, 2) the disposable household income to consider individual profit maximizing 
behavior, 3) the gross domestic product to consider the general local economic dynamics. In 
addition, we include the prices of land that is ready for development to control for the regional 
level of housing prices. As variables that represent the development of further local amenities, 
we include 1) the number of elementary and secondary schools to take into account changes in  
                                                          
5 The amount of this bias is in particular visible in regions with high student rates. The first-residence 
registration in Münster and Gießen significantly increased, after they implemented a taxation on second-
residence registrations. 
6 Similar to the problem with Göttingen, refugee-registration stations for refugee migration (e.g. Fürth region) 
are problematic. However, these effects bring only minor limitations to our dataset as they are marginal until 




Table 2.1: Variable description and data sources of variables  
 
                                                          
7 LMIG 30-49 also includes underaged 
Acronym Variable Description Data Source 
LFT Unconditional financial assignments to municipalities as 
part of the municipal fiscal equalization scheme 
(“Schlüsselzuweisungen) in relation to regional GDP 
[Fiscal Assignments in €/GDP in €]  
Fiscal Transfer: Quarterly Cash Statistics of the 
Federal Government and the Federal States 
GDP: Working Group “National Accounts of the 
Federal States.“ – „Arbeitskreis 





Total GRW funding intensity 
[GRW Industry funding + GRW Infrastructure funding in 
€/GDP in €] 
GRW: Federal Office for Economic Affairsand 
Export Control (BAFA) 
GDP: Working Group “National Accounts of the 
Federal States. – „Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnungen der Länder“ 
LOVN Overnight stays in tourism businesses 
[Overnight stays in tourism businesses/population] 
Monthly Tourism Survey of Federal Government 
and Federal States 
LSCO General education schools per 10.000 inhabitants 
[Sum of general education schools (elementary + 
secondary schools)/Population*10.000] 
Statistical Office of Federal Government and 
Federal States 
LEMPL Employment rate at workplace 
[Employees total /Population aged 15 to 64 years]  
Employees: Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB) 
Population (15-64): Statistical Office of Federal 
Government and Federal states 
LINC Mean disposable household income  
[Disposable income of private households/population] 
National Accounts of the Federal States 
(„Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnung der Länder“) 
LLAPR Prices of sold land plots ready for development per m² 
 
[Total purchase value of sold land ready for development 
in €/sold land ready for development in m²]  
Statistical Office of Federal Government and 
Federal States 
LGDP Nominal gross-domestic product per capita 
[GDP in €/population] 
GDP: Working Group “National Accounts of the 
Federal States. – „Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnungen der Länder“ 
LMIG Internal net migration balance  
[in-movers – out-movers from/to German regions)/ 
population]  
Migration Statistic of the Federal Government and 






Internal net migration balance of 18-24 (25-29; 30-497 
;50-64; >65)-year olds.  
[in-movers – out-movers in age group from/to German 
regions)/ population in age-group]  
 
Migration Statistic of the Federal Government and 





the local education infrastructure, and 2) the number of overnight stays as a proxy for the 
development of cultural amenities and environmental quality. All indicators and data sources 
are displayed in Table 2.1. The selection especially of the non-economic variables is limited by 
the availability of reliable data within the whole research period and the lack of adequate 
indicators. Time invariant variables, such as natural amenities, are not integrated into the model, 
but controlled for in the use of fixed effects. All variables are set to the natural logarithm (ln), 
except for the net migration balance, due to the occurring negative numbers. The presence of 
non- stationarity in the time-series (unit roots) can become a serious problem for panel data 
with long time periods (Im, Pesaran & Shin, 2003). The corresponding test detected unit roots 
for the variable LEMPL and the spatial lags of LINC and LMIG (see section 2.6 for computing 
and use of spatial lags). For this reason, we created stationarity in these variables by eliminating 
linear time-trends in the variables LEMPL, LINC and LMIG and their spatial lag variables. 
Summary statistics of all variables are given in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Variables 2000 to 2014 
ACRONYM OBSERVATIONS MIN 1.QUARTER MEAN 3.QUARTER MAX STD. DEV. 
LMIG 3855 -0.370 -0.023 0.003 0.039 0.263 0.058 
LMIG18-24 3855 -1.009 -0.194 -0.080 0.049 1.340 0.241 
LMIG25-29 3855 -0.665 -0.156 -0.070 0.037 1.062 0.172 
LMIG30-49 3855 -0.424 -0.020 0.013 0.051 0.269 0.060 
LMIG50-64 3855 -0.178 -0.005 0.015 0.032 0.173 0.031 
LMIG65 3855 -0.238 -0.000 0.021 0.039 0.183 0.035 
LFT 3855 -6.908 -4.668 -4.339 -3.960 -2.681 0.599 
GRW 3855 -18.421 -18.421 -13.232 -6.690 -2.576 5.941 
LOVN 3855 -0.693 0.693 1.278 1.825 3.764 0.850 
LSCO 3855 0.793 1.250 1.410 1.562 2.296 0.234 
LEMPL 3855 -0.949 -0.630 -0.532 -0.423 -0.202 0.145 
LINC 3855 6.875 7.073 7.145 7.224 7.547 0.114 
LLAPR 3855 0.793 3.800 4.327 4.845 6.847 0.748 
LGDP 3855 9.393 9.962 10.139 10.309 11.115 0.266 
Note: To overcome problems with zeros in the data sets, zeros in the policy input variables are replaced by 




2.6 Econometric approach 
The variety of considered regional policy effects represents the complex mutual interactions 
between economic and socioeconomic variables in time and space. This impedes model 
building and is reflected in the variety of methodological approaches in regional policy 
evaluation. We follow a flexible vector-autoregressive (VAR), first proposed by Sims (1980) 
that has become a standard part in econometric modelling of time series forecasting and recently 
drew some attention in related spatial policy analysis, used by Eberle et al. (2019) and Mitze et 
al. (2018). Our model basically follows their recent SpVAR approaches, including two main 
advancements that adapt the VAR for panel data analysis and account for the explicit spatial 
dimension by correcting for spatial autocorrelation (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Beenstock & 
Felsenstein, 2007; Di Giacinto, 2010). The main advantages of the model are its ability to 
analyze dynamic direct and indirect relationships among variables while having marginal a 
priori model restrictions and the visualization of relationships between variables in impulse 
response functions (IRF). Moreover, the approach is able to consider that actual migrations are 
time lagged to changes in the push and pull factors of migration.  
VAR estimations are based on the assumption that every variable depends on its own past and 
the past values of every other variable in the system. Variables are given in Table 2.1, LFT and 
LGRW as well as LMIG and its sub-variations define alternative models and are not used in 
the same equation models. Migration and inflation dynamics, trade cycle effects, especially the 
economic crisis beginning in 2008, and cross-sectional heterogeneity in the dataset require to 
control for regional and time fixed effects (μ and τ). Hence, we specify a reduced-form panel 
VAR equation system with M (=8) equations that can be aggregated to the following form by 
matrix notation (Rickman, 2010; Mitze et al., 2018): 




where A is a M*M matrix of regression coefficients that describes the relationship between past 
values and current values, ε is a vector of error terms with the covariance matrix Σ𝑒 and i and t 
represent region and time. We account for the spatial dimension to overcome problems with 
spatial dependency and regional spillovers as proposed by Beenstock & Felsenstein (2007) and 
Di Giacinto (2010). Applying a Morans-I Test we found evidence for spatial autocorrelation in 
every variable except LEMPL. To calculate unbiased coefficients, we apply a Spatial-Durbin-
Model and include spatial lag variables as additional independent variables to the M-equations 
of (2.1): 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  μ𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  A𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐻𝑊𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + εit , (2.2) 
where H is a M*M matrix of regression coefficients equivalent to A and W is a region-specific 
identity spatial weight matrix representing neighboring regions that is constant over all M-
equations and over time. Hence, lagged spatial lag variables represent average values of 
neighboring regions in the previous period. The considered lag length is one year as the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) proves that further lags have no additional explanatory power. 
However, the lack of theoretical assumptions treats all variables as completely endogenous. 
This is not appropriate for policy analysis, since real reciprocal relations are ignored and over-
parametrization results in biased impulse response functions (Rickman, 2010). The structural 
VAR (SVAR) model uses a priori theoretical assumptions to the endogeneity of variables to 
account for the economic structure of variables and gain orthogonalized shocks for calculating 
impulse response functions (Bernanke, 1986). In line with the mentioned papers we use a 
recursive causal ordering on ascending endogeneity of variables to impose a correct 
specification and perform a triangular Choleski identification scheme to the covariance matrix 
of the residuals from the reduced form VAR. The variable ordering is used as in Table 2.1 based 
on theoretical assumptions on ascending endogeneity and indications from Granger causality 




Results confirm that in particular GRW is exogenous, while the exogeneity of fiscal transfers 
is limited. The other variables in the VAR show mutual granger causality.  
2.6.1 Impulse response functions 
Based on the results of equation (2.2), we calculate impulse response functions of every variable 
m in the VAR to uncorrelated exogenous changes (shocks) in other variables by transforming 
them to the moving-average (MA) form (Lütkepohl, 2005). 
The commonly used impulse response functions are non-spatial responses to uncorrelated 
shocks in region i based on the coefficients from A𝑦𝑖𝑡−1, as done i.e. by Eberle et al. (2019). 
This means that spatial dependencies are included in the statistical estimation in order to avoid 
biases due to ignored spatial effects, but the effects of changes in one variable on other variables 
is only examined within regions (non-spatial impulse response functions). We enhance these 
approach by calculating additional spatially indirect IRFs based on the coefficients of 𝐻𝑊𝑦𝑖𝑡−1. 
In principle, the estimated model would allow to follow all responses through space. However, 
the responses lead to further responses that finally disperse over all variables and regions. As a 
consequence, the calculation of all spatially indirect responses would lead to different results 
for each region in which the original change occurs, resulting in 258 different IRFs for each 
pair of variables. Therefore, we restrict the calculation of spatial IRFs by considering spatial 
effects only from the original shock to all variables in the neighboring region, but no later spatial 
effects (while the further intra-regional dynamics are considered). The results represent 
responses within a region to orthogonal shocks in neighboring regions, which allows us to 
calculate one-time spatial-spillover effects (inward-responses). Initial shocks are equivalent to 
shocks for intra-regional IRFs and constant in space assuming spatial homogeneity. Responses 
to shocks in neighboring regions are time-lagged as they need time to diffuse into the region 
and have equivalent autoregressive impact over time in the region. Hence, spatially indirect 




and the moving-average representation from A𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 equivalent to direct IRFs in the following 
years. 
To assess the statistical significance of the resulting IRFs, we calculated confidence intervals 
by performing Monte Carlo simulations and applied the approach to randomly generated data 
sets of same size that result from a redraw (with reclines) of random regions from the original 
data set with all their attributes over time, while the isolated initial shocks are hold constant.  
Since regions are heterogeneous in their economic strength and quality of life, we examine 
conditional effects and different regional or structural transmission paths by running the 
presented SpVAR model separately for different sub-samples of our dataset. Subsamples 
represent the former Western and Eastern regions (SWEST; SEAST) 8, structural types of labor 
market regions (urban regions (SURBAN), rural regions with areas of concentrated population 
(SRUCO) and rural regions (SRURAL)9) and different levels of municipal tax income per 
capita (STAXLOW; STAXMED; STAXTOP; separated according to quantiles). Visualizations 
of subsamples are given in Figure A2.1. It might be considered that the average fiscal 
equalization transfers and GRW funding are larger in the subsamples with lower fiscal 
capabilities. Thus, latter sample building is not completely exogeneous. However, there is no 
indicator that allows to account for economic strength or regional living conditions and proves 
complete exogeneity from the used variables. Again, shocks are constant for all subsamples. 
2.6.2 Robustness checks 
We test the robustness of our results applying the following checks. First, we tested the effects 
of fiscal equalization policy by calculating the equalization grants in € per capita to control for 
                                                          
8 Berlin is excluded due to its history in both subdivisions. 
9 Official Classification of labor market region types according to settlement structure by the German Federal 






possible correlation of transfer grants with regional GDP development. Second, we tested the 
robustness of GRW effects by estimating a SpVAR that includes only regions that received any 
GRW funds. Finally, we added the regional endogenous tax revenues and policy grants from 
the Federal Urban Development, Fiscal Equalization and GRW program as additional 
exogenous variables to the underlying estimation to make further controls on additional income 
sources. All results reported in section 2.7 are verified by these tests. 
2.7 Empirical results 
As we will show in this section, results from both policies differ strongly. However, all impulse 
responses that do not involve policy inputs remain remarkably robust in comparison of both 
SpVAR-models, which confirms adequate choice of the model and included variables. The 
results suggest that direct regional shocks in schools, GDP and in particular in the household 
income have significant positive effects on the regional net migration rate, while an increased 
number of jobs and land prices have no significant effects on the migration balance (Figure 
A2.4 in the Appendix). In the following we present and discuss the effects of the two policy 
measures on the other variables, with a more detailed look on the effects on migration. The 
intra-regional and inter-regional spillover effects of the fiscal equalization payments are 
analyzed separately (section 2.7.1 and 2.7.2). In the case of the GRW funds no inter-regional 
spillover effects on migration are found, so that all results on the GRW funds are examined in 
one section (2.7.3). 
2.7.1  Intra-regional fiscal equalization effects 
The results for direct impulse responses to fiscal equalization payments within a region prove 
that the reaction of regional migration balances to fiscal equalization is positive from one year 
 after funding up to four years after, whereas fiscal transfers have no significant positive effects 




fiscal transfers is found to be significantly negative. This may be explained by the increasing 
population due to the positive migration effect. The fiscal transfer seems to make the region 
more attractive, so that more people stay without implying more jobs, at least in the short run. 
As a consequence, the economic activity per inhabitant decreases. Overall, we do not observe 
any fiscal transfer induced economic growth effects. Comparing the subsamples explained in 
section 2.6, net migration responses to direct fiscal equalization are especially high in the 
eastern regions (SEAST), which have on average lower population density, are weaker in terms 
of regional economic situation and predominantly experience out-migration. The response is 
significant positive up to nine years after the initial funding, while it is not significant in the 
West (SWEST) (Figure 2.4). 
In line with this, net-migration responds in particular positive in regions with low tax income 
(STAXLOW), which supports the hypothesis that especially regions with low tax income are 
able to improve their place-utilities due to enhanced fiscal capacities. Considering settlement 
structures, significant positive effects of fiscal transfers on migration are only found for urban 
Figure 2.3: Selected impulse responses to isolated fiscal transfer shocks based on SpVar estimation with fiscal 
transfer inputs. Note: Estimated impulse response functions are solid lines. Dashed lines represent 95% coefficient 
intervals from Monte Carlo simulations with 500 repetitions. IRFs display responses to orthogonal shocks in the 




regions (SURBAN). Combining these findings, especially urban regions with low tax income 
can improve their attractiveness through fiscal transfers. We conclude that these findings 
primarily result from decreasing out-migration from structurally weak regions due to reductions 
of local push factors. Equalization grants seem to encourage regions with below-average 
residential utilities to improve the quality of life and stabilize migration dynamics. As we found 
no evidence for labor market or income effects, improvements in the supply and quality of non-
economic local amenities seem to cause this effect. These results confirm the home-bias to be 
an important mechanism. Personal income opportunities are offset as long as local amenities 
do not fall below an individual threshold level.  
Applying the SpVAR to the migration rates across age groups provides evidence that significant 
positive responses in the net migration rate persist for the groups LMIG25-29 and LMIG30-49. 
Figure 2.4:  Response of net migration to fiscal transfers shocks in the defined subsamples. Specifications equal 




Responses of 18-24-year-olds are visible, but not significant in the total sample (Figure 2.5). 
Migration decisions of above 50-year-olds show no reaction to additional amenities created by 
equalization grants. Thus, H1, stating effects for all age groups is not confirmed. However, it 
might also be the case that effects for older people are not observed, because they rarely migrate 
anyhow. 
Detailed information for significant results in all subsamples and age-subgroups are given in 
table 2.3. The results indicate that equalization grants are an adequate instrument to reduce 
disparities in perceived regional quality of life. The rate of young and middle-age persons that 
decide to stay in underperforming regions instead of searching for better conditions elsewhere 
can be increased by shifting financial resources to regions with low endogenous income. The 
above findings suggest that equalization transfers are able to stabilize the demographic balance 
of the affected regions to a certain point, although they do not appear to reduce economic 
inequalities. The reduced out-migration should result in increasing regional labor-supply and 
endogenous economic growth effects in the long run, if the additional population is linked to 
increasing human capital. 
 





2.7.2 Spatially indirect fiscal equalization effects 
The results from the spatially indirect IRF estimation show that there is an explicit spatial aspect 
in the findings as we observe average negative responses of net migration to fiscal equalization 
shocks in neighboring regions. These responses are not significant for the complete sample but 
significant for West and East-German regions (Figure 2.6) as well as for rural and medium 
condensed areas and in particular for the age-groups 18-24 and 25-29 over all regions. This 
shows that some of the migration bonus, especially concerning the age groups between 18 and 
29, is rather short-distance migration at the expense of neighboring labor market regions. 
Interestingly, this is more the case for regions with a medium or strong economy. Economically 
weak regions that profit significantly from fiscal equalization, do not show spatial spillover 
population losses to neighboring regions. 
 
Figure 2.6: Selected spatially indirect impulse responses to isolated fiscal transfer shocks in neighboring regions 
based on SpVar estimations with fiscal transfer inputs. Note: Estimated impulse response functions are solid 
lines. Dashed lines represent 95% coefficient intervals from Monte Carlo simulations with 500 repetitions. IRFs 
display responses to orthogonal shocks in the amount of the standard deviations of the impulse variables. 





2.7.3 GRW effects 
In line with the respective Granger causality test (Table A2.3), we do not find significant effects 
of GRW funding on regional net migration rates (Figure 2.7). The impulse responses depicting 
the reactions of the various variables to direct GRW inputs are shown in Figure 2.7 and A2.3. 
The results indicate that GRW has negative impact on regional tourism. This might be provoked 
by additional industry infrastructure that possibly affects the appeal of a region in a negative 
way. Furthermore, we detect a significant negative response of schools in the funding year. 
Both employment and GDP responses show an immediate negative non-significant reaction to 
GRW. The reaction of both variables turns into a positive response after a few years (significant 
in the case of employment), but total effects are not necessarily positive.  
However, GRW funding seems to improve the economic situation in the long-term. The 
household income indicates no significant response to GRW as well as the net migration rate. 
This remains true for both GRW-Industry and GRW-Infrastructure scheme subsidies 
 
Figure 2.7: Selected impulse responses to isolated GRW shocks based on SpVar Estimation with GRW subsidies 
(LGRW). Specifications equal Figure 2.3 
Further results do neither indicate significant responses of net migration rates to GRW funds in 
West- nor in East-German regions. Short-time significant effects appear in the year of funding 
in the subsample STAXTOP, but not in regions with lower tax income. Since only 5 out of 86 
regions in the STAXTOP subsample received any GRW subsidies, results are built on small 
numbers. 
The significant positive response of net migration in rural regions (SRURAL) up to three years 
after funding indicates that GRW has positive effects on living conditions in rural regions, 
although we find no evidence that this is accompanied by a significant GRW induced economic 





Figure 2.8: Response of net migration to GRW subsidy shocks in the defined subsamples. Specifications equal 
Figure 2.7. Estimated policy shocks are hold constant over subsamples 
This is accompanied by negative spatial-spillover effects on migration from spatially indirect 
shocks in neighboring regions, which suggests that the positive direct results in rural regions 
are driven by a small number of movers from neighboring regions.  
A look into the age groups within different subsamples reveals positive responses to direct 
GRW funding for the age group 25-29 in the intersection of STAXTOP, SRUCO and SRURAL. 
This proves the hypothesis H2 stating age group 25-29 to be most sensitive to GRW funding, 
probably due to the economic effects. Against this hypothesis, we observe slight positive short-
time migration responses for the age group 50-64 in the East and in rural regions. This might 
be caused by supporting low-level jobs in these regions. Less explainable, significant effects 




information for significant effects on direct funding in all subsamples and age-subgroups are 
again given in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Summary of estimated responses of LMIG and its variations to policy input in the defined 
subsamples.  
Effect strength significant positive response (at least one time point) 
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Notes: The results displayed in Table 2.3 are verified by robustness checks. Bold variations respond significant 
positive within the whole time period. 
We can conclude that GRW funding has only small effects on regional living conditions as 
there is no significant response in the total sample and only few significant responses in specific 
subsamples. Present effects are found mainly for regions with high tax income and for rural 
regions, which indicates differing mechanisms between GRW and equalization grants. In 
addition, we do not find any evidence for spatial spillover effects on migration due to GRW 
shocks in neighboring regions. 
In summary, GRW does not satisfy the equity criterion of funding, as migration rates do not 
show any measurable improvements in the regional utility function in regions with low 





The central aim of this paper is to investigate whether regional redistribution policies are able 
to contribute to the decline of regional inequalities and improve the quality of life in supported 
regions. A further aim is to examine whether different policy measures have different effects. 
Variations in regional net migration rates are used as indicator for the development of regional 
living conditions. Germany is an adequate study object because it applies two large and quite 
different regional redistribution policies. Indeed, the results from our SpVAR-model point to 
very different effects of fiscal equalization and structural GRW funding in Germany. Given 
their different aims this is not surprising, but the detailed differences in their effects on the 
migration rates has not been studied before. This provides insights beyond the German case on 
how redistribution policies should be designed to change the regional quality of life and the 
resulting migration flows. 
First, we find empirical evidence that the German fiscal equalization scheme is an appropriate 
and effective policy to enhance regional quality of life in supported regions, since it is able to 
significantly improve migration development in particular in regions with low endogenous 
fiscal capacities and for all age groups up to 50-year-old persons. Especially labor market 
regions with small tax incomes that predominantly experience outward migration and are 
structurally lagging behind seem to benefit from the additional financial capabilities. As no 
evidence for substantial economic growth is found, we conclude that the higher degree of 
financial freedom allows to enhance or maintain supply and quality of public infrastructure, 
public goods and further cultural amenities financed by the municipal budget. This results in 
enhancements in the individual’s regional utility function and hampers outward migration from 
structurally weak regions. However, part of this effect, especially in the case of younger people, 
seems to be rather local, influencing the migration between neighboring regions. Second, we 




equalization grants, some positive effects on migration are found in rural regions and regions 
with higher endogenous tax revenues. We find no evidence that GRW funding increases 
regional equity in the form of improving quality of life in poor regions. Taking into account all 
findings, both examined policy measures contribute to quality of life in a specific way. Fiscal 
equalization seems to have no short- or medium-run economic effects but is quite effective in 
regions with low fiscal income to improve living conditions, especially in urban areas. In 
contrast, GRW funding rather affects the economy and is most effective in rural regions with 
comparably high fiscal income. 
It seems likely that the basic insights of our study apply also to other countries, especially other 
developed countries as well as in the European context. Hence, the obtained knowledge can be 
helpful also for the European Structural and Cohesion Policy. If the reduction of migration 
flows is the main aim, fiscal transfers seem to be most adequate, especially for very poor and 
rather urban regions. However, they do not improve the economic situation – so that permanent 
transfers might be necessary – and seem to address to some extend the short-distance migration. 
Economic orientated policies, such as the GRW funds, seem to be effective only in regions with 
some economic strength and in the very rural regions and seem to have, on average, much lower 
effects on migration. 
The conducted analysis can be easily applied to further place-based policies. For instance, we 
did not find any empirical evidence for significant effects on migration rates for the German 
Federal Urban development program in any of the presented subsamples. Beyond that, it would 
be interesting to apply our approach to the EU structural cohesion funds or to similar policies 
in other countries. Since our model has some limitations in terms of selection and availability 
of appropriate indicators displaying non-economic amenities, future research can refer to these 
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LFT LOVN LSCO LEMPLL LINC LLAPR LGDP LMIG 
LFT 0.491*** -0.020* 0.016* -3.45e-4 0.001 -0.012 -0.009* 0.005* 
(0.000) (0.012) (0.015) (0.796) (0.671) (0.581) (0.013) (0.037) 
LOVN 0.001 0.758*** -0.037*** 0.002 0.003 0.099** 0.006 0.006** 
(0.967) (0.000) (0.000) (0.282) (0.097) (0.001) (0.254) (0.091) 
LSCO 0.134** -0.027 0.727*** 0.002 0.004 -0.045 0.005 0.010 
(0.001) (0.113) (0.000) (0.557) (0.088) (0.324) (0.480) (0.055) 
LEMPL 0.249 -0.160 -0.193 0.524*** -0.007 0.230 -0.106* 0.029 
(0.250) (0.080) (0.802) (0.000) (0.590) (0.350) (0.010) (0.279) 
LINC -0.266 -0.031 0.010 0.115*** 0.627*** 0.263 0.061 0.145*** 
(0.296) (0.774) (0.915) (0.000) (0.000) 0.361 (0.208) (0.000) 
LLAPR  0.021 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.272*** -0.003 3.04e-6 
(0.160) (0.687) (0.528) (0.384) (0.101) (0.000) (0.270) (0.987) 
LGDP -0.607*** 0.016 0.068** 0.025*** -0.006 -0.226** 0.657*** 0.037*** 
(0.000) (0.597) (0.008) (0.000) (0.191) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
LMIG -0.226 0.022 -0.004 0.005 -0.022** 0.002 -0.080** 0.374*** 
(0.098) (0.703) (0.930) (0.618) (0.009) (0.988) (0.002) (0.000) 
SPL_FT 0.021 0.028* 0.038*** 0.003 -0.004* -0.030 0.004 -0.005* 
(0.481) (0.026) (0.000) (0.187) (0.047) (0.367) (0.443) (0.149) 
SPL_OVN -0.038 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.171*** -0.016 -0.003 
(0.407) (0.966) (0.833) (0.248) (0.693) (0.001) (0.064) (0.654) 
SPL_SCO 0.071 -0.026 -0.038 -0.023*** -0.004 0.110 -0.019 -0.014* 
(0.221) (0.292) (0.062) (0.000) (0.325) (0.092) (0.067) (0.045) 
SPL_EMP -0.574 -0.025 0.337** -1.45e-4 0.019 0.224 0.014 -
0.227*** 
(0.109) (0.870) (0.008) (0.995) (0.389) (0.581) (0.839) (0.000) 
SPL_INC 0.403 0.145 0.378* -0.012 -0.168*** -0.243 -0.091 -0.001 
(0.337) (0.412) (0.012) (0.676) (0.000) (0.609) (0.253) (0.988) 
SPL_LAPR 0.057* 0.028* -0.017 -0.007*** -0.004* 0.194*** -0.012* -0.006 
(0.30) (0.012) (0.072) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.018) (0.057) 
SPL_GDP -0.364** 0.063 0.114* -2.88e-4 -0.021* -0.549*** 0.087*** 2.34e-4 
(0.005) (0.256) (0.014) (0.975) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.989) 
SPL_MIG -0.446 0.038 0.067 0.027 -0.153*** -0.601 -0.043 -0.071* 
(0.112) (0.748) (0.505) (0.174) (0.000) (0.058) (0.417) (0.042) 
N 3598 3598 3598 3598 3598 3598 3598 3598 
R² 0.428 0.794 0.714 0.714 0.596 0.159 0.944 0.278 
















(T-1) LFT LOVN LSCO LEMPLL LINC LLAPR LGDP LMIG 
LGRW 0.491*** -0.002** 0.001 1.84e-4 5.87e-5 -3.28e-4 0.001** -1.30e-4 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.265) (0.075) (0.521) (0.843) (0.008) (0.477) 
LOVN 
 
-0.226 0.759*** -0.038*** 0.002 0.003 0.100** 0.008 0.005** 
(0.440) (0.000) (0.000) (0.212) (0.109) (0.001) (0.134) (0.143) 
LSCO 
 
-0.325 -0.037* 0.732*** 0.002 0.005 -0.048 0.002 0.012* 
(0.448) (0.031) (0.000) (0.582) (0.064) (0.291) (0.744) (0.021) 
LEMPL 
 
1.946 -0.151 -0.030 0.524*** -0.007 0.231 -0.106** 0.029 
(0.401) (0.098) (0.701) (0.000) (0.598) (0.348) (0.010) (0.281) 
LINC 
 
2.570 -0.021 0.020 0.113*** 0.626*** 0.261 0.059 0.145*** 
(0.345) (0.843) (0.823) (0.000) (0.000) 0.365 (0.218) (0.000) 
LLAPR  -0.358* -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.270*** -0.003 -2.53e-5 
(0.023) (0.785) (0.680) (0.443) (0.078) (0.000) (0.259) (0.989) 
LGDP -2.365** 0.033 0.044 0.025*** -0.006 -0.207** 0.670*** 0.031*** 
(0.001) (0.250) (0.069) (0.000) (0.155) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
LMIG -0.857 0.024 -0.015 0.005 -0.022* 0.003 -0.080** 0.375*** 
(0.557) (0.675) (0.763) (0.641) (0.011) (0.983) (0.002) (0.000) 
SPL_GRW 0.068 -0.001 -0.001 2.418e-4 9.06e-6 -0.006* -1.27e-4 2.01e-4 
(0.002) (0.465) (0.329) (0.095) (0.943) (0.015) (0.743) (0.431) 
SPL_OVN -0.057 -0.011 -0.011 0.004 0.002 -0.185*** -0.016 -0.001 
(0.907) (0.582) (0.501) (0.193) (0.460) (0.000) (0.059) (0.901) 
SPL_SCO 
 
0.671 -0.012 -0.020 -0.021*** -0.005 0.090 -0.019 -0.017* 
(0.262) (0.603) (0.319) (0.000) (0.126) (0.157) (0.079) (0.017) 
SPL_EMP 
 
-7.695* -0.082 0.249 -4.349e-5 0.025 0.236 0.023 -0.226*** 
(0.043) (0.584) (0.051) (0.999) (0.255) (0.559) (0.731) (0.000) 
SPL_INC 0.038 0.154 0.424** -0.012 -0.170*** -0.254 -0.094 -1.99e-4 
(0.993) (0.385) (0.005) (0.698) (0.000) (0.593) (0.235) (0.997) 
SPL_LAPR 0.446* 0.027* -0.011 -0.007*** -0.004* 0.192*** -0.012* -0.006 
(0.101) (0.015) (0.229) (0.000) (0.010)** (0.000) (0.015) (0.058) 
SPL_GDP -1.815 0.021 0.056 -0.003 -0.015* -0.514*** 0.083*** 0.006 
(0.173) (0.61) (0.213) (0.699) (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) (0.644) 
SPL_MIG -6.019* 0.028 0.018 0.025 -0.151*** -0.558 -0.036 -0.071* 
(0.044) (0.814) (0.858) (0.205) (0.000) (0.078) (0.490) (0.040) 
N 3598 3598 3598 3598 3598 3598 3598 3598 
R² 0.259 0.794 0.711 0.714 0.596 0.160 0.944 0.278 
Notes: Number of Regions = 257, P-values are given in parentheses. Significance codes: *** p<0.001 **p<0.01, 




Table A2.3: Panel Granger Causality Test (lag =1) 
 
 
Figure A2.1 Regional subsamples used for the region‐specific SpVAR analyses. SpVAR, spatial vector autoregressive
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CAUSES 






















LFT x x - - - - 5.647 0.000 7.805 0.000 12.25 0.000 -2.70 0.007 0.821 0.411 -0.40 0.689 6.666 0.000 
LGRW - - x x - - 1.679 0.093 2.983 0.003 4.114 0.000 -0.36 0.717 2.066 0.039 -0.26 0.788 1.309 0.191 
LUDP - - - - x x 6.102 0.000 3.618 0.000 8.631 0.000 0.638 0.524 2.545 0.011 -1.53 0.125 2.513 0.012 
LOVN 11.76 0.000 7.962 0.000 7.217 0.000 x x 11.16 0.000 25.89 0.000 0.054 0.957 3.086 0.002 2.259 0.024 18.14 0.000 
LSCO 5.24 0.000 3.079 0.002 5.776 0.000 16.42 0.000 x x 21.39 0.000 2.808 0.005 2.424 0.015 5.93 0.000 6.174 0.000 
LEMPL 1.61 0.107 -1.39 0.163 -1.18 0.237 6.359 0.000 9.565 0.000 x x 8.891 0.000 0.555 0.579 5.961 0.000 19.31 0.000 
LINC -0.02 0.977 -2.34 0.019 -1.38 0.166 3.782 0.000 4.304 0.000 3.863 0.000 x x 0.773 0.439 9.307 0.000 7.561 0.000 
LLAPR 1.08 0.279 1.889 0.059 1.659 0.097 4.348 0.000 2.769 0.006 5.994 0.000 1.953 0.051 x x 1.135 0.257 1.661 0.096 
LGDP 17.0 0.000 12.39 0.000 10.59 0.000 25.41 0.000 9.617 0.000 29.73 0.000 -4.89 0.000 10.64 0.000 x x 10.29 0.000 
LMIG 1.13 0.255 -1.32 0.186 -0.54 0.584 3.158 0.002 2.441 0.015 6.392 0.000 3.301 0.001 -6.85 0.493 -1.41 0.158 x x 
Note: Granger Causality Test is performed for every region, test as given in Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012). Alternative hypothesis = Granger causality given 





Figure A2.2: Full impulse responses to isolated fiscal transfer shocks based on SpVar estimation with fiscal 
transfer inputs in total subsample. Graph specification equal Figure 2.3 
 
 







Figure A2.4: Full impulse responses to isolated variable shocks on regional net migration rates based on SpVar 










3. Measuring the regional, multifaceted, direct and indirect Effects of European 
Cohesion Policies  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  This paper was submitted for publication in the Journal of Regional Science (11.02.2021). The 
paper is co-authored by Thomas Brenner. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract: European structural and investment funds (ESIF’s) are the European Union’s main 
instrument for ensuring spatially equitable and sustainable regional development in its member 
states. The efficacy of these funds is a multi-billion-dollar issue and of great interest to policy 
makers from the European Commission to local governments. The paper complements the 
existing literature by applying an advanced econometric method to study the multifaceted, 
direct and indirect regional effects of three ESI-funds at European NUTS-2 level based on panel 
data estimations for 258 European regions and the years from 2007 to 2017. We test the efficacy 
of the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund separately on regional indicators of economic growth 
and on regional migration rates, using a spatial panel vector-autoregressive (SpVAR) model 
considering time-lagged effects and indirect effects between the variables in the economic 
system. Furthermore, we analyze if effects depend on regional characteristics such as regional 
economic strength. 
We find evidence that the ERDF can support economic growth by having positive effects on 
employment growth, regional productivity growth and growth of household incomes, especially 
in less developed regions, while ESF and Cohesion Fund do not reveal overall robust effects. 
We do not find significant effects of all three funds on regional migration rate changes, which 
is used as a proxy indicator for the development of living conditions that are not measurable by 
economic indicators. 
Keywords: European regional policy, Cohesion Funds, economic growth, employment, 
migration, SpVAR, impulse response functions 





European regions experience heterogeneous recent economic, social and political development 
trends that cause asymmetric living conditions and development challenges throughout Europe. 
These regional disparities, especially between eastern and western, but also between northern 
and southern European regions, have arisen as a remnant of Europe’s historic development. 
Moreover, disparities between dynamic metropolitan core areas that pull skill-intensive high 
wage jobs and less prosperous and declining peripheral and rural areas are getting more intense 
in many countries in recent years (Charron, 2016). A third thread of challenges for Europe’s 
regional development arises from the aftermath of the economic crisis from 2008 onwards 
whose consequences are still noticeable particularly in southern European countries, as well as 
the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Hence, the European Union is confronted with major structural inequalities that determine 
economic dynamics and citizens living standards, such as employment opportunities, personal 
incomes or access to education, social and health-care infrastructure and public services. In the 
recent literature, the outcome of regional inequalities is discussed as the geography of 
discontent (Dijkstra et al., 2020). Inequalities are accused of threatening economic development 
and political stability by triggering rising nationalist parties, especially in more remote and 
declining areas, resulting in mistrust in politics that caused for example the Brexit vote in 2016, 
which has a strong impact on the future development of Europe (Iammarino et al., 2019; 
Dijkstra et al., 2020). 
Regional Cohesion Policy addressing social and economic convergence is a key issue in the 
EUs development strategy. European Structural and Investment Funds (henceforth ESIFs) aim 
to reduce economic and social disparities as well as to improve economic competitiveness and 
citizens’ living standards by reallocating financial resources predominantly to less developed 




ESIFs to ensure a balanced development, while at the same time not undermining total welfare 
by reallocating production factors to less productive regions (Fiaschi et al., 2018). This conflict 
is often declared as a trade-off from spatial development policies (Glaeser, 2011; Storper, 
2011). It implies that policy measures can be efficacious in terms of convergence among regions 
by enhancing economic growth, creating jobs or improving quality of life in a less developed 
region, while being not necessarily efficient, if the same expenses would create more positive 
outcomes in more developed regions. Hence, there is a need to distinguish between efficacy 
and efficiency of Cohesion Policy. By targeting regional convergence, Cohesion Policies have 
to be efficacious in promoting local factors towards convergence, while macroeconomic 
efficiency in terms of creating maximum output is subordinate. Further research on the efficacy 
of cohesion-oriented policy needs to provide new insights into policy mechanisms, since the 
European Commission aims to setup more result-based and more efficient Cohesion Policy in 
order to maximize outcomes in the forthcoming program period 2021 – 2027 (European 
Commission, 2018).  
Since the Treaty of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty) identifies three development 
objectives: Economic, social and territorial cohesion (European Union, 2012), policy evaluation 
should not be limited to economic growth measures, but should also assess effects on the social 
dimension, although all policies are primarily economic policies (Ferrara et al., 2020). Barca 
(2009) points out that improving the people’s well-being and living standards is the ultimate 
goal of Cohesion Policy. Iammarino et al. (2020) emphasize the role of regional and local living 
conditions apart from economic conditions as gateways for building personal capacities and 
personal freedom to participate in society and economy. Studies that examine non-economic 
outcome of Cohesion Funds are underrepresented in quantitative research and limited to Ferrara 




objectives - economic growth and non-economic regional development– and gains new insights 
into the contribution of ESIF investments to these factors. 
For this purpose, we investigate the effects of the three strands of the Cohesion Policy 
Framework (European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF) and 
Cohesion Fund). Our flexible spatial vector autoregressive estimation approach (henceforth: 
SpVAR) is able to represent the complex and interdependent regional dynamics triggered by 
policy measures using simultaneous equations and considering indirect funding effects between 
variables through various transmission channels and has not been used yet in the context of 
European Cohesion Policy. Our paper contributes to the existing research by emphasizing the 
variety of effects on regional outputs of ESIF policy measures, namely public investment rate, 
employment, GDP growth, household income and regional net migration rates. We find 
evidence, that the ERDF works towards economic convergence by having positive effects on 
employment, GDP and household income growth, while ESF effects are limited to income 
effects in Eastern Europe and the Cohesion fund only affects regional migration rates in a 
significant matter. 
The paper starts with a brief presentation of the investigated policies in Section 3.2, while 
section 3.3 provides an overview of related existing research on European Cohesion Policy 
efficacy. Research hypotheses, variable selection and the econometric model setup are 
discussed in section 3.4 and 3.5. Our empirical results are given in section 3.6. Section 3.7 
concludes. 
3.2 Cohesion Policy Framework  
Cohesion Policy is a solidarity framework aiming at interregional convergence across Europe. 
Strong economies within the EU redistribute a part of their wealth to less developed regions to 




Europe 2020 strategy. The individual policies within the framework target several dimensions 
of regional development in funded regions: Productivity and competitiveness of the local 
economy, in particular sustainable development, combating unemployment, inequalities and 
economic discrimination (European Commission, 2015). However, it is widely accepted that 
the objective of European cohesion is not equal to perfect convergence across regions. 
The ESIF consist of five specific funds with individual objectives that interact complementary 
to a holistic policy framework. Out of these, the ERDF, the ESF and the Cohesion Fund are 
investigated in this paper. We would have liked the European Agricultural for Rural 
Development (EAFRD), but the used dataset reveals inconsistencies that mainly concern the 
year 2014 and analyses with this limited dataset show no significant effects of the policy. The 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) is not an actual regional development fund. 
The detailed individual specifications indicate that the outcome is supposed to vary between 
policies, which provides a specific interest in analyzing the individual mechanisms of the funds 
in separate analysis. Funding details are presented in Table 3.1, the spatial distribution of 
funding intensity is displayed in Figure 3.1.  
The fund allocation is based on the classification of regions into categories based on their GDP 
level per inhabitant that alters by funding period. Policy strategies, management and 
implementations are organized individually by the member countries under supervision of the 
European Committee through partnership-agreements (until 2013: “National Strategic 
Reference Frameworks”), which allows countries to pursue individual goals within the 
cohesion framework, but implies that policy efficacy and efficiency may be heterogeneous on 
country level. Funds are designed to serve as a catalyst for further capital investments in the 
regions by requiring co-financing of received subsidies by recipient countries and creating 
incentives for further private investments, due to improved local infrastructure or business 





Table 3.1: Overview on ESIF funding objectives 
Fund Major Objectives Average annual 
amount (2007 – 2017)* 
Remarks 
ERDF Economic growth, regional 
competitiveness, employment, 
innovation, entrepreneurship, research & 
technological development, sustainable 
transformations & green growth  
20.8 bn € The majority of funds is 
directly paid to supported 
firms (especially SMEs).  
ESF Employment growth, human capital 
development & job training, inclusive 
labor market accessibility, fight against 
poverty risks, social exclusion and 
discrimination 
8.77 bn € A restructuring of fund design 
into ESF+ for the new funding 
period starting in 2021 is 
under negotiations. 
CF  (technical) infrastructure development, 
in particular (trans-European) transport 
and energy infrastructure, environment 
protection, climate change adaption, 
enhance institutional capacities of public 
administrations and authorities  
8.18 bn € Funding is limited to 
countries with a gross 
national product below 90% 
of the EU average level. 
References: (European Union, 2013a; 2013b; 2013c). * Modelled annual expenditures published by the 
European Commission. 
3.3 Related studies  
Given the total amount spent on Cohesion Policy, it is not surprising that various econometric 
studies examine its economic impact. However, the results do not yet reach any consensus and 
depend on model specifications, time-period, regional sample (EU15 or EU27) and the regional 






Figure 3.1: Average annual Cohesion policy funding intensity (Modelled annual expenditures) 2007 – 2017 per 
fund. Data source: Lo Piano et al. (2018) 
 
Hagen and Mohl (2009) provide an older comprehensive summary on econometric ex-post 
studies that find mixed effects of policy interventions on economic growth between 1981 and 
2005. The authors outline that most of these studies show conditional positive policy effects, 
but argue that all methods used have some empirical drawbacks.  
The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 changed the situation dramatically, as the new member 
countries increase inequalities, bring further variety of economic and institutional preconditions 
and now receive a major share of the funds. Although some time has passed since the 
enlargement, most recent studies still concentrate on the EU15 countries. Pieńkowski & 
Berkowitz (2016) provide an extensive summary on econometric Cohesion Policy analysis 
studies up to 2015, studies published later are shown in Table 3.2. The majority of these studies 
find positive impact of the ESIF on economic growth, but differ widely in terms of 





Table 3.2: Comparison of recent econometric studies measuring Cohesion Policy efficiency 
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NUTS-2 GDP/worker Positive effects on growth in 
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effectiveness over time. 
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Moreover, a strand of studies discusses the Cohesion Policy effects on individual countries and 
regions. For example, Guia (2017) finds positive effects on regional employment in Italian 
regions, Fortuna et al. (2016) conclude that loosing Cohesion funds would cause a GDP and 
consumption drop on the Azores, Medeiros (2017) finds positive effects on environmental 
sustainability and governmental, but not on economic cohesion in Spanish regions. 
In contrast to earlier research, a relevant share of more recent studies increasingly focuses on 
the essential finding, that policy effectiveness is heterogeneous and location-dependent 
(Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015; Crescenzi & Guia, 2020). This results in different findings 
across member states and types of regions. Reasons for this conditionality are suspected in 
national policy implementations due to partnership agreements as well as in heterogenous 
administrative and institutional capacities that are determined by local economic, social and 
natural conditions and the quality of government and local institutions (Ederveen, de Groot & 
Nahuis, 2006; Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015; Fratesi & Wishlade, 2017; Dotti, 2016). 
Moreover, the differing economic structure across European regions creates preconditions that 
are expected to cause different reactions to policy interventions and require customized 
solutions. Therefore, conditionality of funding effects is an important part of our analysis.  
Recently, Ferrara et al. (2020) and Rodriguez-Pose and Dijkstra (2020) added a new thread to 
the literature considering for the first time social and socioeconomic effects of Cohesion Policy. 
The former address regional well-being by creating a well-being indicator that is based on a 
number of objective regional measures such as individual income, education & health care. 
They find a positive relationship between ERDF & ESF funding and growth of regional well-







3.4 Theoretical considerations and research hypotheses 
Although Cohesion Policy aims to support structural lagging regions to start an economic 
catching-up process that enables future income and career opportunities in a region (European 
Commission, 2017), regional economic growth is not necessarily equal to growth of the 
citizens’ individual well-being that depends on various personal circumstances, such as the 
individual employment status, job satisfaction, income, housing situation, quality of health care 
& public services, education infrastructure and further residential amenities. Since the treaty of 
the European Union mentions economic cohesion in line with the objectives of social and 
territorial cohesion, efficient cohesion policy should have positive impact on all these 
dimensions (European Union, 2012). In consequence, a measure of the effectiveness of 
European Cohesion policy should consider multiple regional outcome variables. Therefore, we 
have developed the research questions Is European cohesion policy efficacious in terms of 
regional economic development and individually perceived quality of life?  
Neoclassical growth theory is often used to explain the impact of public investments on regional 
growth in a specific region (Dall'Erba & Fang, 2017; Eberle et al., 2019). Starting with the 
extended neoclassical regional production function from Mankiw et al. (1992) (MRW-Model), 
the economic output Y from a region i at time t is defined as: 




where K and H are physical and human capital stocks, A denotes the technology level and L 
represents the regional labor supply. α and ß are coefficients describing the returns to both types 
of capital with α + ß <1, under the assumption of decreasing returns to capital. Both types of 
capital depreciate at the same rate. A and L grow at an exogenous rate, where labor supply 
equals the working-age population. In a spatially augmented MRW-model, Lopez-Baso et al. 




technology level of neighboring regions that spill over into the regional economy, which causes 
interdependencies between regions.  
Following Crihfield et al.’s (1995) extension to this model, which allows for distinguishing 
between private and public capital, capital investments from Cohesion Policy should work as 
exogenous shocks on (public) physical capital stocks. While the ERDF & CF mainly focus on 
physical capital investments, the ESF mainly invests in human capital resources. All policies 
therefore enhance the regional steady state output 𝑌𝑖𝑡 and support further capital accumulation. 
Considering the marginal product of private capital, decreasing returns cause that benefits are 
higher for regions with a low initial capital stock. In consequence, economies with similar 
economic conditions converge towards a common steady state income level (ß-convergence), 
with low-income regions growing faster than high-income regions (Durlauf et al., 2005). 
Additionally, economic market integration and free trade due to EU-membership should align 
the economic condition and strengthen convergence throughout Europe. Barro (2012) argues 
that this would render the need for Cohesion Policy superfluous. In practice, however, short-
term convergence without regional policy interventions is not realistic, since income 
inequalities originate in persistent local factors that determine the regions absorptive capacity 
such as infrastructure, production factor endowments (resources and knowledge capacities) and 
quality of local institutions, which cannot simply converge (Pienkowski & Berkowitz, 2016).  
While in neoclassical models growth is limited to the new steady state levels, we argue that 
technology level is not necessarily exogenous, but can be strengthened by R&D and human 
capital investments as emphasized by endogenous growth models (Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995). 
Therefore, we argue that policy measures including investments in R&D should have long-term 
effects on economic output. Furthermore, the new economic geography framework (Krugman, 
1991; Fujita et al., 1999) points out that regional economic development benefits from 




accessibility and local conditions for economic development, which may possibly stimulate 
further private sector investments. This leads to hypothesis 1: 
H1: Public investments from Cohesion Policy increase regional (public) capital stocks which 
stimulate (short-time) regional economic growth (steady state shift) and result in increasing 
outputs and employment rates; Long-term growth depends on investments in technology and 
infrastructure. 
The mentioned theoretical approaches do not directly suggest expectations regarding the 
population’s participation in economic growth, growth of regional living standards and well-
being. We consider average disposable household income as an important indicator for material 
living conditions. Following the MRW-Model, at a given population, labor supply remains 
constant. However, the output growth due to public investment assumed in H1 is an exogenous 
shock increasing labor demand that should result in rising wages, at least in the long-run and 
have positive effects on disposable household incomes by reducing unemployment. 
H2: If H1 (GDP and employment growth) applies, public funds cause increasing wages and 
primary incomes. 
Assessing non-economic outcome of policy interventions, we face the lack of comprehensive 
social or socioeconomic regional data and the absence of a common indicator to measure 
regional quality of life and well-being and the individual perception of well-being. Hence, 
different approaches appeared in similar studies. First well-being and happiness scores provide 
information about the individual perception of well-being. However, Bond & Lang (2019) 
argue that this produces systematic errors and are not necessarily comparable across countries 
and in time, as people tend to adapt to new living conditions. Second, studies such as Ferrara et 




these indices tend to be biased due to the authors variable selection and cannot possibly reflect 
the individual dimension of well-being. 
Faggian et al. (2012) use regional net-migration rates as a proxy indicator of regional well-
being based on the hypothesis that regions with below-average living conditions experience 
out-migration and vice versa. We enhance this to an explicitly dynamic context in which 
Cohesion Policy that successfully improves the quality of life in a region, should increase 
regional net migration rates by creating incentives to either stay in a region or move into a 
region. Pfaffermayr (2012) models net immigration ξ in a number of regions (𝑦1 … , 𝑦𝑁) as: 
 
ξ(y1 … , yN) ≈ κ [(yi − yi





In this formula, yi − yi
∗denotes the difference of the regional income to the regions steady 
state income, mij represents exogenous spatial weights that represent the fact that short-distance 
migration between neighbouring regions appears to be more likely and decreases with distance, 
due to financial and social migration costs. The constant parameter κ denotes the sensivity to 
migrate at a given spatially weighted income differential (Pfaffermayr, 2012). 
Thus, a regional net migration rate highly depends on the regions income level. However, 
Rodriguez-Pose & Ketterer (2012), Faggian et al. (2012) and Wardenburg & Brenner (2020) 
argue that individual migration decisions do not only depend on economic considerations, but 
also on regional natural and cultural amenities that determine the individual well-being, such 
as the weather, local infrastructure, availability of public services and public goods, education, 
health care and other individual preferences. Thus, dynamic changes in the net migration rates 
also reflect the development of regional non-economic amenities and emphasize individually 
weighted demands and preferences of economic welfare and non-economic well-being and 
become a reasonable indicator for the development of the individually perceived regional 




out-migration from structurally lagging regions. By concentrating on a dynamic setting, the 
initial level of in- or out-migration is not relevant. The same applies to migration frictions, 
assuming them to be constant for every region. 
H3: Public investment in the regional quality of life, especially in public goods and services, 
should lead to increasing net migration rates, especially to reduced outward migration from 
economically lagging regions. 
At least it should be mentioned that migration and growth are not independent. Population 
growth cannot be handled as exogenous in modelling economic growth, since it is directly 
affected by net migration. Net migration brings additional output capacities and development 
potentials by enhancing labor supply and human capital within a region, while regions with 
negative net migration suffer from brain-drain dynamics. On the other hand, immigration 
should decrease the labor-capital ratio and returns to human capital, which negatively affects 
labor productivity. 
3.5 Econometric strategy  
The search for new quantitative methods to best measure the outcome of Cohesion Policy is an 
ongoing debate in this field resulting in various approaches (see Table 3.2). We decided to test 
our hypotheses with a flexible recursive dynamic spatial vector-autoregressive model (SpVar) 
that is not used in this context before and is becoming increasingly popular in policy analysis 
for several reasons. The SpVar is able to investigate short-time policy effects on various output 
variables, while controlling for the mutual endogeneity among variables and considering 
indirect effects between variables in the regional economic system over time through other 
transmission channels. Thus, we overcome the common problem of econometric policy analysis 
that not perfectly exogenous controls or instruments that are affected by the policy itself bias 




(1980) approach on time-series forecasting, enhanced for the use of panel data estimations by 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and allows to build dynamic regression designs that are able to 
represent that the outcome effects are time-lagged to the funding input and enables to visualize 
relationships and temporal dynamics between variables via associated impulse response 
functions.  
We basically follow the econometric SpVAR estimation strategy used in comparable research 
settings (Mitze et al., 2018; Eberle et al., 2019). Therefore, we specify a dynamic simultaneous 
panel equation system with M (=6) equations, in which every variable in the system appears as 
dependent variable once, depending on lagged values of all variables in the system. Variable 
selection is based on theoretical considerations from Section 3.4, including regional capital, 
labor, output productivity, primary income and migration. Information on used variables are 
given in Section 3.5.2. The reduced form VAR can be written in its aggregated form as follows 
(Rickman, 2010; Mitze et al., 2018): 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  A𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + εit  (3.3) 
where A is a M*M size matrix of regression coefficients that describes the relationship 𝑦𝑖𝑡 to 
the time-lagged variables in the system. The choice of one-year lags is based on the Akaike-
Criterion. The use of individual fixed effects (𝜇𝑖) considers strong regional heterogeneity 
controlling for time-invariant preconditions across the EU. In addition, heterogeneous 
economic dynamics should be considered, especially during and after the economic crisis 
beginning in 2008/2009. Thus, pooling all regional units into standard invariant time-fixed 
effects (𝜏𝑡) can thus not adequately capture this heterogeneity. To address this problem, we 
cluster all regions into four more homogenous development groups (g) and estimate four 
separate group specific time-fixed effects (𝜏𝑡𝑔). Two parameters are used for the grouping: First 
the GDP level in 2007 to obtain an exogenous measure of economic strength and the GDP 




group the regions as follows: (1) If both GDP and growth rates are below the median; (2) If 
their economic strength is above median, but growth rates below median; (3) If GDP level is 
below median, but growth rates above the median and (4) if both values are above the median 
level. The groups are displayed in Figure 3.2. The time fixed effects are added to equation (3.3):   
  𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡𝑔 +  𝐴𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + εit . (3.4) 
Several further adjustments must be made to the unrestricted reduced model presented in 
equation (3.4): To consider the impact of spatial externalities on the regression results, we 
include additional independent spatial lag variables to calculate unbiased coefficients in A as 
follows (Beenstock & Felsenstein, 2007): 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  μ𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡𝑔 +  A𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐻𝑊𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + εit . (3.5) 
In this equation, the supplementary M*M coefficient matrix H represents coefficients of 
variables lagged in space and time, representing possible spatial spillover from neighboring 
regions. W is an identity spatial weight matrix that is constant over equations and time, with 
𝑊𝑖𝑗 = 1 if regions have a common border (Spatial-Durbin-model). In the case of remaining 
island regions in the dataset (Greek Islands, Baleares, Sardinia, Sicilia), we define the nearest 
regions as neighboring regions. Comparing model fits confirms, that using an identity weight 
matrix is more efficient for our data than computing spatial lags based on inverse-distance 
weighting.  
As Elhorst (2012) points out different estimators are feasible to estimate dynamic panel models. 
Since dynamic OLS-fixed effects estimators are known to be biased if t is small (Nickell, 1981), 
different techniques have been proposed. GMM estimators are common to dynamic panels. 
However, they are very sensitive to incorrect or weak instruments and categorization of 




Figure 3.2: Regional classification into subgroups used for groupwise estimation of time fixed-effects 
Hsiao et al. (2002) propose a quasi-maximum-likelihood estimator including fixed effects that 
is found to be consistent in the case of heterogeneous individuals in the estimation. However, 
we find QMLs estimations to perform weak in our estimation context if independent variables 
are not clearly exogenous. This is the case, since spatial lags of all variables are considered in 
the estimation (Beenstock & Felsenstein, 2007). Similar problems appear for bootstrap 
corrected OLS estimators (Kiviet, 1995; Everaert & Pozzi, 2007) since the authors clarify that 
exogeneity of dependent variables is a necessary precondition. As t is not considerably small 
(=10), we argue, that the OLS-FE indicator is still not unbiased, but more robust than alternative 
estimators.  
However, these considerations and restrictions make robustness checks essential. In order to 




GMM estimation (see Blundell & Bond, 1998) with further lags of the dependent and 
independent variables as instrument variables, with collapsed instruments. To ensure the 
stability of the IRF-process, the variable calculation is slightly different in this robustness 
check. Furthermore, due to the GMM functionality ordinary time-fixed instead of grouped 
effects are used for GMM estimation. 
3.5.1 Impulse response functions 
In a next step, we estimate associated IRFs that visualize the relationship between an orthogonal 
uncorrelated shock in one variable to the other variables in the system that includes indirect 
effects between variables over time based on the coefficients from A. However, treating all 
variables as completely endogenous as in (3.5) causes over-parametrization of the error-term 
that leads to biased IRFs (Di Giacinto, 2010; Rickman, 2010). Following Rickman (2010), we 
define a structural VAR with a-priori recursive causal ordering of the variables based on 
assumptions towards ascending endogeneity corresponding to (3.5) as follows:  
 𝐵𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  μ𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡𝑔 +  C𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐻𝑊𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + Dεit  (3.6) 
where B includes contemporaneous structural parameters, C is a coefficient matrix similar to A 
and D is a diagonal matrix linking uncorrelated exogenous shocks in εt to the endogenous 
variables. We restrict contemporaneous effects from right to left (more endogenous to more 
exogenous) performing a Choleski-Decomposition to the variance-covariance matrix of the 
variance-covariance matrix as proposed by Lütkepohl (2005). We then apply the moving 
average representation of C in which 𝐶𝑧 represents the effects of one unit shock after z time-
steps (Lütkepohl, 2005). This means that, although we display the development of responses to 
shocks over years in the IRFs, this is the direct and indirect replication based on the short-term 
(year to year) estimates from the structural VAR model with a one-year time lag. Finally, we 




estimation is performed with similar, randomly generated same-size datasets in which regions 
are drawn from the original data set (with reclines) with all their original attributes (500 
repetitions). The initial exogenous shock is hold constant over repetitions.  
3.5.2  Data and variables 
To test our hypotheses, we investigate the impacts of ERDF, ESF and the Cohesion Fund on 
NUTS-2 level in the period 2007 – 2017, which allows to consider effects for 258 regions in all 
EU27 countries, including the member states that joined in 2004 and 2007. We use the open 
policy Dataset “Historic EU payments – regionalized and modelled” provided by the European 
Commission with latest updates from May 2020. This data includes all annual expenditures by 
policy and funding period at NUTS-2 level. In our analysis, we aggregate the total annual 
amount of subsidies regardless of the funding period they belong to, so that total annual 
expenditures may include projects from different funding periods. However, the use of annual 
payments within calendar years is somehow problematic for policy evaluation, as they become 
effective at a later date. Depending on the specific projects this can happen rather quickly or, in 
the case of complex infrastructure construction several years later. To address this problem, we 
use the model-based measure “modelled annual expenditure” that models the funding that 
becomes effective on the ground in the specific year instead of payment. Details on the 
modelling approach are given by Lo Piano et al. (2018). However, the complexity of funded 
projects raises some doubt whether a one-year time lag is enough to measure the majority of 
outcomes of those subsidies, especially if the subsidies become effective at the end of the year. 
Therefore, we also estimated the model with an additional one-year time-lag on the policy 
variable. The results will be presented in Section 3.6.  
We integrate regional variables based on the theoretical assumptions, namely the regional 
private sector investment rate, as a proxy for private physical capital investments and regional 




productivity as a measure for economic growth and regional competitiveness as a major goal 
of Cohesion Policy. To test H2 and H3, we include primary incomes of private households and 




where 𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡 denotes net migration as the difference between all immigrants and emigrants to a 
region and POP is the region’s population. In case of balanced migration its value will be 1, if 
in-migration exceeds out-migration the variable is larger. This transformation avoids negative 
values and ensures the possibility to use the logarithm form (Mitze, 2019).  
Due to lack of data, we have not been able to include additional national public or regional 
development funds, which may be further sources of economic growth or regional development 
within European regions. We decided to omit further variables that may influence the 
socioeconomic system in order to limit the number of variables, which would reduce the 
degrees of freedom of the SpVAR model and cause further endogeneity problems. This is 
mainly the technological progress, but also socio-economic variables that may affect the 
migration rates. Our model is explicitly dynamic which means that more or less constant 
regional factors such as natural conditions and geographic location do not influence the 
dynamic development of the regional factors studied.  
Detailed use of variables and data sources are displayed in Table 3.3. The majority of data was 
obtained from the Eurostat database. In some cases, we had to supplement missing data by data 
from the OECD statistics database. This applies for France and Poland and results from 
problems with NUTS-2 reorganizations within the time period that complicates to build up a 
continuous panel data set. For the same reason, we had to merge the regions within Ireland and 
Lithuania to their NUTS-1 shape. In the special cases of London, Budapest and Warsaw, that 




Table 3.3: Variable descriptions and data sources 
Acronym Variable Description Data Source 
POL Policy Input (either ERDF, ESF or Cohesion Fund) in relation to 
regional GDP  




INVQ Gross Capital Investment Rate 
[Gross Capital Investment/GDP in € 
Eurostat 
GDP: Eurostat/OECD 
EMPL Employment rate of economically active population  
[Employees total /Population aged 15 to 64 years]  
Eurostat 
GDP Nominal gross-domestic product per capita 
 
[GDP in €/population] 
Eurostat/OECD 
INC Primary income of private households 
[Primary income of private households/population] 
Eurostat/OECD 
MIG Regional net migration rate 
[Net migration as a function of population as defined in equation (7) ]  
Eurostat 
 
boundaries with 2 (London) and 1 (Budapest, Warsaw) regions. We also omitted several regions 
from the dataset to improve the reliability of the analysis. First, we did not include oversea 
territories and islands that are more than 500 km away from the European continent or 
geographically belong to another continent (including the Canary Islands, Madeira, the Azores, 
Cyprus and the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla) due to their different economic 
structure and limited migration possibilities. Malta had to be omitted due to poor data quality. 
Croatia cannot be part of the analysis as its EU accession only took place in 2013, Great Britain 
is still part of the analysis. Finally, we work with a balanced and reliable data set covering 11 
years and 258 regions. All variables are used in their natural logarithm form. Zeros are replaced 
by very small numbers before transformation. The SpVAR models fail if non-stationarity is 
given in any variable. The results from the corresponding IPS-test (Im et al., 2005) are displayed 




Table 3.4: Variable summary statistics  
Acronym Observations Min 1.Quarter Mean 3. Quarter Max Std. Dev. 
ERDF 2838 -18.421 -8.661 -7.142 -5.314 -2.504 2.018 
ESF 2838 -18.421 -8.470 -7.494 -6.289 -3.958 1.600 
CF 2838 -18.421 -18.421 -14.228 -6.412 -3.256 6.012 
INVQ 2838 -2.546 -1.709 -1.577 -1.450 -0.507 0.221 
EMPL 2838 -0.944 -0.491 -0.422 -0.323 -0.187 0.127 
GDP 2838 8.392 10.165 10.463 10.857 12.014 0.609 
GDP_detr 2838 8.352 10.178 10.358 10.730 11.880 0.629 
INC 2838 7.492 9.347 9.636 10.056 10.899 0.615 
INC_detr 2838 7.373 9.422 9.571 9.975 10.763 0.634 
MIG 2838 -0.026 -0.001 0.003 0.005 0.054 0.005 
        
To overcome this problem, a linear detrending is applied to the concerned variables. Table 3.4 
provides summary statistics of all variables. 
The use of NUTS-2 regions brings several advantages and shortcomings to the analysis. First, 
the measurement of economic and socioeconomic effects that take place at a more local level 
is imprecise at such a large regional scale. The use of the migration indicator on NUTS-2 
regions may not be optimal, as a significant part of personal relocations are not noticed in the 
data because they take place within these regions, especially if prosperous core regions and 
economic lagging regions or urban and peripheral regions belong to the same NUTS-2 region. 
If people live in countries that consist out of just one NUTS-2 region (e.g. Latvia), they have to 
leave/enter the country to be present in the migration statistics. In such cases, migration barriers 
(language, culture, social and monetary costs) are substantially larger than at a more local level. 
On the opposite, the NUTS-2 scale is the regional level which defines regional eligibility for 
funding in the European regulations. Another advantage is that we are able to measure effects 
with a wider geographical scope. Policy funding should provide incentives to trigger further 
public and private investments into the region and potentially cause direct and indirect 
spillovers on the local and regional scale. However, the pragmatic reason for using NUTS-2 




funds for interregional infrastructure projects (e.g. freeways) cannot be assigned to NUTS-3 
regions in a reliable way. 
In contrast to many existing studies, we are able to distinguish between policies. Moreover, 
considering regional conditionality, we conduct our analysis additionally on selected 
subsamples of the dataset to obtain a further understanding of which economic preconditions 
lead to more effective policy implementation. For this purpose, we divide the regions in the 
dataset following the European commission’s official regional development classification that 
defines the eligibility of funding levels. This status is based on the on the regional GDP per 
capita on NUTS-2 level in comparison to the EU average: Regions are classified as less 
developed regions (former Objective-1 regions), transition regions and more developed regions 
(See figure 3.3). 
 




3.6 Empirical results 
In this section, we present the empirical findings. As expected, our results are heterogeneous 
across funds. This supports the assumption that each fund has its own transmission channel. 
The presented results are supported by the additional system-GMM estimation. Regression 
tables and GMM-based IRFs are presented in the Appendix. 
3.7 European Region Development Fund (ERDF) 
The various estimated responses to monetary ERDF policy input shocks are shown in the IRFs 
displayed in Figure 3.4. As explained above, two analyses are performed. The upper row 
presents IRFs based on an estimation as described in section 3.4. Thus, it shows the long-term 
autoregressive and indirect reproduction of estimated coefficients for the year-to-year 
relationships between the variables. The bottom row presents the results from an identical 
estimation with an additional time-lag only in the policy variable. The x-axis shows the 
persistence of the effects in the moving-average of the estimated coefficients. This MA can be 
calculated to infinity, regardless how the underlying coefficients are estimated.  
 
Figure 3.4: Responses to ERDF funding shocks. Note: Estimated impulse response functions are solid lines. Dashed 
lines represent 95% coefficient intervals from Monte Carlo simulations with 500 repetitions. IRFs display responses 




We find that there are no short-time positive effects of ERDF funding. However, the additional 
GMM estimation, suggests significant negative effects on GDP and household income 
development (Figure A3.1). As expected, the effect persistence is estimated to be much longer 
with GMM estimation, since the estimated autoregressive coefficients are higher than in the 
OLS estimation. This is true for all GMM-robustness checks. However, these finding do not 
mean that ERDF is counterproductive. If we look at the results with a longer time interval 
between funding and outcome measure in the estimation, we find that employment rates, GDP 
and household income growth seem to react significantly positive to ERDF funding after some 
time. This means that ERDF funding has rather medium than short-time effects. GMM 
estimates confirm these results (Figure A3.1). We can thus partially confirm the hypotheses H1 
and H2 for ERDF funds, ERDF funding has positive impact on regional employment rates, 
GDP growth and income growth. However, this cannot be found by only looking at short-time 
outcome of policy measures. Migration rates in the OLS and the GMM estimation do not react 
significantly to ERDF funding, which means that we have to reject H3 in this case. 
The regional patterns of these effects can be examined by applying the SpVAR to sub-samples 
of the data, which is grouped by the eligibility status of regions (see Figure 3.3).  






While the short time estimation, again, reveals no significant effects in any of these sub-
samples, significant effects on GDP and household income are observed with the additional lag 
structure for less developed regions (Figure 3.5). The effect strength is higher than in the total 
subsample. Furthermore, we observe significant negative effects to migration for several years. 
Both is replicated in GMM estimation results (Figure A3.2). This indicates that although ERDF 
funding triggers economic growth in economically lagging regions, non-financial living 
standards seem not to improve to the same extent. This result suggests that the ERDF is 
promoting economic convergence within Europe by supporting economic growth in Eastern 
Europe and lagging Southern-European regions. One interpretation of the estimated negative 
effects to migration is that non-economic living conditions will converge in the long run in a 
similar way, but need more time to adapt to growth processes. Another interpretation is that 
with the improvement of the economic situation in this regions people are enabled to move to 
more prosperous regions, lowering migration barriers. 
3.7.1 European Social Fund (ESF)  
According to the results of our SpVar estimation, monetary shocks in ESF funding have limited 
effects on the regional socio-economic system in the funded regions (Figure 3.6).  
 




While the estimation points to a significant negative co-development in the specific year of 
funding for migration and positive for income growth that are not significant afterwards, no 
particular significant effects can be found with the alternative time-lag or GMM estimation 
(Figure A3.3). 
However, in the estimation without additional time-lag the effects on GDP and household 
income seem to be rather positive (but not significant). Again, we find conditionality in the 
effect intensity across the subsamples, but not as strong as in the case of ERDF and not resulting 
in significant effects. Figure 3.7 shows this for less developed regions with the additional lag 
structure analogous to Figure 3.5. It indicates, that effects on income growth are rather positive 
in less developed regions. This effect gets significant if we limit the data-sample to Eastern 
European regions. Therefore, in the case of the European Social fund we cannot confirm any 
of our hypotheses. It seems to have some positive effects on household incomes in Eastern 
Europe. 
However, this rather seems to be the result of individual cases rather than structural growth, as 
we observe neither significant employment nor significant productivity effects. Again, there are 
no significant effects on investment rates or migrations found on the regional level. We find no 
evidence for the ESF enhancing regional migration rates and thus the quality of life. Thus, we  
 
Figure 3.7: Responses to ESF funding shocks in less developed regions. Specifications equal Figure 3.4. Shock 




conclude that the ESF contribution to economic and socioeconomic convergence is rather small 
However, the education based policy objectives may cause that effects on an individual basis 
are not displayed in regionally aggregated data or take much longer to develop than considered 
in our analysis. Thus, the results do not automatically imply that ESF funds do not fall on fertile 
ground on the individual (personal) level, which is with the level aimed at by the policy 
objectives. 
3.7.2 Cohesion Fund 
The Cohesion Fund is the only considered funding scheme that is not available in all regions in 
the EU. The criterion of less than 85% of the EU’s average gross national income was fulfilled 
in 13 of the 25 investigated countries within the EU. These are the new member states from 
2004 and 2007 as well as Greece, Portugal and a few Spanish regions on a transitional fading 
out basis. Only those regions who received funds are part of the analysis. An analysis of the 
subsamples is not possible in this case, since most funded regions are less developed regions. 
The IRFs from the SpVAR estimation do not report significant economic effects from monetary 
shocks in the Cohesion Fund to the regional economy (Figure 3.8).  
 




The estimation results without additional time-lags show significant effects on migration rates, 
however this is not a robust result, because it cannot be reproduced by GMM estimations 
(Figure A3.4). Therefore, we have no evidence, that the Cohesion Fund produces measurable 
outcome on the investigated variables. 
3.8 Conclusion & Policy implications 
The aim of the paper was to gain new insights into the simultaneous responses of economic 
growth, socio-economic convergence and perceived quality of life to EU Cohesion Policy at 
the regional level. Our results from a SpVAR using regional and funding data from 258 NUTS-
2 regions in the period 2007 – 2017 support previous studies that the economic efficacy of 
Cohesion Policy as a whole is not easy to assess because results vary between funds and 
between regional subsamples. It is clear that only a small spectrum of effects could be examined 
in this study. Individual policy objectives such as sustainability or infrastructure development 
need to be investigated in more detailed studies, as they require more complex indicators. 
Of the policies examined, the ERDF is the only one that showed significant effects on economic 
growth at the aggregated level of NUTS-2 regions, namely employment rate, productivity (GDP 
per working age population) and disposable household income growth. The effects are time-
lagged, as these effects are only observable by measuring the effects two years after funding 
and robust to different estimation techniques. Furthermore, the ERDF contributes to economic 
convergence by having positive effects, particularly in regions classified as less developed. 
However, the non-existent effects on migration rates indicate that the funds do not make the 
regions more attractive to live or stay in. None of the investigated funds seems to significantly 
contribute to this issue. 
We conclude that the presence of policy efficacy is not self-evident, but depends strongly on 
the combination of policy design and conditional local economic or political preconditions. In 




specific responses for each individual member state or smaller subsamples would be interesting, 
but requires a different approach, as the number of regions turns too small for a valid SpVAR 
analysis on NUTS-2 level. The conditionality of responses suggests that to increase future 
effectiveness, policy designs and individual funding implementation have to be individually 
tailored to specific regional challenges in order to unfold their impact on regional development. 
The chosen approach offers various advantages to econometric policy evaluation, but like any 
regional econometric analysis it simplifies and aggregates complex regional dynamics, which 
automatically leads to simplified results. Especially the rather large geographical scale implies 
that we cannot be sure about more detailed effects at the local level. The limited number of 
examined variables causes that the funds may have additional positive effects for instance on 
the quality of life or on regional sustainability that may not be found in this paper. Furthermore, 
we are not able to make statements about processes at the micro-level that include concrete 
regional transition channels. As a consequence, we are unable to assess individual or regional 
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Table A3.2: Test results for Im-Pesaran-Shin Unit-Root Test 
Acronym Test-statistic (Wtbar) p-value 
ERDF -15.981 0.000 
ESF -11.202 0.000 
CF - - 
EARDF -7.32 -0.000 
INVQ -16.931 -0.000 
EMPL -2.726 -0.003 
GDP 18.237 1.000 
GDP_detr -28.793 0.000 
INC 11.697 1.000 
INC_detr -32.884 0.000 
MIG -15.814 -0.000 






TableA3.2a: Model 1: ERDF – no additional lag 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                  Dependent variable:                      
                                                                            ERDF              INVQ              EMPL               GDP               INC                MIG     
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
plm::lag(ERDF, 1)            0.318***   -0.005     0.0002    -0.001     0.001    -0.0001  
                             (0.021)    (0.004)   (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.0001)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(INVQ, 1)             -0.128    0.462***   0.005      0.004    -0.002    
0.002***  
                             (0.110)   (0.019)    (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(EMPL, 1)            1.878***   0.122    0.580***  0.156***   0.084**   0.008**  
                             (0.619)   (0.106)   (0.021)    (0.043)   (0.039)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(GDP, 1)              0.166     0.092   -0.043***  0.301***   0.053**   0.005**  
                             (0.414)   (0.071)   (0.014)    (0.029)   (0.026)   (0.002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(INC, 1)             -0.962*    0.004     -0.019     0.055   0.254***  -0.009*** 
                             (0.525)   (0.090)   (0.018)    (0.037)   (0.033)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(MIG, 1)              2.646    2.802***   0.217     -0.040    -0.004    0.384***  
                             (4.965)   (0.848)   (0.166)    (0.346)   (0.314)   (0.025)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(sppol, 1)           0.077**   -0.005     -0.001    -0.001     0.001   -0.001*** 
                             (0.035)   (0.006)   (0.001)    (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.0002)  
                                                                                           
plm::lag(spinv, 1)            0.269    0.150***   0.006     0.028**   0.023**   0.0001   
                             (0.172)   (0.029)   (0.006)    (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spemp, 1)           -1.067     0.167    0.249***    0.031   0.140***   0.008**  
                             (0.814)   (0.139)   (0.027)    (0.057)   (0.052)   (0.004)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spgdp, 1)            0.910   -0.237**   0.054***  -0.085**   -0.048    0.007**  
                             (0.579)   (0.099)   (0.019)    (0.040)   (0.037)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spinc, 1)           -0.194     0.028   -0.037***    0.004     0.007   -0.004**  
                             (0.385)   (0.066)   (0.013)    (0.027)   (0.024)   (0.002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spmig, 1)           -10.103   -1.686   -1.153***   -0.460    -0.581    -0.001   
                             (6.318)   (1.078)   (0.212)    (0.440)   (0.400)   (0.032)  
                                                                                         
g1_2008                      0.247*   0.087***    -0.005   -0.035*** -0.037***  -0.0003  
                             (0.136)   (0.023)   (0.005)    (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2008                       0.083     0.024     -0.002     0.010     0.009    0.001*   
                             (0.106)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2008                       0.070   0.122***  -0.026***  0.035***  0.042***   0.0004   
                             (0.118)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2008                      -0.038   0.059***   -0.007*     0.011    0.018**   -0.001   
                             (0.120)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2009                      0.286**   -0.003   -0.037***  -0.081*** -0.071***  -0.001*  
                             (0.131)   (0.022)   (0.004)    (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2009                       0.023   -0.063*** -0.027***  -0.074*** -0.063***  0.0004   
                             (0.100)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2009                     0.497***    0.009   -0.048***  -0.111*** -0.095***  -0.0001  
                             (0.114)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2009                      0.283**  -0.055*** -0.029***  -0.071*** -0.045***  -0.001   
                             (0.116)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2010                       0.078     0.010   -0.031***  -0.058*** -0.059***  -0.0003  
                             (0.126)   (0.021)   (0.004)    (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2010                      -0.012    -0.006   -0.020***  -0.019*** -0.013**  0.001***  
                             (0.101)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2010                     0.287***   0.040**  -0.043***  -0.035*** -0.041***   0.001   
                             (0.110)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2010                       0.106   -0.044**  -0.018***  -0.00002   -0.011     0.001   
                             (0.119)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2011                      0.263**   -0.022   -0.041***  -0.067*** -0.066***  -0.001*  
                             (0.120)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2011                       0.037    -0.021   -0.015***  -0.015**  -0.015**    0.001   
                             (0.099)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2011                     0.569***  0.085***  -0.035***  -0.023*** -0.038***  0.001**  
                             (0.108)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2011                     0.424***   0.039**    -0.005     0.012     0.008     0.001   
                             (0.116)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2012                     0.361***  -0.091*** -0.054***  -0.080*** -0.087*** -0.001**  
                             (0.120)   (0.021)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         




                             (0.097)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2012                     0.570***   0.043**  -0.031***  -0.044*** -0.046***  0.001**  
                             (0.111)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2012                       0.069     0.003    -0.010**   -0.001     0.009     0.001   
                             (0.118)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2013                     0.438***  -0.063*** -0.050***  -0.073*** -0.085***  0.001**  
                             (0.121)   (0.021)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2013                      0.168*    -0.030*  -0.014***   -0.005   -0.015**  0.003***  
                             (0.094)   (0.016)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2013                     0.556***    0.023   -0.029***  -0.051*** -0.050***  0.001*   
                             (0.108)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2013                     0.358***   -0.030    -0.009**   -0.010     0.001    0.001**  
                             (0.116)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2014                     0.382***   -0.004   -0.018***  -0.044*** -0.051***  -0.0003  
                             (0.124)   (0.021)   (0.004)    (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2014                     0.278***   -0.006     -0.005   0.031***  0.024***    0.001   
                             (0.098)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2014                     0.520***  0.062***  -0.014***  -0.045*** -0.054*** 0.002***  
                             (0.105)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2014                     0.344***   -0.004    -0.007*    -0.009    -0.002   0.002***  
                             (0.117)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2015                       0.194    -0.001    -0.010**  -0.022**  -0.033***  0.0004   
                             (0.122)   (0.021)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2015                       0.013     0.024     -0.004   0.067***  0.068***  0.002***  
                             (0.100)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2015                      0.185*   0.065***  -0.016***  -0.030*** -0.053*** 0.003***  
                             (0.103)   (0.018)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2015                       0.020     0.018     -0.004    0.0003    -0.005   0.005***  
                             (0.117)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2016                     -1.091***  -0.025     -0.002   -0.024*** -0.031*** 0.002***  
                             (0.117)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2016                     -1.118***   0.016     0.002      0.010     0.005    0.001**  
                             (0.097)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2016                     -0.910*** -0.054*** -0.009***  -0.039*** -0.040***  -0.001   
                             (0.099)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2016                     -0.865***   0.017     0.002     -0.0005   -0.004     0.001   
                             (0.113)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)                                                                                     
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                  2,580     2,580     2,580      2,580     2,580     2,580   
R2                            0.478     0.564     0.788      0.501     0.512     0.372   
Adjusted R2                   0.408     0.506     0.760      0.434     0.447     0.287   
F Statistic (df = 48; 2274) 43.395*** 61.370*** 176.131*** 47.514*** 49.802*** 28.007*** 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 






Table A3.2b: Model 2 - ERDF – additional lag 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                  Dependent variable:                      
                                                                        ERDF(t-1)        INVQ              EMPL               GDP               INC                MIG     
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
plm::lag(ERDF, 2)            0.178***  -0.001    0.002***    0.002    0.003**  -0.0001  
                             (0.025)   (0.004)   (0.001)    (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.0001)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(INVQ, 1)            -0.001    0.415***   0.004     -0.003    -0.005   0.002***  
                             (0.121)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(EMPL, 1)             1.269*    0.097    0.550***   0.150***   0.083*    0.005   
                             (0.682)   (0.112)   (0.023)    (0.048)   (0.043)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(GDP, 1)             -0.935**    0.088    -0.036**  0.299***   0.059**  0.006***  
                             (0.449)   (0.074)   (0.015)    (0.031)   (0.028)   (0.002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(INC, 1)              0.266     0.014     -0.002     0.056   0.246***  -0.009*** 
                             (0.599)   (0.098)   (0.020)    (0.042)   (0.038)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(MIG, 1)              8.225    3.049***    0.118     -0.222    -0.276   0.345***  
                             (5.433)   (0.893)   (0.180)    (0.380)   (0.343)   (0.028)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(sppol, 1)           0.113***   -0.011     -0.001   -0.008***  -0.002  -0.001*** 
                             (0.042)   (0.007)   (0.001)    (0.003)   (0.003)  (0.0002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spinv, 1)            0.126   0.112***    0.004      0.022     0.006    -0.0001  
                             (0.191)   (0.031)   (0.006)    (0.013)   (0.012)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spemp, 1)           -1.154     0.041    0.234***    0.047   0.175***    0.006   
                             (0.912)   (0.150)   (0.030)    (0.064)   (0.058)   (0.005)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spgdp, 1)           -0.725     0.018    0.071***   -0.046    -0.006   0.009***  
                             (0.647)   (0.106)   (0.021)    (0.045)   (0.041)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spinc, 1)            0.125     0.002    -0.038**    0.025     0.020    -0.002   
                             (0.457)   (0.075)   (0.015)    (0.032)   (0.029)   (0.002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spmig, 1)            1.632    -1.470   -1.098***   -0.757    -0.694    -0.033   
                             (6.986)   (1.148)   (0.232)    (0.488)   (0.441)   (0.036)  
                                                                                         
g1_2009                     1.400***    0.023   -0.035***  -0.078*** -0.063*** -0.001**  
                             (0.126)   (0.021)   (0.004)    (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2009                     1.232***  -0.071*** -0.028***  -0.074*** -0.059***  -0.0002  
                             (0.089)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2009                     1.006***   -0.006   -0.053***  -0.116*** -0.091*** -0.002*** 
                             (0.121)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2009                     0.943***  -0.062*** -0.032***  -0.073*** -0.044*** -0.001**  
                             (0.112)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2010                     1.410***    0.032   -0.030***  -0.056*** -0.052***  -0.001   
                             (0.119)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2010                     1.054***   -0.001   -0.019***  -0.015**   -0.005    0.001**  
                             (0.094)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2010                     1.268***   0.037**  -0.045***  -0.036*** -0.032***  -0.001   
                             (0.111)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2010                     1.129***  -0.046**  -0.019***   -0.001    -0.007    -0.0002  
                             (0.113)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2011                     1.185***   -0.006   -0.040***  -0.065*** -0.060*** -0.001**  
                             (0.115)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2011                     1.012***   -0.021   -0.015***   -0.012*   -0.009    0.0004   
                             (0.092)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2011                     1.133***  0.075***  -0.038***  -0.024*** -0.032***  0.0001   
                             (0.106)   (0.017)   (0.004)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2011                     1.004***    0.028    -0.007**    0.010     0.009    0.0001   
                             (0.110)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  





g1_2012                     1.335***  -0.086*** -0.054***  -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.002*** 
                             (0.113)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2012                     1.070***   -0.028*  -0.015***   0.015**   0.013**   0.001**  
                             (0.091)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2012                     1.430***   0.030*   -0.035***  -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.00001  
                             (0.106)   (0.017)   (0.004)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2012                     1.347***   -0.012   -0.013***   -0.004     0.011    -0.0001  
                             (0.109)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2013                     1.431***  -0.067*** -0.052***  -0.073*** -0.079***  0.0004   
                             (0.111)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2013                     0.929***  -0.040*** -0.015***   -0.005   -0.011**  0.002***  
                             (0.089)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2013                     1.454***    0.013   -0.033***  -0.051*** -0.044***  0.0001   
                             (0.101)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2013                     1.018***  -0.041**  -0.012***   -0.012     0.002     0.001   
                             (0.110)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2014                     1.483***   -0.014   -0.020***  -0.043*** -0.044***  -0.001*  
                             (0.113)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2014                     1.207***   -0.020    -0.005*   0.030***  0.029***   -0.0003  
                             (0.090)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2014                     1.432***  0.053***  -0.018***  -0.045*** -0.049***  0.001**  
                             (0.097)   (0.016)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g4_2014                     1.246***   -0.018   -0.010***   -0.011    -0.0002  0.002***  
                             (0.109)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2015                     1.429***   -0.008   -0.012***  -0.022*** -0.028***  -0.0004  
                             (0.111)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2015                     1.390***    0.006    -0.006**  0.065***  0.071***   0.001**  
                             (0.087)   (0.014)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0004)  
                                                                                         
g3_2015                     1.393***  0.059***  -0.018***  -0.029*** -0.047*** 0.002***  
                             (0.094)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g4_2015                     1.230***    0.006    -0.006*    -0.001    -0.003   0.005***  
                             (0.109)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2016                     1.294***   -0.034*    -0.004   -0.026*** -0.028***  0.001*   
                             (0.109)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2016                     1.206***   -0.005     -0.002     0.007     0.005    0.0004   
                             (0.090)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2016                     1.090***  -0.057*** -0.010***  -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.001**  
                             (0.093)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g4_2016                     0.890***    0.007    0.00004     0.001    -0.001     0.001   
                             (0.110)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                  2,322     2,322     2,322      2,322     2,322     2,322   
R2                            0.434     0.458     0.767      0.456     0.458     0.311   
Adjusted R2                   0.350     0.377     0.732      0.374     0.377     0.208   
F Statistic (df = 44; 2020) 35.212*** 38.770*** 151.095*** 38.418*** 38.751*** 20.685*** 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 





Table A3.3a: Model 3 - ESF – no additional lag 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                  Dependent variable:                     
                                                                            ESF             INVQ              EMPL               GDP               INC                MIG     
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
plm::lag(ESF, 1)            0.096***   -0.003     0.0001     0.001     0.001   -0.00003  
                             (0.025)   (0.003)   (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.0001)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(INVQ, 1)            -0.090   0.462***    0.005      0.004    -0.002   0.002***  
                             (0.139)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(EMPL, 1)            -0.607     0.117    0.579***   0.154***   0.083**   0.007**  
                             (0.783)   (0.106)   (0.021)    (0.043)   (0.039)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(GDP, 1)              0.153     0.098   -0.043***  0.303***   0.053**  0.006***  
                             (0.524)   (0.071)   (0.014)    (0.029)   (0.026)   (0.002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(INC, 1)             -0.596    -0.003     -0.019     0.054   0.253***  -0.009*** 
                             (0.666)   (0.090)   (0.018)    (0.037)   (0.033)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(MIG, 1)             -10.187  2.712***    0.221     -0.023     0.028   0.382***  
                             (6.312)   (0.850)   (0.167)    (0.347)   (0.315)   (0.025)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(sppol, 1)          0.115***   -0.005     -0.002   -0.004**  -0.006*** -0.0003*  
                             (0.039)   (0.005)   (0.001)    (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.0002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spinv, 1)           -0.388*  0.148***    0.006     0.027**   0.021**   0.00004  
                             (0.218)   (0.029)   (0.006)    (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spemp, 1)            0.473     0.158    0.247***    0.026    0.131**   0.008*   
                             (1.033)   (0.139)   (0.027)    (0.057)   (0.051)   (0.004)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spgdp, 1)           -1.123   -0.226**   0.056***  -0.083**   -0.047    0.007**  
                             (0.734)   (0.099)   (0.019)    (0.040)   (0.037)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spinc, 1)           -0.426     0.026   -0.037***    0.004     0.008   -0.004**  
                             (0.488)   (0.066)   (0.013)    (0.027)   (0.024)   (0.002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spmig, 1)           11.272    -1.636   -1.164***   -0.490    -0.629    -0.002   
                             (8.018)   (1.080)   (0.212)    (0.441)   (0.400)   (0.032)  
                                                                                         
g1_2008                     0.759***  0.085***    -0.004   -0.032*** -0.025***  -0.001   
                             (0.168)   (0.023)   (0.004)    (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2008                     1.331***    0.029    -0.0002    0.016**   0.023***   0.001   
                             (0.144)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2008                       0.024   0.120***  -0.025***  0.036***  0.046***   0.0002   
                             (0.148)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2008                     0.594***  0.058***   -0.007*    0.013*   0.027***   -0.001*  
                             (0.148)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2009                     0.749***   -0.005   -0.036***  -0.078*** -0.061*** -0.002*** 
                             (0.161)   (0.022)   (0.004)    (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2009                     1.274***  -0.059*** -0.025***  -0.069*** -0.050***  0.0003   
                             (0.135)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2009                     0.448***    0.006   -0.047***  -0.110*** -0.091***  -0.0003  
                             (0.143)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2009                     0.635***  -0.055*** -0.028***  -0.069*** -0.036***  -0.001   
                             (0.146)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2010                      0.302**    0.007   -0.031***  -0.056*** -0.049***  -0.001   
                             (0.154)   (0.021)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2010                     0.623***   -0.001   -0.018***   -0.014*   0.0001   0.001***  
                             (0.139)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2010                       0.156    0.036**  -0.043***  -0.035*** -0.035***  0.0002   
                             (0.134)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2010                       0.050   -0.046**  -0.018***    0.002    -0.003    0.0004   
                             (0.146)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2011                     0.722***   -0.025   -0.041***  -0.065*** -0.058*** -0.001**  




                                                                                         
g2_2011                     0.729***   -0.018   -0.013***   -0.011    -0.005     0.001   
                             (0.130)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2011                     0.418***   0.081*** -0.035***  -0.023*** -0.032***   0.001   
                             (0.131)   (0.018)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2011                      0.337**   0.035*     -0.005     0.013    0.014**   0.0004   
                             (0.140)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2012                     0.703***  -0.093*** -0.054***  -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.002*** 
                             (0.147)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2012                     0.902***   -0.021   -0.013***   0.018**   0.018***  0.001***  
                             (0.129)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2012                     0.634***   0.038**  -0.031***  -0.043*** -0.039***   0.001   
                             (0.134)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2012                     0.401***   -0.002   -0.010***   -0.0002   0.017**   0.0004   
                             (0.141)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2013                     0.475***  -0.066*** -0.050***  -0.071*** -0.075***  0.001*   
                             (0.147)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2013                     0.416***   -0.024   -0.012***  -0.00003   -0.004   0.003***  
                             (0.129)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2013                     0.567***    0.019   -0.028***  -0.050*** -0.042***   0.001   
                             (0.131)   (0.018)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2013                     0.607***   -0.033*   -0.009**   -0.008     0.009    0.001**  
                             (0.142)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2014                      0.328**   -0.009   -0.017***  -0.042*** -0.041***  -0.001   
                             (0.148)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2014                     0.794***   -0.006     -0.004   0.033***  0.033***   0.0003   
                             (0.123)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2014                      0.279**  0.058***  -0.014***  -0.043*** -0.046*** 0.002***  
                             (0.127)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2014                       0.041    -0.006    -0.007*    -0.007     0.007   0.002***  
                             (0.144)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2015                      0.295**   -0.006   -0.010***  -0.020**  -0.025***  -0.0001  
                             (0.144)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2015                     0.651***    0.024     -0.003   0.070***  0.079***  0.002***  
                             (0.125)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g3_2015                      -0.002   0.060***  -0.015***  -0.029*** -0.045*** 0.002***  
                             (0.121)   (0.016)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g4_2015                     -1.607***   0.012     -0.004     0.002     0.002   0.005***  
                             (0.140)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2016                     -0.870***  -0.030     -0.002   -0.023*** -0.023***  0.001**  
                             (0.141)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2016                     -1.031***   0.017     0.003     0.013*    0.015**    0.001   
                             (0.124)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2016                     -0.755*** -0.059*** -0.009***  -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.001**  
                             (0.118)   (0.016)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g4_2016                     -0.598***   0.008     0.002      0.001     0.003    0.0002   
                             (0.141)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)                                                                                          
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                  2,580     2,580     2,580      2,580     2,580     2,580   
R2                            0.484     0.564     0.788      0.502     0.514     0.370   
Adjusted R2                   0.414     0.506     0.760      0.435     0.449     0.286   
F Statistic (df = 48; 2274) 44.350*** 61.357*** 176.290*** 47.665*** 50.159*** 27.834*** 
======================================================================================== 






Table 3.3b: Model 4 - ESF – with additional lag 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                  Dependent variable:                     
                                                                         ESF(t-1)              INVQ              EMPL               GDP               INC                MIG     
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
plm::lag(ESF, 2)              0.014     -0.002     0.0003    -0.001    -0.001    0.00002  
                             (0.027)    (0.003)   (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.0001)  
                                                                                          
plm::lag(INVQ, 1)              0.076     0.415***    0.004     -0.002    -0.005   
0.002***  
                             (0.155)    (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
plm::lag(EMP, 1)              -0.444     0.099    0.549***  0.144***   0.074*    0.006*   
                             (0.875)    (0.112)   (0.023)    (0.047)   (0.042)   (0.003)  
                                                                                          
plm::lag(GDP, 1)              0.139      0.093    -0.037**  0.303***   0.060**  0.006***  
                             (0.576)    (0.074)   (0.015)    (0.031)   (0.028)   (0.002)  
                                                                                          
plm::lag(INC, 1)              -1.066    -0.003     -0.001     0.037   0.231*** -0.010*** 
                             (0.769)    (0.098)   (0.020)    (0.041)   (0.037)   (0.003)  
                                                                                          
plm::lag(MIG, 1)            -23.827*** 3.027***    0.122     -0.208    -0.254   0.344***  
                             (6.982)    (0.894)   (0.181)    (0.376)   (0.339)   (0.028)  
                                                                                          
plm::lag(sppol, 1)            0.033     -0.007     -0.001   -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.00003  
                             (0.046)    (0.006)   (0.001)    (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.0002)  
                                                                                          
plm::lag(spinv, 1)            -0.402   0.114***    0.004     0.024*     0.007    0.0001   
                             (0.245)    (0.031)   (0.006)    (0.013)   (0.012)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
plm::lag(spemp, 1)            -1.308     0.039    0.234***    0.042   0.169***    0.006   
                             (1.171)    (0.150)   (0.030)    (0.063)   (0.057)   (0.005)  
                                                                                          
plm::lag(spgdp, 1)            1.305      0.025    0.070***   -0.043    -0.007   0.010***  
                             (0.830)    (0.106)   (0.021)    (0.045)   (0.040)   (0.003)  
                                                                                          
plm::lag(spinc, 1)            -0.476    -0.010    -0.038**    0.013     0.011    -0.003   
                             (0.587)    (0.075)   (0.015)    (0.032)   (0.028)   (0.002)  
                                                                                          
plm::lag(spmig, 1)            13.182    -1.460   -1.123***  -0.975**  -1.002**   -0.018   
                             (8.985)    (1.151)   (0.233)    (0.484)   (0.436)   (0.036)  
                                                                                          
g1_2009                      1.769***    0.024   -0.035***  -0.070*** -0.053*** -
0.002*** 
                             (0.162)    (0.021)   (0.004)    (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g2_2009                      2.411***  -0.067*** -0.028***  -0.063*** -0.046***  -0.0005  
                             (0.119)    (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                          
g3_2009                      0.693***   -0.001   -0.053***  -0.113*** -0.092***  -0.001   
                             (0.153)    (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g4_2009                      1.343***  -0.054*** -0.032***  -0.060*** -0.029***-0.002*** 
                             (0.155)    (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g1_2010                      1.601***    0.032   -0.030***  -0.052*** -0.047***  -0.001   
                             (0.153)    (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g2_2010                      2.388***    0.001   -0.019***   -0.010     0.002    0.001*   
                             (0.121)    (0.016)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                          
g3_2010                      0.889***   0.040**  -0.045***  -0.039*** -0.038***  -0.0002  
                             (0.140)    (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g4_2010                      1.317***   -0.038*  -0.020***    0.009     0.003    -0.0002  
                             (0.153)    (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g1_2011                      1.201***   -0.006   -0.040***  -0.062*** -0.056***-0.002*** 
                             (0.147)    (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g2_2011                      1.953***   -0.018   -0.015***   -0.006    -0.001    0.0002   
                             (0.119)    (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                          
g3_2011                      0.874***  0.076***  -0.038***  -0.025*** -0.033***  0.0003   
                             (0.136)    (0.017)   (0.004)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g4_2011                      0.865***   0.033*    -0.008**   0.019**  0.019***   -0.0002  




                                                                                          
g1_2012                      1.524***  -0.086*** -0.054***  -0.082*** -0.083***-0.002*** 
                             (0.145)    (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g2_2012                      1.934***   -0.027*  -0.015***   0.015**   0.013**   0.001*   
                             (0.116)    (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                          
g3_2012                      1.109***   0.030*   -0.035***  -0.046*** -0.040***  0.0001   
                             (0.136)    (0.017)   (0.004)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g4_2012                      1.085***   -0.009   -0.013***   -0.0003   0.016**   -0.0003  
                             (0.146)    (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g1_2013                      1.490***  -0.066*** -0.052***  -0.072*** -0.078***  0.0004   
                             (0.143)    (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g2_2013                      2.103***  -0.039*** -0.015***   -0.003    -0.009*  0.002***  
                             (0.114)    (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                          
g3_2013                      1.355***    0.014   -0.032***  -0.048*** -0.040*** -0.00000  
                             (0.130)    (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g4_2013                      1.144***  -0.038**  -0.012***   -0.005     0.011    0.0005   
                             (0.147)    (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g1_2014                      1.337***   -0.014   -0.019***  -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.001**  
                             (0.145)    (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g2_2014                      1.602***   -0.016    -0.006*   0.035***  0.033***   -0.0001  
                             (0.115)    (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                          
g3_2014                      1.363***  0.054***  -0.017***  -0.039*** -0.041***  0.001*   
                             (0.125)    (0.016)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                          
g4_2014                      1.363***   -0.012   -0.010***   -0.002     0.010    0.001**  
                             (0.147)    (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g1_2015                      1.281***   -0.009   -0.012***  -0.020*** -0.025***  -0.001   
                             (0.142)    (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g2_2015                      1.937***    0.004    -0.006**  0.062***  0.068***   0.001**  
                             (0.112)    (0.014)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.005)  (0.0004)  
                                                                                          
g3_2015                      1.138***  0.060***  -0.017***  -0.023*** -0.039*** 0.002***  
                             (0.121)    (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                          
g4_2015                      0.875***    0.012    -0.006*     0.011     0.010   0.004***  
                             (0.148)    (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g1_2016                      1.208***   -0.035*    -0.004   -0.025*** -0.026***   0.001   
                             (0.139)    (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                          
g2_2016                      1.815***   -0.006     -0.002     0.009     0.008    0.0001   
                             (0.115)    (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                          
g3_2016                      0.843***  -0.058*** -0.010***  -0.034*** -0.030***-0.001*** 
                             (0.119)    (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                          
g4_2016                     -0.807***    0.009     0.0001     0.007     0.008    0.0001   
                             (0.146)    (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)                                                                                        
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                  2,322      2,322     2,322      2,322     2,322     2,322   
R2                            0.459      0.458     0.766      0.467     0.473     0.299   
Adjusted R2                   0.378      0.377     0.731      0.387     0.394     0.194   
F Statistic (df = 44; 2020) 38.881***  38.768*** 150.425*** 40.180*** 41.193***19.563*** 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 





Table A3.4a: Model 5: Cohesion Fund – no additional lag 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                  Dependent variable:                     
                                                                          CF            INVQ                EMPL                  GDP               INC                MIG     
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
plm::lag(CF, 1)            0.803***    0.003    -0.0002     0.001     0.001    0.0002   
                            (0.050)   (0.006)   (0.001)    (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.0001)  
                                                                                        
plm::lag(INVQ, 1)            0.300   0.399***   0.017***    0.005    -0.010   0.003***  
                            (0.288)   (0.033)   (0.006)    (0.010)   (0.011)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
plm::lag(EMPL, 1)            -0.341     0.123    0.622***   0.120**    0.036     0.005   
                            (1.541)   (0.179)   (0.034)    (0.052)   (0.057)   (0.004)  
                                                                                        
plm::lag(GDP, 1)            -0.153    -0.006     -0.025   0.328***  0.124***    0.001   
                            (1.283)   (0.149)   (0.028)    (0.044)   (0.048)   (0.003)  
                                                                                        
plm::lag(INC, 1)            -0.211    -0.015    -0.053**    0.033   0.206***  -0.006**  
                            (1.167)   (0.135)   (0.026)    (0.040)   (0.043)   (0.003)  
                                                                                        
plm::lag(MIG, 1)            13.959   4.538***    0.143      0.144    -0.182   0.488***  
                           (14.316)   (1.660)   (0.313)    (0.486)   (0.532)   (0.034)  
                                                                                        
plm::lag(sppol, 1)           0.061    -0.002     -0.001    -0.001    -0.002    -0.0002  
                            (0.058)   (0.007)   (0.001)    (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.0001)  
                                                                                        
plm::lag(spinv, 1)           0.098     0.074     0.018      0.006     0.023    -0.0005  
                            (0.527)   (0.061)   (0.012)    (0.018)   (0.020)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
plm::lag(spemp, 1)         -5.770***   0.291    0.206***   -0.071     0.020    -0.006   
                            (2.140)   (0.248)   (0.047)    (0.073)   (0.080)   (0.005)  
                                                                                        
plm::lag(spgdp, 1)          -0.029    -0.159     0.013     -0.081     0.040     0.004   
                            (1.870)   (0.217)   (0.041)    (0.064)   (0.070)   (0.004)  
                                                                                        
plm::lag(spinc, 1)           0.918     0.062    -0.037**    0.029     0.032    -0.001   
                            (0.794)   (0.092)   (0.017)    (0.027)   (0.030)   (0.002)  
                                                                                        
plm::lag(spmig, 1)         59.446*** -5.868**  -1.633***   -0.793    -1.204    -0.0004  
                           (21.191)   (2.457)   (0.463)    (0.720)   (0.788)   (0.050)  
                                                                                        
g1_2008                      0.372   0.149***   -0.022**   -0.030*   -0.029*   -0.002   
                            (0.468)   (0.054)   (0.010)    (0.016)   (0.017)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g2_2008                      0.175     0.055     0.002     -0.005     0.009    -0.002   
                            (0.956)   (0.111)   (0.021)    (0.032)   (0.036)   (0.002)  
                                                                                        
g3_2008                    -0.937*** 0.202***  -0.038***  0.037***  0.041***   -0.001   
                            (0.310)   (0.036)   (0.007)    (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g4_2008                    7.315***   -0.141     -0.004    -0.062    -0.022    -0.005   
                            (1.357)   (0.157)   (0.030)    (0.046)   (0.050)   (0.003)  
                                                                                        
g1_2009                     0.801*     0.035   -0.053***  -0.069*** -0.057*** -0.003*** 
                            (0.447)   (0.052)   (0.010)    (0.015)   (0.017)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g2_2009                      1.461    -0.156    -0.047**   -0.058*   -0.064*  -0.005**  
                            (0.928)   (0.108)   (0.020)    (0.032)   (0.035)   (0.002)  
                                                                                        
g3_2009                    -0.806**    0.058   -0.060***  -0.144*** -0.142***  -0.001   
                            (0.319)   (0.037)   (0.007)    (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g4_2009                    3.766***   -0.263   -0.079***  -0.183*** -0.127**   -0.005   
                            (1.390)   (0.161)   (0.030)    (0.047)   (0.052)   (0.003)  
                                                                                        
g1_2010                      0.008     0.006   -0.046***  -0.061*** -0.061***  -0.002*  
                            (0.417)   (0.048)   (0.009)    (0.014)   (0.015)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g2_2010                      0.377    -0.022     -0.016    -0.047    -0.047    -0.004*  
                            (0.934)   (0.108)   (0.020)    (0.032)   (0.035)   (0.002)  
                                                                                        
g3_2010                    -1.504***  0.065**  -0.065***  -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.002**  
                            (0.267)   (0.031)   (0.006)    (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g4_2010                    -8.032*** -0.364**   -0.064**  -0.193*** -0.138***  -0.002   
                            (1.433)   (0.166)   (0.031)    (0.049)   (0.053)   (0.003)  
                                                                                        
g1_2011                      0.388    -0.057   -0.069***  -0.093*** -0.088*** -0.003*** 




                                                                                        
g2_2011                      0.074    -0.046     -0.017    -0.057*   -0.037    -0.003   
                            (0.907)   (0.105)   (0.020)    (0.031)   (0.034)   (0.002)  
                                                                                        
g3_2011                    -0.599**  0.117***  -0.052***  -0.046*** -0.063***  -0.001   
                            (0.252)   (0.029)   (0.006)    (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g4_2011                      0.538    -0.308*   -0.055*   -0.189*** -0.146***  -0.002   
                            (1.388)   (0.161)   (0.030)    (0.047)   (0.052)   (0.003)  
                                                                                        
g1_2012                      0.446   -0.172*** -0.089***  -0.120*** -0.125*** -0.005*** 
                            (0.355)   (0.041)   (0.008)    (0.012)   (0.013)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g2_2012                      0.464    -0.030    -0.049**  -0.085*** -0.095*** -0.008*** 
                            (0.877)   (0.102)   (0.019)    (0.030)   (0.033)   (0.002)  
                                                                                        
g3_2012                    -0.566**   0.062**  -0.043***  -0.070*** -0.074***  -0.001   
                            (0.260)   (0.030)   (0.006)    (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g4_2012                      0.530    -0.111     -0.045   -0.198*** -0.109**   -0.001   
                            (1.400)   (0.162)   (0.031)    (0.048)   (0.052)   (0.003)  
                                                                                        
g1_2013                     0.702**  -0.148*** -0.073***  -0.112*** -0.120*** -0.004*** 
                            (0.354)   (0.041)   (0.008)    (0.012)   (0.013)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g2_2013                     1.539*    -0.027    -0.047**  -0.074**  -0.082**  -0.008*** 
                            (0.873)   (0.101)   (0.019)    (0.030)   (0.032)   (0.002)  
                                                                                        
g3_2013                    -0.687***  0.050*   -0.041***  -0.076*** -0.072*** -0.001**  
                            (0.236)   (0.027)   (0.005)    (0.008)   (0.009)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g4_2013                      0.365    -0.245     -0.015   -0.222*** -0.107**    0.001   
                            (1.391)   (0.161)   (0.030)    (0.047)   (0.052)   (0.003)  
                                                                                        
g1_2014                      0.410    -0.060   -0.034***  -0.085*** -0.081*** -0.002*** 
                            (0.361)   (0.042)   (0.008)    (0.012)   (0.013)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g2_2014                     1.763**    0.007     -0.017   -0.061**  -0.067**   -0.002   
                            (0.885)   (0.103)   (0.019)    (0.030)   (0.033)   (0.002)  
                                                                                        
g3_2014                    -0.633*** 0.087***  -0.021***  -0.070*** -0.075***  -0.0004  
                            (0.223)   (0.026)   (0.005)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g4_2014                      0.373    -0.126     -0.012   -0.182***  -0.069     0.003   
                            (1.408)   (0.163)   (0.031)    (0.048)   (0.052)   (0.003)  
                                                                                        
g1_2015                     -0.338    -0.064   -0.021***  -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.002*** 
                            (0.351)   (0.041)   (0.008)    (0.012)   (0.013)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g2_2015                      0.334    -0.009     -0.007    -0.032    -0.032    -0.001   
                            (0.887)   (0.103)   (0.019)    (0.030)   (0.033)   (0.002)  
                                                                                        
g3_2015                    -0.839*** 0.106***  -0.021***  -0.049*** -0.068***  -0.001   
                            (0.213)   (0.025)   (0.005)    (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g4_2015                      0.244    -0.025     -0.001     0.051    -0.037     0.004   
                            (1.391)   (0.161)   (0.030)    (0.047)   (0.052)   (0.003)  
                                                                                        
g1_2016                    -4.752*** -0.083**    -0.012   -0.039*** -0.045***   0.001   
                            (0.327)   (0.038)   (0.007)    (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g2_2016                    -7.456***  -0.061     -0.004    -0.017    -0.018    -0.001   
                            (0.868)   (0.101)   (0.019)    (0.030)   (0.032)   (0.002)  
                                                                                        
g3_2016                    -1.741*** -0.059**  -0.018***  -0.054*** -0.051*** -0.001**  
                            (0.211)   (0.024)   (0.005)    (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                        
g4_2016                      0.163    0.326**    0.011     -0.031    -0.046     0.004   
                            (1.344)   (0.156)   (0.029)    (0.046)   (0.050)   (0.003)                                                                                      
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                  890       890       890        890       890       890    
R2                           0.807     0.690     0.877      0.699     0.667     0.587   
Adjusted R2                  0.772     0.634     0.855      0.645     0.607     0.513   
F Statistic (df = 48; 753) 65.629*** 34.925*** 111.792*** 36.506*** 31.472*** 22.314*** 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 




Table A.3.4b: Model 6: Cohesion Fund – with additional lag 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                  Dependent variable:                     
                                                                         CF(t-1)          INVQ              EMPL               GDP              INC           MIG     
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
plm::lag(CF, 2)            0.676***   -0.010*   -0.003**    0.001    -0.003   -0.0004*  
                             (0.056)   (0.006)   (0.001)    (0.003)   (0.002)  (0.0002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(INVQ, 1)            0.525***  0.416***    0.004     -0.002    -0.005   0.002***  
                             (0.178)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(EMPL, 1)              0.169     0.100    0.549***  0.152***   0.083*    0.006*   
                             (1.008)   (0.112)   (0.023)    (0.048)   (0.043)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(GDP, 1)              0.172     0.092    -0.036**  0.299***   0.058**  0.006***  
                             (0.664)   (0.074)   (0.015)    (0.031)   (0.028)   (0.002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(INC, 1)            -2.398***   0.003     0.0001     0.051   0.248***  -0.009*** 
                             (0.886)   (0.098)   (0.020)    (0.042)   (0.038)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(MIG, 1)             -2.576   3.110***    0.133     -0.222    -0.260   0.345***  
                             (8.039)   (0.892)   (0.180)    (0.380)   (0.343)   (0.028)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(sppol, 1)            0.077    -0.005     0.001     -0.003    -0.0004   0.0001   
                             (0.050)   (0.006)   (0.001)    (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.0002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spinv, 1)          1.645***  0.113***    0.004      0.022     0.006    0.0001   
                             (0.283)   (0.031)   (0.006)    (0.013)   (0.012)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spemp, 1)          -5.816***   0.040    0.234***    0.048   0.175***    0.006   
                             (1.349)   (0.150)   (0.030)    (0.064)   (0.058)   (0.005)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spgdp, 1)            0.910     0.026    0.070***   -0.042    -0.007   0.010***  
                             (0.957)   (0.106)   (0.021)    (0.045)   (0.041)   (0.003)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spinc, 1)           -0.105    -0.002    -0.039**    0.024     0.020    -0.003   
                             (0.677)   (0.075)   (0.015)    (0.032)   (0.029)   (0.002)  
                                                                                         
plm::lag(spmig, 1)           10.313    -1.351   -1.113***   -0.691    -0.712    -0.018   
                            (10.303)   (1.143)   (0.231)    (0.487)   (0.440)   (0.036)  
                                                                                         
g1_2009                     2.652***    0.024   -0.034***  -0.079*** -0.062*** -0.002*** 
                             (0.185)   (0.021)   (0.004)    (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2009                       0.148   -0.073*** -0.028***  -0.076*** -0.059***  -0.0005  
                             (0.131)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2009                       0.184    -0.007   -0.054***  -0.114*** -0.092***  -0.001*  
                             (0.178)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2009                      -0.010   -0.066*** -0.032***  -0.075*** -0.044*** -0.002*** 
                             (0.166)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2010                     2.853***   0.036*   -0.029***  -0.056*** -0.050***  -0.001   
                             (0.177)   (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2010                       0.156    -0.001   -0.019***  -0.016**   -0.005    0.001*   
                             (0.139)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2010                      0.272*    0.038**  -0.046***  -0.034*** -0.033***  -0.0003  
                             (0.162)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2010                      -0.040   -0.044**  -0.019***   -0.001    -0.007    -0.0002  
                             (0.167)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2011                     2.438***    0.002   -0.038***  -0.064*** -0.057*** -0.001**  
                             (0.172)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2011                       0.105    -0.021   -0.015***   -0.012*   -0.009    0.0002   
                             (0.136)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2011                      -0.205   0.074***  -0.039***  -0.024*** -0.032***  0.0002   
                             (0.156)   (0.017)   (0.004)    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2011                      -0.218     0.027    -0.007*     0.009     0.010    -0.0001  
                             (0.162)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2012                     2.613***  -0.080*** -0.054***  -0.078*** -0.079*** -0.002*** 




                                                                                         
g2_2012                       0.121    -0.027*  -0.015***   0.014**   0.012**   0.001*   
                             (0.134)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2012                      0.357**    0.021   -0.036***  -0.047*** -0.041***  -0.0001  
                             (0.160)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2012                      -0.053    -0.015   -0.013***   -0.006     0.011    -0.0003  
                             (0.161)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2013                     2.705***  -0.063*** -0.051***  -0.072*** -0.078***   0.001   
                             (0.165)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2013                       0.202   -0.040*** -0.015***   -0.005   -0.012**  0.002***  
                             (0.131)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2013                     0.559***    0.006   -0.033***  -0.052*** -0.044***  -0.0001  
                             (0.150)   (0.017)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g4_2013                      -0.011   -0.045**  -0.012***   -0.014*    0.002     0.001   
                             (0.161)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2014                     2.816***   -0.011   -0.019***  -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.001**  
                             (0.168)   (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2014                      0.240*    -0.019    -0.006*   0.031***  0.028***   -0.0001  
                             (0.132)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2014                     0.558***  0.049***  -0.017***  -0.046*** -0.048***  0.001*   
                             (0.143)   (0.016)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g4_2014                       0.054    -0.020   -0.010***   -0.013*   -0.001   0.001***  
                             (0.160)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2015                     2.786***   -0.004   -0.011***  -0.021*** -0.027***  -0.001   
                             (0.165)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2015                      0.323**    0.006    -0.006**  0.064***  0.070***   0.001**  
                             (0.129)   (0.014)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0004)  
                                                                                         
g3_2015                     0.583***  0.057***  -0.017***  -0.030*** -0.046*** 0.002***  
                             (0.138)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g4_2015                       0.047     0.002    -0.006*    -0.003    -0.003   0.005***  
                             (0.160)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g1_2016                     2.469***   -0.030*    -0.003   -0.025*** -0.026***   0.001   
                             (0.162)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)  
                                                                                         
g2_2016                     0.345***   -0.007     -0.002     0.005     0.005    0.0001   
                             (0.133)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g3_2016                     0.377***  -0.058*** -0.010***  -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.001*** 
                             (0.136)   (0.015)   (0.003)    (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.0005)  
                                                                                         
g4_2016                      -0.028     0.002     0.0003    -0.002    -0.001    0.0001   
                             (0.161)   (0.018)   (0.004)    (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.001)                                                                                     
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                  2,322     2,322     2,322      2,322     2,322     2,322   
R2                            0.381     0.459     0.767      0.454     0.457     0.300   
Adjusted R2                   0.289     0.379     0.732      0.373     0.376     0.196   
F Statistic (df = 44; 2020) 28.240*** 38.981*** 151.178*** 38.230*** 38.687*** 19.711*** 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 


















Figure A3.2: Responses to ERDF funding shocks in less developed regions with GMM estimation. Specifications 






Figure A3.3: Responses to ESF funding shocks with GMM estimations. Specifications equal Figure 3.6. 
 
 





4. Who benefits from Structural Investment Policy? An Empirical Analysis of the effects 
from the German Structural Fund GRW on Regional Wage Structures 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: This paper was submitted for publication in Regional Science & Urban Economics (15.02.2021). 
The paper is co-authored by Thomas Brenner. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract: The German structural investment policy GRW provides financial subsidies to firms 
or providers of economic infrastructure in structurally weak regions in order to reduce regional 
economic disparities. The paper analyzes the effects of GRW grants on the wage development 
in funded regions at different quantiles of the wage distribution in order to answer the question 
to what extend additional productivity and income effects on firm level are transmitted to 
employees. We use a flexible spatial vector autoregressive panel model (SpVAR) that is able 
to estimate direct and indirect effects of GRW funding. We find that GRW industry subsidies 
have some positive effects on different stages of the wage distribution in East Germany, while 
effects in the West are limited to the top of the wage distribution. Infrastructure subsidies appear 
to be more efficient on wages than industry-firm subsidies, but are also limited to the East and 
to the service sector. This may indicate an upgrading of knowledge-intensive jobs due to 
infrastructure improvements. 
Keywords: Regional policy, wages, income inequalities, spatial econometrics, impulse 
response functions 






Besides the European Cohesion Policy, the majority of member states offer national regional 
structural fund programs and investment subsidies to balance the spatial development and 
ensure equal opportunities as independent as possible from the place of residence (Criscuolo et 
al., 2019). The “Joint Federal/Länder task for the Improvement of Regional Economic 
Structures” (henceforth GRW) is the most important of these structural funds in the largest 
economy of Europe, Germany. Very similar investment funds for lagging areas at national level 
are provided by many other countries, for instance by Italy (Law 488/1992). 
The GRW program redistributes financial resources to economically lagging regions by 
supporting capital investments and labor growth of private businesses as an incentive to locate 
in economically lagging regions and by subsidizing municipality projects bound to 
infrastructure that improve the regional conditions for economic actors in these regions. The 
program’s main purpose is to procure primary and secondary effects on economic growth as a 
start for long-term endogenous and sustainable economic growth aiming for a more even spatial 
economic development under the objective of equivalent living conditions across regions that 
is postulated in the German constitution (Article 72).  
This paper extends the scientific debate on the economic effects of structural GRW funds (e.g. 
Eberle et al. 2019; Brachert al. 2018; von Ehrlich & Seidel, 2015; Mitze et al., 2015), which 
focuses on productivity and employment effects, to the effects on the wage distribution in order 
to answer the question to what extend additional productivity and income effects on firm level 
are transmitted to employees. The effects of GRW funds and similar policies on wages and their 
intraregional inequalities are more or less neglected in previous studies (Cieślick & Rokicki, 
2017). We analyze the effects on different quantiles of the wage distribution separately. This 
allows for examining the quality of jobs created as well as the impact on intraregional income 




Figure 4.1 illustrates that inflation-adjusted real wages developed positive for high wages (75th 
and 90th percentile of the wage distribution) in Germany, while median wages and below have 
decreased on average over the period 2001 – 2010 based on the Employment History Dataset 
(BHP) from the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB) that is used in this study. 
Similar findings are made for example by Dustmann et al. (2009), Card et al. (2013) and 
Antonczyk et al. (2018). Several reasons are explaining this trend. Structural and technological 
change and associated demand for highly qualified workforce contributes to an increasing 
demand for workers at the top of the wage distribution. Contemporaneously there is a 
decreasing demand for low skilled workers due to the automation of routine and manual 
occupations on the bottom of the wage structure (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). Afonso et al. 
(2013) find that this “skill biased technological change” has the strongest effect on intra-country 
inequalities in the European Union. Further explanations for rising income inequalities include 
the de-unionization and labor market liberalizations that took place in Germany under the name 
“Agenda 2010” (Biewen & Seckler, 2019), as well as financialization (Kohler et al., 2019; Lin 
& Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013) and consequences of globalization and free-trade (Afonso et al., 
2013).  
 
Figure 4.1: Inflation adjusted monthly gross wage percentile growth of full-time employed workers in Germany 





It appears to be important to consider effects on wages, personal incomes and income 
inequalities in policy evaluation, as personal income is one of the most important determinants 
of individual material living standards, quality of life, well-being, participation in society and 
crucial for managing social balance and opportunities (e.g. Diener et al., 1985; Easterlin, 1974). 
Moreover, small personal income limits access to community goods, such as health care, 
education, housing, leisure opportunities and vacations (Ostry et al. 2014). Barca (2009) and 
Ferrara et al. (2020) clarify that improving the citizens well-being must be an important goal of 
regional policy. However, Schwellnus et al. (2017) illustrate that there is no linear relationship 
between regional or national economic growth and wages. The findings in Figure 4.1 support 
this, as Germany experienced a period of economic growth until 2008 that is not reflected in 
the wage development.  
In addition, there is evidence that societies with higher income inequalities tend to reduce social 
mobility and have higher sensitivity for mental illness, crime and homicide rates (Wilkinson & 
Peckett, 2009). Moreover, Berg et al. (2012) find for multiple countries that low inequality 
levels lead to more sustainable growth in the long term, while on the other hand social 
inequalities and concentration of wealth are harming social cohesion and are found to be a cause 
for rising discontent (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). Thus, the discussion on the geography of 
discontent emphasizes the role of inequalities in the recent rise of populist and right-wing 
parties in many countries (Dijkstra et al., 2020). This shows that income inequalities have 
become a central social and politic challenge and should be considered in policy evaluation. 
This objective of structural funds can be understood as regional instrumentation of the welfare 
state principle. Oates (1999) argues that a potential failure of regional redistribution policies 
occurs, if poor people in rich regions subsidize rich people in poor areas with their taxes. 
To extract causal effects of GRW subsidies on regional wages, we use the advantages of a 




increasing attention in comparable research settings, since it is able to consider indirect effects 
between variables in the economic system over time. The approach contains simultaneous 
dynamic fixed effects panel estimations and controls for spatial spillover effects as well as for 
potential endogenous economic variables. To investigate GRW effect on wages, we use 
regional wage data from the IAB’s employment history panel data for all 401 German 
administrative districts in the period 2001 – 2010. Finally, we test if there are conditional effects 
on GRW efficacy between the western and the structurally weaker eastern part of Germany. 
The remainder of the paper succeeds in the following way. Section 4.2 concentrates on the 
GRW policy setup and related empirical research conducted so far. Section 4.3 presents our 
theoretical framework and research hypotheses. Data and variables are presented in section 4.4, 
the methodological approach is explained in section 4.5. Section 4.6 focuses on our empirical 
results. Finally, section 4.7 concludes.  
4.2 GRW policy setup and empirical studies 
As most important regional development policy in Germany, the GRW was implemented in 
1969 to contribute to the aim of equivalent living conditions across the country and extended 
in the 1990s to foster the economic convergence of East Germany after the German 
reunification process (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). The regional eligibility of funds depends 
on an indicator based on the regional unemployment rate, wage level, employment forecast and 
infrastructure and is limited to structurally lagging regions. In fact, 189 of 402 districts were 
supported by GRW funds in the period studied. The GRW program provides two separate 
investment schemes. The industrial scheme is dedicated to the production sector and directly 
subsidizes private firm investments in physical capital or labor costs, covering 35% to 50% of 
total costs with a focus on MSEs that manufacture products for (regional) export. The creation 
of additional jobs within the subsidized firm is obligatory in this scheme. The infrastructure 




education and research centers up to 60% of the total costs. The co-financing approach aims to 
reduce windfall gains to a minimum, similar to other regional policy measures such as the 
European Cohesion Policy that is directly connected to GRW since part of the financial means 
result from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). GRW regulation details and 
subsidies are in the competence of the 16 federal states within a nationwide framework and 
payment is subdivided into federal and federal state grants, which causes a bit of fuzziness. In 
practice, the regulations differ only slightly and are comparable across federal states.  
In our research period 2001 to 2010, the granted subsidies amounted to 20.51 billion euros. Of 
this amount, 14.29 billion were industry investment subsidies and 6.22 billion were 
infrastructure grants. 80% of the subsidies were spend on projects in the Eastern regions that 
formed the former GDR. The spatial distribution of funds is displayed in Figure 4.2. 
Many studies have examined the efficacy of GRW funding subsidies. Eberle et al. (2019) offer 
 




a comprehensive summary with a focus on GRW effects on regional economic growth. Alecke 
and Unitiedt (2007), Röhl and von Speicher (2009), Alecke et al. (2013), Mitze et al. (2015), 
Rhoden (2016) find that GRW has positive effects on regional productivity. Regional 
employment growth is identified by Schalk and Untiedt (2000), von Ehrlich & Seidel (2015) 
and Dettmann et al. (2017). No or very limited effects are found by Eckey and Kosfeld (2005) 
and Egger et al. (2014).  
Brachert et al. (2019) first mention wages in GRW evaluation in a study of effects in Western 
German regions in the program period 2000 - 2006. While they find evidence for regional 
productivity growth, they find no evidence for total gross wage growth. In similar policy setups, 
Busso et al. (2013) find positive effects on weekly wages of the US federal urban Empowerment 
Zones that do not correspond to increases in the local costs of living. Cieślick and Rokicki 
(2017) find a positive relationship between European structural funds and individual wages on 
NUTS-2 level for Polish regions. 
4.3 Theoretical considerations  
In order to obtain a theoretical framework that produces profound research hypothesis and 
allows for adequate model building, we consider the macroeconomic wage equation as 
established e.g. by Blanchard and Katz (1997), in which the change of log nominal wages 𝑤𝑡 
in a region i is defined as:  
 ∆𝑤𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑤𝑖 +  ∆𝑝𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑤𝑖𝑡, (4.1) 
where u is the unemployment rate, p the log price level, 𝛼𝑤 a constant and 𝜀𝑤𝑡 the error terms. 
The price level 𝑝𝑡, in turn, is constant across regions and depends on the constant, the wage 
level and the error term, so that price and wage inflation are mutually dependent. In the case of 
time-constant price inflation, real wages are a function of the unemployment rate. Decreasing 




lower end of the wage distribution, leading to the wage curve introduced by Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1994). Blanchard and Katz (1997) extend this by adding firm productivity to the wage 
equation: 
 ∆𝑤𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑤𝑖 +  ∆𝑝𝑡−1 −  λ(𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑡−1 − 𝑥𝑡−1)  − 𝛽𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑤𝑖𝑡,  (4.2) 
where 𝑥𝑡 denotes the log productivity level which has a positive impact on wages. The equation 
implies that productivity growth is constant over regions. However, we argue that this is 
insufficient, as individual regional factors lead to differences in firm and regional factor 
productivity levels and growth rates. 
Mankiw et al. (1992) define the steady-state output X of an economy i at time t in their 
augmented Solow-Model (Solow, 1956) as: 
 Xi (t) = Ki(t)
αHi(t)
ß(Ai(t)Li(t))
1−α−ß  (4.3) 
where K and H represent the physical and human capital in a region, while A represents the 
technological level in a region and L is the labor input with an exogenous growth rate equal to 
working-age population growth. The coefficients α and β display the decreasing returns to the 
different types of capital. Thus, region specific accumulation of physical and human capital as 
well as employment and technology input determine the growth of regional output.  
We follow the extension by Eberle et al. (2019) who define L, in the spirit of Bräuninger and 
Pannenberg’s (2002) endogenous augmentation of the production function, as: 
 𝐿𝑖𝑡 = κ𝑖(t) ∗ 𝑄𝑖(0)𝑒
𝑛𝑖𝑡,  (4.4) 
where 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the population between 15 and 64 years with the exogenous growth rate 𝑛𝑖 and 
κ𝑖is the share of 𝑄𝑖𝑡 that is actually employed (Li(t)), which shows short-run variations, but is 





Thus, the output per working-age population (labor productivity) is: 





Considering another extension from Crihfield et al. (1995), who consider public capital Zit, 
which has similar properties to Kit, but is non-excludable, equation (4.5) can be extended as 
follows (Eberle et al., 2019): 




1−α−ß−γ , (4.6) 
where γ is the return to public capital. This term can be included into equation (4.2), which now 
takes into account differences in regional labor productivity. It becomes apparent that investing 
in regional production factors (physical, public & human capital, technology & employment) 
should have positive effects on regional wages. Therefore, we control for these factors in our 
model. By including public capital, we explicitly consider the effects of regional policy 
subsidies. Effective policy interventions either directly enhance the capital stock of (private) 
firms, stimulate further private capital investments through co-financing or support public 
infrastructure improvements. Hence, there should be a positive relationship between subsidies 
such as GRW funding and the regional steady state productivity and thus regional wages. 
In addition, we should consider sector and firm heterogeneity across regions in the wage 
equation. Every sector or occupational group has its own wage market equilibrium and thus its 
own wage rate based on the specific factor productivity and adoption rate of technological 
innovation (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). For example, wage rates in high productive and 
knowledge intensive services and particular industries (e.g. automotive) are higher than in most 
person-related services or agriculture. Hence, the regional average wage level strongly depends 
on the sectoral structure within the region. Moreover, Card et al. (2013) find evidence for rising 
firm heterogeneity in wage levels. Comparable employees are paid differently even between 




the development of high-wage-firms and low-wage firms. Economies of scale allow larger 
firms to pay higher wages than small firms. Therefore, we add a factor 𝑓𝑡 to the augmented 
wage equation that reflects the regions observable firm characteristics (sectors, innovativeness, 
sizes, etc.): 
 ∆𝑤𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑤𝑖 +  ∆𝑝𝑡−1 −  λ(𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑡−1 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1)  − 𝛽𝑢𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑓𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑤𝑖𝑡.    (4.7) 
In a next step, we assess cross-regional worker heterogeneity. Higher education and experience 
largely determines the access to high wages, employment opportunities and high-income 
careers. Especially the presence of the so-called creative class, is considered as a key factor for 
regional wage differentials, as creative and high-skilled employees are able to generate above-
average wages (Hortas-Rico & Rios, 2019; Rodriguez-Pose & Tselios, 2009). Conversely, low 
education limits employment opportunities and income chances. Thus, the higher the average 
education level among employees, the higher the regional wage level. This is in line with the 
findings from Acemoglu & Autor (2011) and Afonso et al. (2013) that the skill-biased 
technological change is a key driver of the expanding wage distribution. Besides qualification, 
workforce heterogeneity can arise from age and gender of the local population. Wages are lower 
in the beginning of the professional career and increase with experience and productivity, but 
may decrease at the end of the career (Harris & Holmstrom, 1982). Aggregating these to the 
regional level we can add the factor 𝑏𝑡, which reflects the regions observable working age 
population characteristics (education, experience, age, gender), to eq (4.7), as follows: 
 ∆𝑤𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑤𝑖 +  ∆𝑝𝑡−1 −  λ(𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑡−1 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1)  − 𝛽𝑢𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑓𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑤𝑖𝑡    (4.8) 
Migration can impact the strength of the human capital factor 𝑏𝑡 by interregional and 
transnational migration dynamics. These bring several interesting dynamics to the model. 
Employees and jobseekers will look for jobs in another region, if they are unsatisfied with their 




regions and individual costs, which increase with distance. If wages are higher within an 
acceptable distance, this brings bargaining power to the local workforce. Thus, the regional 
wages depend on wage developments in neighboring regions. Adding this into eq. (4.8), we get:  
∆𝑤𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑤𝑖 + ∆𝑝𝑡−1 −  λ(𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑡−1 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1)  − 𝛽𝑢𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑓𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐻𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑤𝑖𝑡,   (4.9) 
 
where H is a spatial weight matrix, representing the decreasing likelihood to move with 
distance. The regional wage level thus depends not only on various regional economic factors, 
but on the same factors in neighboring regions. Figure 4.3 illustrates that median gross wages 
for full time employees in Germany definitely show spatial autocorrelated behavior. Moreover, 
we clearly see the presence of high wages in high-productive agglomerations.  





In addition, numerous studies prove that foreign migration has a strong impact on the labor 
market. Immigrants are more likely to perform low-skilled jobs and to earn less than natives 
even if they have similar education and qualifications (e.g. Topel, 1994). In Germany, there is 
especially a share of immigrants from Eastern Europe earning very low wages for example in 
agriculture, in less skill-intensive services and in the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, 
foreign high-skilled workers are recruited for top-level positions in knowledge intensive 
services and global player companies (Afonso et al., 2013). This impact of foreign migration 
on the regional workforce should be already included in our model through factor b, as it 
manifests itself in the worker/population heterogeneity.  
The interactions within (4.9) become more heterogeneous, as we are not only interested in 
average wages, but in different quantiles of the wage distribution. It is probable that not all 
factors have linear effects across the wage distribution. For example, technological progress in 
a region causes demand in high qualified workers, which means that wages on the top of the 
wage distribution rise faster than those on the bottom. On the other hand, a decline in 
unemployment should increase the wages of low-skilled workers, who are more at risk of 
unemployment than high-skilled workers are. Structural policy measures can therefore have 
different effects on the wage distribution depending on the regional factors affected.  
4.4 Data and variables 
For the analysis, we use a balanced panel data set with annual data for the 401 German 
administrative county districts and cities. The Employment History Dataset (BHP) from the 
German Institute for Labor Market Research (IAB) is as the central wage data. It contains 
regional percentiles of monthly gross wages of full-time employees in the private sector at the 
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile level. This data only includes wages of full-time 
employees, while wages and salaries of civil-servants that are determined by long-term 




excluded. This, leads to some shortcomings at the lower end of the wage distribution: In 
particular, the data does not show the development of diverse forms of contracts, such as mini- 
and part-time jobs. However, excluding this part of the labor market from the analysis means 
that we focus on the effects of the GRW funds on full-time employment, which is our intention.  
Wage research often has to struggle with the sensitivity of wage data. Especially data sources 
on inequalities are often lacking even for highly developed countries (Hortas-Rico & Rios, 
2019). Although the administrative data source guarantees best data reliability, we face some 
minor difficulties. First, a continuous wage data set is limited to the years 2001 to 2010, as 
changes in the survey after that date prevent continuous panel data. Second, high incomes on 
the 90th percentile are often censored at the level of the maximum income limit of the 
unemployment insurance system, which leads to missing values in 43 regions with peak 
incomes. All of these regions are cities or located in metropolitan areas and located in West-
Germany (except Berlin). Their economic strength causes that these regions do not receive 
GRW funds, so that the missing data should not compromise the analysis (except Berlin, again). 
The GRW investment subsidies are measured in €, normalized to the regional GDP. This has 
the advantage that real subsidies are taken into account instead of treatment groups as done in 
most econometric policy evaluation studies. As Figure 4.2 shows, there are large differences in 
the funding intensity across regions that are eligible for funding. Moreover, it allows for 
distinguishing between industry and infrastructure subsidies. 
We include further economic measures, as displayed in Table 4.1, in order to apply the 
augmented wage equation from eq. (4.9): In equilibrium, industry investments compensate the 
depreciation of physical capital and accounts for a fixed share of it, so it can be used as a 
measure for physical capital (k). The gross employment rate represents labor input (κ) in eq. 
(6). As a proxy for the regional technology level (A), we include the rate of employees in 




education (university degree) in the workforce. In addition, we use the share of employees 
without vocational training as a second proxy for human capital. Total productivity 
(GDP/working-age population) represents the productivity level in eq. (4.9). The workforce 
heterogeneity (b) in eq. (4.9) is represented by the share of foreign employees, the share of 
employees in their most productive career stage (age 30 – 55) and the share of male employees, 
which controls for the still existing gender pay gap. Firm heterogeneity (f) in eq. (4.9) is 
accounted for by including the firm sizes and the share of employees in the production sector, 
both of which are associated with higher wages. Table 4.1 presents all details on the used 
variables.  
The use of spatial lags as control for spatial autocorrelation in wages as proposed in eq (4.9) is 
explained in section 4.5. All variables are transformed to their natural logarithm. Null values 
are replaced by very small numbers before transformation. As the SpVAR approach presented 
in section 4.5 is limited to stationary panel data sets, we apply the IPS-test (Im et al., 2005), 
which detects non-stationarity for the industry share, higher education, employment, GDP and 
higher wages (test results are given in Appendix Table A4.1). In order to use stationary data in 
the estimation, we subtracted linear time trends from those data together with their spatial lags, 
following Elhorst (2012). To ensure comparability, we de-trended every wage variable, also 




Table 4.1: Variable descriptions and data sources 
Acronym Variable Description Data Source 
1a) GRW_IND 
1b)GRW_INFRA 
GRW funding intensity (either total, industry, or 
infrastructure scheme) in relation to regional GDP  
[GRW subsidies/GDP in € ] 
GRW: Federal Office for Economic 
Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) 
GDP: Working Group „National 
Accounts oft he Federal States. - 
“Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnungen der Länder 
2) INVQ Private sector physical capital industry investment rate in 
the manufacturing, mining and quarrying sector in relation 
to regional GDP 
[Industry Investments in € / GDP in € ] 
German Federal Institute for Research on 
Building, Urban Affairs, and Spatial 
Development (BBSR), ongoing spatial 
monitoring, various issues 
3) IND_S Share of employees in the production sector on all 
employed workers 
[Employed persons in production/Employed persons total ] 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) 
4) EDU Higher education – Workers with a university degree per 
economically active working population 
[Employed persons with university degree/Population aged 
15 to 64 years]  
German Federal Employment Agency  
Population data: German Federal Statistic 
Office  
5) R&D Share of employed persons in Research & Development  
[Employed persons in R&D/Employed persons in total] 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) 
6) EMP Gross employment rate 
[Employed persons/Population aged 15 to 64 years]  
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) 
7) GDP Nominal GDP per economically active working population 
[GDP in €/population aged 15 to 64 years] 
Working Group „National Accounts oft 
he Federal States. - “Arbeitskreis 
Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen 
der Länder 







Monthly gross wages of full-time employees as Mxth 
percentile of the regional wage distribution among all full-
time employed workers  
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) 
9) FSIZE Weighted average firm size value 
[(Employees * individual firm size dummy)/ all employees] 
With dummies: Firms (<10 Employees =1, 10-49 
employees = 2, 50 – 250 employees = 3 and > 250 
employees = 4)) 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) 
10) FOR Foreign employees 
[Employees with German citizenship/total employees] 
German Federal Employment Agency 
11) NDEG Employees without vocational education per economically 
active working population 
[Employees with vocational qualification/Population aged 
15 to 64 years] 
German Federal Employment Agency 
12) AGE Share of Employees between 30 and 55 years 
[Employees aged between 30 and 55 years/ total employee] 
German Federal Employment Agency 
13) GEND Share of male employees 
[Male employees/all employees] 




Table 4.2: Variable summary statistics  
Nr Acronym Observations Min 1.Quarter Mean 3. Quarter Max Std. Dev. 
1a GRW_IND 4010 -18.421 -18.421 -13.776 -7.268 -2.854 5.740 
1b GRW_INFRA 4010 -18.421 -18.421 -15.640 -11.352 -3.392 4.816 
2 INVQ 4010 -8.194 -4.356 -3.971 -3.542 -1.496 0.684 
3 IND_S 4010 -3.261 -1.558 -1.329 -1.016 -0.377 0.413 
3b IND_S_DET 4010 -3.065 -1.525 -1.278 -0.961 -0.327 0.412 
4 EDU 4010 -4.887 -3.649 -3.224 -2.872 -1.016 0.618 
4b EDU_DET 4010 -5.063 -3.937 -3.474 -3.111 -1.364 0.639 
5 R&D 4010 -5.806 -4.594 -4.236 -3.883 -2.247 0.550 
6 EMP 4010 -1.008 -0.748 -0.700 -0.643 -0.468 0.081 
6b EMP_DET 4010 -0.982 -0.779 -0.732 -0.679 -0535 0.074 
7 GDP 4010 9.75 10.29 10.53 10.72 12.03 0.362 
7b GDP_DET 4010 9.68 10.16 10.39 10.58 11.77 0.372 
8a WAGE_M10 4010 6.772 7.041 7.134 7.222 7.519 0.130 
8a2 WAGE_M10_DET 4010 6.791 7.020 7.123 7.220 7.523 0.135 
8b WAGE _M25 4010 7.077 7.428 7.501 7.606 7.933 0.158 
8b2 WAGE_M25_DET 4010 7.045 7.408 7.477 7.581 7.914 0.156 
8c WAGE _M50 4010 7.334 7.723 7.792 7.888 8.270 0.161 
8c2 WAGE_M50_DET 4010 7.311 7.679 7.733 7.818 8.122 0.149 
8d WAGE_M75 4010 7.613 7.955 8.052 8.151 8.688 0.167 
8d2 WAGE_M75_DET 4010 7.587 7.886 7.963 8.051 8.431 0.153 
8e WAGE _M90 3580* 7.866 8.195 8.293 8.403 8.618 0.151 
8e2 WAGE_M90_DET 3580 7.842 8.106 8.190 8.305 8.475 0.137 
9 FSIZE 4010 0.688 0.888 0.958 1.025 1.271 0.093 
10 FOR 4010 -0.190 -0.084 -0.057 -0.025 -0.002 0.040 
11 NDEG 4010 -0.310 -0.094 -0.077 -0.054 -0.021 0.035 
12 AGE 4010 -0.537 -0.446 -0.420 -0.394 -0.284 0.038 
13 GEND 4010 -0.872 -0.656 -0.608 -0.559 -0.320 0.082 
4.5 Econometric approach 
Extracting the real effects of structural funds on wage development in the subsidized regions is 
not easy. The effects may occur directly and without time delay through new created jobs or 
with time-delay due to the rigidity of wages and indirect effects. For example, subsidies may 
trigger productivity or technology growth in the long-term that lead to wage growth in a later 




Flexible vector autoregressive models have evolved as econometric method to analyze dynamic 
relationships between variables in time-series forecasts. Beyond that, the method allows for 
analyzing panel data with time-lagged variables, and the integration of spatial 
interdependencies, which explicitly considers the evolutionary nature of spatial economic 
systems and mutual interdependencies and indirect transmissions of effects between variables 
over time. Finally, it allows for visualizing the various estimated effects to local shocks in 
impulse response functions (IRFs). 
The basic VAR approach by Sims (1980) has experienced two main advances that enable its 
application in regional economics.  Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) adapted the approach for panel 
data, Beenstock & Felsenstein (2007) and Di Giacinto (2010) developed methods to consider 
spatial autocorrelation and introduced the SpVAR model. Our model follows these approaches 
and is similar to the approaches of Mitze et al. (2018) and Eberle et al. (2019). 
We estimate a dynamic SpVAR model to find the effects of GRW subsidies. Therefore, we 
specify a simultaneous equation system consisting of M simultaneous dynamic panel data 
equations in which every variable m appears as dependent variable. All variables are applied 
with a lag length of t -1 year, since the variables need some time to react to “shocks” in other 
variables. This is particularly useful to take into account the stickiness of wages. The lag-length 
t-1 is chosen based on the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Since the considered time period is influenced by trade cycle effects and in particular by the 
economic crisis from 2008 onwards, as well as cross-sectional heterogeneity, it is necessary to 
control for individual (μ) and time fixed effects(𝜏), which are able to control for exogenous 
global effects in the data set. The panel VAR equation system can be aggregated to the 
following reduced form (Rickman, 2010; Mitze et al., 2018): 




where 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote region and time, A is a M*M coefficient matrix representing the 
relationships between dependent and independent time-lagged variables and ε denotes the error 
terms. 
To limit the number of variables in the VAR, which has negative effects on the degrees of 
freedom, we make further assumptions about the endogeneity of variables in the system. We 
expect eight variables to interact directly and indirectly in a reciprocal manner (denoting them 
by y), while five variables control for dynamics in the regional labor market that directly affect 
the average wage development as given in equation (4.9), but do not interact with the other 
growth variables in a reciprocal way (denoting them by z). The former are the variables GRW 
input, investment rate, share of the manufacturing sector, higher education rate, employees in 
research & development, employment rate, GDP per economically active working population 
and the wage variable as displayed in Table 4.1. The latter are firm size, foreign employees, 
employees without vocational education and the employees average age and gender. Thus, we 
extend eq. (10) to differentiate between these groups of variables:  
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  A𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + B𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 +  εit ,                                         (4.11) 
where B is a N*M coefficient matrix representing the relationship of dependent variables to 
time-lagged values of the control variables. 
Furthermore, we consider the role of spatial dependency and spatial spillovers among variables, 
which is represented in the augmented wage equation. Since a Moran’s I test confirms that 
spatial autocorrelation is present not only in wages but in all variables, we include spatial lags 
of all variables into the equations using a Spatial-Durbin model according to Beenstock & 
Felsenstein (2007) and Di Giacinto (2010). Hence, we can extend equation (11) as follows: 




where Hy represents a M*M and Hz represents a N*M coefficient matrix and W is a binary matrix 
of spatial weights in which 𝑊𝑖𝑗 = 1 when there is common border. However, the matrixes B, 
HyW and HzW are only integrated in order to calculate unbiased coefficients for matrix A, which 
is used in the IRF calculation.  
In the empirical analysis the equations can be solved with different types of dynamic panel data 
estimators that have individual advantages and limitations. A detailed summary on this is given 
by Elhorst (2012). Dynamic linear fixed effect models are biased, especially if the time 
dimension is short. (Nickell, 1981). However, GMM estimators, that are the most popular 
alternative, provide reliable results if instruments are strong, but, as shown for example by 
Kiviet (1995) and Binder et al. (2005), the results can be strongly distorted if instruments are 
weak. As a third alternative dynamic quasi-maximum-likelihood estimators such as the QML-
FE estimator (Hsiao et al., 2002) are developed to deal with the known problems. However, we 
observe problems to the indicator in the case of not completely exogenous independent 
variables, which cannot be avoided in the use of spatial lags as independent variables. Weighing 
the pros and cons, we estimate linear estimations, knowing that the Nickell-Bias, which causes 
downward biases in the lag dependent variables’ estimates, is not significantly large for t=10. 
This makes robustness checks very important. Therefore, we additionally estimate the models 
as two-step system-GMM with collapsed instruments, using further lags of the dependent and 
independent variables as instruments. We will carefully refer to the robustness checks in the 
estimation section and present the GMM results in the Appendix. 
Based on the results, we are able to calculate M*M impulse response functions (IRFs) that 
represent the reaction of all y-variables in region i to orthogonalized and uncorrelated 
exogenous shocks in these variables. To this end, the coefficient matrix A𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is transformed 




Since all variables in A are treated as completely endogenous, we define a recursive variable 
order with ascending endogeneity and perform a triangular Choleski identification on the 
variance-covariance matrix of ε, following Mitze et al. (2018). This restricts the 
contemporaneous (same year) effects to one direction in order to avoid over-parametrization of 
the error terms that would lead to biased IRFs (Rickman, 2010). The causal ordering is based 
on a-priori theoretical assumptions on the endogeneity and results from Granger-Causality tests 
(see Appendix A4.2). The variable order corresponds to the order in Table 4.1. Finally, we are 
now able to calculate the moving-average-process over an infinite number of years, but all 
responses are based on the coefficient matrix calculated as in eq. (12). 
In order to obtain 95% confidence intervals of the estimated IRFs, we conduct repeated 
simulations of the SpVAR with panel data sets of the same size that are randomly generated 
from the original data in a Monte Carlo simulation with 500 repetitions. Random regions are 
drawn (with recline) from the original data into the simulation data with all their attributes over 
time. Initial shocks are kept equal to the original SpVAR estimate. 
4.6 Empirical results 
We will present our empirical findings in three steps. In a first step, we present the responses 
of the investigated wage quantiles to shocks in the economic variables in the system to examine 
the differences in the factor’s relevance for each wage quantile. This is relevant to understand 
indirect transmission channels from GRW funding to wage growth. In a second and more 
detailed step, we will present the effects of both GRW funding schemes on the wage quantiles 
to answer our primary research question. Finally, we split the dataset along the former inner-
German border into West and East Germany to compare the responses to both GRW schemes. 
This is useful because the economies of both parts are still quite different. The East is 
structurally weaker than the West and is characterized by lower productivity and wages. 




participation rate, is higher. The results confirm that there is a different reaction to GRW 
funding in the subsamples (Figure 4.6). Berlin is excluded from both subsamples because of its 
particular history. Additionally, we study if there is a difference in the response of wages in the 
production and service sector. This is reasonable as GRW is a policy measure that is mainly 
designed to support the production sector.  
We find further results in the VAR estimation that are not in our focus, such as effects of GRW 
subsidies on variables other than wages. We observe, consistent with most similar studies 
presented in Sector 2, that GRW industry subsidies have significant positive effects on regional 
employment rates and GDP output per working population. The employment effect is 
immediately visible, and significantly positive up to 2 years after the actual subsidy. This was 
expected since job creation is mandatory for most funding cases in this scheme. We find 
significant GDP growth due to GRW industry subsidies from one year after the subsidy, but 
persisting longer term than employment growth.  
Effects of GRW infrastructure subsidies on the local economy differ from those of industry 
funding. We do not observe employment or GDP growth, but significant growth of the share of 
employees in R&D starting one year after funding, which could result from the fact that research 
centers are explicitly part of the funded projects in this investment scheme. It further implies 
that firms engaged in R&D in particular can benefit from infrastructural improvements. 
However, this is not reflected in the growth of other variables. The full sets of IRFs are given 
in the Appendix (Figures A4.1 and A4.2). 
4.6.1 Responses of wages to economic shocks 
In the next step, we take a closer look on the responses of wages to general economic shocks. 
The results are shown in figure 4.4. The IRFs positioned in the same line are responses from a 
given wage quantile to non-policy variables estimated within one SpVAR model. These effects 




reliability and stability of our econometric method. The estimated impulse responses using 
GMM estimations are presented in the appendix (Figures A4.3-A4.8). As expected, GMM’s 
estimate larger coefficients of the autoregressive term, resulting in longer-lasting responses. In 
order to ensure the stability of the system, the R&D variable had to be detrended in the 
robustness tests. This should affect the estimated wage responses to R&D shocks, but not have 
large impact on the estimated wage responses to GRW shocks. 
 
Figure 4.4: Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of Wage variables to isolated shocks in other variables in the SpVAR 
systems. Note: Estimated impulse response functions are solid lines. Dashed lines represent 95% coefficient 
intervals from Monte Carlo simulations with 500 repetitions. IRFs display responses to orthogonal shocks in the 




We find evidence that wages above the median respond significantly positive to shocks in the 
private sector investment rates in the linear equation models (Figure 4.4). However, these 
significances are not robust in GMM estimation (Figure A4.3). Contrary to the theoretical 
considerations, higher education shares do not affect wages according to the linear equation 
models. However, GMM estimates suggest a positive relationship between higher education 
and wages in the long run. In contrast, we find evidence that shocks in the number of R&D 
employees have positive effects on median wages and the 75th percentile of the wage 
distribution. This is a very robust result. In GMM estimation (with detrended R&D variable) 
all wage quantiles respond positively to R&D employment shocks. This proves the general 
impact of an increasingly technology and innovation-oriented economy on the upgrading of 
jobs, but according to the linear model also on increasing regional inequalities, supporting the 
findings from Hortas-Rico & Rios (2019). 
In contrast, shocks in the overall employment rate trigger most positive effects for lowest wages 
at the 10th and 25th percentile, smaller effects on the median and the 75th percentile and not 
significant effects for top wages at the 90th percentile. This is confirmed by the GMM 
estimation. Hence, as expected, low wages are more sensitive to the regional employment 
dynamics, especially the number of unemployed persons. Finally, GDP shocks have very 
positive effects on wages all over the wage distribution, which again is very robust.  
 
4.6.2 Responses of wages to GRW industry funding 
We find evidence that GRW subsidies can have positive effects on wages in the total sample of 
401 German counties and independent cities, but we do not find general validity of this 
statement (Figure 4.5). The estimated effects of GRW industry subsidies on lowest wages (10th 
percentile) initially suggest a positive contemporaneous relationship between GRW and lowest 




automatically associated with the subsidies, as they may occur at a point in the year when the 
subsidies have not yet been paid. We cannot differentiate this with our panel data. However, 
later effects can be claimed as time-causal relationships due to the estimated lag-structure. We 
find the same picture for median wages. Again, the result is not robust. Top wages (75th and 
90th percentile) respond positively to GRW industry subsidies in the medium term (approx. 3 
years after funding). As shown in A4.6, these results remain robust to GMM estimates. These 
medium-term effects appear to be indirect effects to some extent, as subsidies cause GDP 
growth that causes rising wages in the medium term (see Figure 4.4) 
We conclude that the impact of GRW industry funding on wages is limited to high wages. Thus, 
GRW subsidies appear to increase wage inequalities within funded regions. At this point Oates’ 
(1999) argument is not met, since mainly affluent employees seem to benefit from public 
redistributive policies.  
Splitting up the sample into western and eastern regions, we observe that GRW effects on wages 
are much more often positive and several times higher in the eastern part than in the West 
(Figure 4.6). Since shocks are hold constant over both versions, the y-scales are comparable, 
although real GRW subsidies are much higher in the East. In the Western part of Germany 
significant medium-run effects can be found for top wages (90th percentile) (robust for GMM 
Figure 4.5: Impulse responses of wages to GRW Industry shocks. Each response represents individual model 
estimation, thus shock strength is not comparable. Model specifications remain constant except for the wage 





Figure 4.6: Impulse Responses of wage variables to GRW industry shocks in the Western and the Eastern 
subsample. Shock strength are hold constant to estimation with total sample. Specifications equal Figure 4.5 
(A4.5)). However, the immediate effects are volatile, so that both are not necessarily 
significantly positive in total.  
In contrast, we find significantly positive effects on all estimated quantiles except for top wages 
in the East, using both estimation techniques. It shows that wage responses to subsidies differ 
substantially between the East and the West. The effects on lower wages may be due to 
employment and productivity effects. Thus, GRW industry subsidies in the East have several 
positive effects on wages, indicating sustainable improvements in the labor market that do not 
occur in the subsidized Western regions. Surprisingly, we find no substantial differences 
between wage responses in the industry and the service sector, although this scheme aims at 
supporting firms in the industrial sector. 
These results do not allow us to draw conclusions about the development of intraregional 
inequalities in the East. While short-term job creation due to GRW subsidies appears to support 
low-income jobs, GRW induced regional growth effects appear to support high-wages in a 





4.6.3 Responses of wages to GRW infrastructure funding 
As expected, wage responses to infrastructure subsidies differ from those to industry subsidies 
(Figure 4.7). There are no significant effects on wages below the median. Median wages and  
75th percentile wages show a significant response to infrastructure subsidies, which also holds 
for GMM estimation (Figure A4.6, without significance for t=0). Top wages at the 90th do not 
respond significantly These effects could be explained by the observed growth in R&D 
employment, since we find neither employment nor productivity growth. Thus, the effects may 
indicate an upgrading of jobs towards more skill intensive positions, but not management 
positions. 
Again, the wage effects of GRW infrastructure subsidies in the West differ substantially from 
those in the East (Figure 4.8). Wage responses to infrastructure subsidies in the West are not 
significant at all in the linear model, while wages at the 25th and 50th and 75th percentile in the 
East immediately respond significantly positive to GRW. Again the GMM check points to more 
volatile immediate relationships, but confirms a positive reaction to GRW subsidies in the East 
(also for the 10th percentile) (Figure A4.7).  
 
Figure 4.7: Impulse responses of wages to GRW Infrastructure shocks. Each response represents individual 
model estimations, thus shock. Model specifications remain constant except for the wage variable. Graph 




Unlike for industrial funding, we find differences in wage responses between the production 
and service sector for infrastructure subsidies. For the production sector, we find no significant 
wage effects at all, neither in total, in the West, nor in the East. In contrast, we find that wage 
growth in the service sector due to GRW infrastructure subsidies seems to drive the observed 
effects (Figure 4.9). These results are robust in the GMM estimation (A4.8). We can conclude 
that infrastructure subsidies mainly affect wages in the service sector. This supports the 
hypothesis that growth due to GRW subsidies is mainly driven by R&D subsidies. Since these 
are wages around the median, we find that Oates’ (1999) argument is neither met nor rejected 
in the case of infrastructure subsidies. However, as the effects are not accompanied by total 
GRW-induced productivity growth, it is not likely that these effects trickle-down to low-income 
workers over time. 
Figure 4.9: Impulse responses of Service sector wages to GRW infrastructure shocks. Shock strength are hold 
constant to estimation with total sample. Specifications equal Figure 4.5 
Figure 4.8: Impulse Responses of wage variables to GRW infrastructure shocks in the Western and the Eastern 






4.7 Conclusion  
The paper contributes to the evaluation of the economic effects of structural investment policies 
by drawing attention to wage responses to structural funds (GRW) in Germany. A SpVAR 
simultaneous equation model is applied to regional panel data for the 401 German county 
districts and independent cities in the period 2001- 2010 to examine causal effects of GRW 
subsidies. The model incorporates advanced theoretical representations of regional wage 
growth based on the wage equation from Blanchard and Katz (1997). Mutual responses to 
orthogonal shocks to variables in the regional economic system are illustrated in impulse 
response functions. This method allows the simultaneous estimation of multiple effects on the 
regional economies and the inclusion of indirect effects and interdependencies between 
variables. For instance, consistent with studies by Schalk and Untiedt (2003), von Ehrlich and 
Seidel (2015) and Dettmann et al. (2017), we find employment growth as a consequence from 
subsidies in the GRW industry subsidies, which may result from mandatory job creation within 
the funding scheme.  
We find, however, that these growth effects do not lead to significant overall wage growth, but 
to wage growth that is limited to certain quantiles of the wage distribution, to specific funding 
schemes, and to certain regions and sectors. While industry subsidies appear to support more 
affluent employees especially in the wealthier West, effects of the infrastructure subsidies are 
limited to East Germany, mainly in the medium range of the wage distribution. We find that 
skill-intensive services in particular seem to benefit from infrastructure subsidies, although 
GRW has a general focus on the industrial sector. Thus, infrastructure subsidies seem to 
contribute to structural change in industrially dominated regions that face structural difficulties. 
Moreover, these findings somehow contradict the growth and employment effects that are 
found by many studies (and also true for the infrastructure scheme in this study). This could be 




contracts, which decouples their short-term development from single funding or productivity 
enhancing events and may only appear due to long-term stable productivity growth on firm 
level, which would require a more advanced lag-strucure in the estimation system to be 
identified. Extending the model to better capture long-term effects would make it even more 
complex, but could be an interesting further research on this topic. To gain more detailed 
insights into this dynamics, future research could also compare wage effects in different 
economic sectors to explain the found relationship between infrastructure funding and wages 
in the service sector, or focus on other inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient. 
While this study concentrates on economic effects in Germany, it seems reasonable that its 
results provide a relevant contribution to the general discussion of effects from similar regional 
investment policies such as the closely related European Regional Development Fund, even 
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Table A4.1: Test results for Im-Pesaran-Shin Unit-Root Test 
Acronym Test-statistic (Wtbar) p-value 
GRW_IND 
-18.847 0.000 
GRW_INFRA -13.535 0.000 
INVQ -24.54 0.000 
IND_S -11.61 1.000 
IND_S_DET -29.19 0.000 
EDU 37.33 1.000 
EDU_DET -30.95 0.000 
R&D -5.87 0.000 
EMPL 4.31 1.000 
EMPL_DET -26.27 0.000 
GDP 14.30 1.000 
GDP_DET -34.05 0.000 
WAGE_M10 -5.68 0.000 
WAGE_M10_DET -27.82 0.000 
WAGE_M25 -5.67 0.000 
WAGE_M25_DET -39.38 0.000 
WAGE_M50 10.16 1.000 
WAGE_M50_DET -40.16 0.000 
WAGE_M75 19.05 1.000 
WAGE_M75_DET -39.13 0.000 
WAGE_M90 24.93 1.000 
WAGE_M90_DET -36.86 0.000 
Notes: Im-Pesaran-Shin-Test for unit roots in Panel data as in Im, Pesaran, Shin (2005). Alternative hypothesis: 









    GRW_IND    GRW_INFRA        INVQ      IND_S_DET       EDU_DET           R&D    EMPL_DET    GDP_DET     WAGE_M50 
value p-value value p-value value p-value value p-value value p-value value p-value value p-value value p-value value p-value 
GRW_IND x x - - 0.97 0.33 1.77 0.08 -1.13 0.26 1.93 0.05 0.38 0.70 -0.38 0.70 -0.09 0.93 
GRW_INFRA - - x x 0.22 0.83 -0.89 0.37 -0.40 0.68 0.83 0.41 -0.27 0.78 -0.58 0.56 -0.57 0.57 
INVQ -0.81 0.42 3.46 0.00 x x 1.81 0.07 1.86 0.06 2.55 0.01 3.34 0.00 4.12 0.00 4.35 0.00 
IND_S_DET 0.14 0.89 0.29 0.77 3.33 0.00 x x 5.40 0.00 1.97 0.00 9.99 0.00 11.27 0.00 5.63 0.00 
EDU_DET 0.52 0.60 -0.03 0.97 6.63 0.00 6.14 0.00 x x 7.59 0.00 14.98 0.00 5.46 0.00 9.95 0.00 
R&D -0.09 0.92 0.18 0.86 1.86 0.06 2.03 0.04 2.23 0.02 x x 6.35 0.00 3.25 0.00 3.22 0.00 
EMPL_DET 1.77 0.07 0.86 0.39 5.42 0.00 4.71 0.00 4.52 0.00 15.95 0.00 x x -.04 0.96 13.91 0.00 
GDP_DET -0.18 0.86 1.97 0.04 3.91 0.00 9.74 0.00 7.10 0.00 -0.90 0.37 9.63 0.00 x x 24.51 0.00 
WAGE_M50_DET 1.08 0.28 -0.10 0.92 1.07 0.28 9.16 0.00 14.06 0.00 0.94 0.34 24.33 0.00 3.81 0.00 x x 
Note: Granger Causality Test is performed for every region, test as given in Dumitrescu &Hurlin (2012) 
Alternative hypothesis = Granger causality given for at least one region 





Figure A4.1: Full set of IRFs with GRW Industry subsidies (GRW_IND) and median wages 
(WAGES_M_50). 
 
Notes: Impulse response Functions (IRFs) of Wage variables to isolated shocks in other variables in 
the SpVAR systems with linear fixed effects estimations. Note: Estimated impulse response functions 
are solid lines. Dashed lines represent 95% coefficient intervals from Monte Carlo simulations with 
500 repetitions. IRFs display responses to orthogonal shocks in the amount of the standard 







Figure A4.2: Full set of IRFs with GRW Infrastructure inputs (GRW_INFRA) and median wages 
(WAGES_M_50). 
 













Figure A4.3: Wage responses to variables in the SpVAR system with GMM estimations 
 
 
Note: This Figure is the robustness check to Figure 4.4, using GMM estimations as given in Section 





Figure A4.4: Wage responses to GRW Industry subsidies with GMM estimations 
 
 
Note: This Figure is the robustness check to Figure 4.5, using GMM estimations as given in Section 
4.5. Specifications equal Figure 4.5. 
Figure A4.5: Wage responses to GRW Industry subsidies in Eastern and Western subsample with 
GMM estimations 
 
Note: This Figure is the robustness check to Figure 4.6, using GMM estimations as given in Section 
4.5. Specifications equal Figure 4.6. 
Figure A4.6: Wage responses to GRW Infrastructure subsidies with GMM estimations 
 
Note: This Figure is the robustness check to Figure 4.7, using GMM estimations as given in Section 





Figure A4.7: Wage responses to GRW Infrastructure subsidies in the Western and Eastern subsample 
with GMM estimations 
 
Note: This Figure is the robustness check to Figure 4.8, using GMM estimations as given in Section 
4.5. Specifications equal Figure 4.8. 
Figure A4.8: Wage responses in the service sector to GRW Infrastructure subsidies with GMM 
estimations 
 
Note: This Figure is the robustness check to Figure 4.9, using GMM estimations as given in Section 




5. Analyzing the spatio-temporal diffusion of economic change – advanced statistical 
approach and exemplary application 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: This paper was submitted for publication in Spatial Economic Analysis (22.12.2020). The paper 
is co-authored by Thomas Brenner. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract: This article presents a spatio-temporal panel vector-autoregressive approach 
(SptpVAR) as an extended spatial econometric method for analyzing spillover effects of 
regional economic change in time and space. The approach aims to extend the spatial dimension 
of SpVAR models by capturing the overall cross-regional spillover dynamics over time through 
additional estimations of effects into neighboring regions and backward spillover to the source 
region. By showing how local economic dynamics trigger spillover dynamics in economically 
linked regions, the results are of particular interest to policy makers. To demonstrate the 
functioning of the SptpVAR approach, it is applied to 361 German regions using a regional 
growth model and a regional panel data set in the time-period 2000-2017 in an exemplary 
application. 
Keywords: Economic dynamics, Spatial spillover, Spatial econometrics, SpVAR 






Regional sciences face growing interest in applied spatial econometrics and interest in spatial 
data analysis tools. Especially the analysis of economic spillover and externalities across 
regional units is an important topic to understand the spatial dynamics of economic systems. 
Simultaneously, dynamic flexible vector-autoregressive panel models (pVARs), as one of many 
methods, have become an essential tool in the empirical analysis of economic systems with 
interrelated variables and estimation of responses to exogenous shocks, such as economic 
policy interventions. Although cutting-edge pVAR models are referred to as spatial panel VARs 
(SpVAR), these models provide scope for improvement in the integration of cross-regional 
interdependencies among variables and the spatial dissemination of economic effects in 
neighboring or economically linked regions (e.g. the models of Beenstock & Felsenstein 2007, 
Mitze et al.; 2018, Eberle et al., 2019). Local economic growth shocks cause spatial externalities 
in economically linked regions due to various transmission channels that affect the mobility of 
production factors, such as technology and knowledge diffusion, commuting, or cross-border 
trade. Thus, effects from a single economic shock can disseminate in space by causing 
multiplicative effects. 
The used SpVAR approaches fall short to capture the complete spatiotemporal dynamics for 
two reasons: First, only direct spatial effects from neighboring regions to the analyzed region 
are considered (so-called in-spillover), neglecting economic linkages with larger geographic 
distance. Second, in most of these cases spatial effects are only used to avoid statistical biases 
caused by spatially autocorrelated error terms. Further spatial effects over time are usually not 
analyzed (an exception is Wardenburg & Brenner, 2020). This is somewhat inconsistent, 
because the SpVAR approaches considers indirect effects among the variables included, 
meaning the effects from one variable to another and from this variable to a third variable and 




region and feedback effects into the initial region are not examined. The reason for this 
shortcoming in the literature can be found in the complexity of spatial spillover. On the one 
hand, the spatial structure allows for a large variety of third-order and higher spillover effects. 
On the other hand, the spillover effects strongly depend on the type of regions involved. In 
principle, a complete analysis of spatial spillover would require to consider each region with its 
specific characteristics and neighbors separately, which would imply separate regressions for 
each region, which usually is not statistically possible without increasing the number of 
observations.  
The purpose of this paper is to develop an approach that is able to capture and analyze spatial 
spillover processes as far as possible within a rather general statistical approach, integrate them 
into the resulting impulse response functions (IRFs) and estimate the spatial expansion of 
regional economic shocks over neighboring and economically linked regions. To this end the 
SpVAR approach is extended to include the spatial dissemination of local economic shocks 
over time while considering regional heterogeneity in region types and economic structure. To 
demonstrate the functioning of the approach, it is applied to the economic development in 
German regions. The assessment of spatial effects is of particular importance for regional policy 
makers, since it is important to know how economic policy measures for one region affect other 
regions.  
Using German regional panel data in the time-period 2000 to 2017, we use our recursive 
SptpVAR to analyze the spatio-temporal dissemination of economic changes, especially local 
labor demand shocks and productivity growth. The study focusses on the extent to which both 
variables affect economic development in economically connected regions. A specific interest 
in this paper is in supra-regional labor market migration in reaction to local economic shocks, 




The remainder of the paper succeeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theory on spatial 
interdependent growth models and cross-regional spillover dynamics as well as spatial VAR 
models. Section 3 introduces our SptpVAR framework strategy and exemplary data and 
variables. The empirical results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes with a summary. 
5.2. Theoretical background 
As it is widely shown in theoretical and empirical works, the economic development of 
countries, regions or cities depends to a certain extend on economic processes within nearby 
regions or countries due to growth spillover and cross-regional interdependencies (e.g. Ertur & 
Koch, 2007; Grossmann & Helpman, 1991; Howitt, 2000; Rey & Janikas, 2005; Rey & 
Montouri, 1999). From an observer’s perspective this can be seen in historical examples such 
as the spatiotemporal dissemination of the industrial revolution across England and Europe, but 
also in the present co-movement in business cycles of neighboring and economically linked 
regions (Montoya & de Haan, 2008).  
Multi-country growth models explaining spatially interdependent growth by considering cross-
unit spillover have been developed in endogenous as well as neoclassical settings. Endogenous 
growth models that emphasize the role of knowledge and innovation spillover as source of 
spatially interdependent technological progress are more common (Coe & Helpman, 1995; 
Ertur & Koch, 2011; Grossmann & Helpman, 1991; Howitt, 2000; Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes, 
2005). Basile and Usai (2015) provide a summary on these models. Nevertheless, for the basic 
mechanisms in our application we build on a neoclassic model that considers the spatial effects 
of technology and knowledge diffusion and the mobility of further production factors, such as 






5.2.1. Spatial growth models 
Neoclassic regional growth models build on the Solow-Modell, which explains regional growth 
of a closed market as a function of Capital (K), Labor (L) and Technology (A) (Solow, 1956). 
Borts and Stein (1964) advanced this model to the first regional growth model allowing for 
spatial spillover.  
Following Lopez-Bazo et al. (2004) who extend the common neoclassical growth model from 
Mankiw et al. (1992) by including cross-regional spatial spillover that are mainly caused by 
technological diffusion, we start with formulating the labor productivity in a simple regional 
economy i in period t as: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝜏𝑘ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝜏ℎ, (5.1) 
where k and h are physical and human capital per labor unit and 𝜏𝑘 and 𝜏ℎ are internal returns 
to both factors, determined by population growth, technology growth and depreciation rate 
(Lopez-Bazo et al., 2004). The spatial dimension is integrated trough spatial technology and 
knowledge diffusion. Thus, 𝐴𝑖𝑡 depends on the technological level of neighboring regions, 
which, in turn, depends on physical and human capital intensity in this regions. So 𝐴𝑖𝑡 is defined 
as: 
 𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  ∆𝑡(𝑘𝜌𝑖𝑡
𝜏𝑘 ℎ𝜌𝑖𝑡
𝜏ℎ )𝛾, (5.2) 
with the exogenous component ∆𝑡 that is assumed to be constant over regions and 𝑘𝜌𝑖𝑡 and ℎ𝜌𝑖𝑡 
denoting the physical and human capital ratios in neighbor regions while 𝛾 measures the 
strength of externalities across regions (Lopez-Bazo et al., 2004). Combining (5.1) and (5.2), it 
becomes clear that a region’s steady state labor productivity and growth rate depend on capital 
investments within the region and in its neighbors. Thus, labor productivity in a region profits 




regional growth systems cannot be analyzed without incorporating spatial interdependencies. 
Similar to Mankiw et al. (1992), physical and human capital growth within a region is a function 
of regional capital accumulation, population and technology growth and depreciation rate. 
Additionally, due to decreasing returns to capital, investment rates are a decreasing function of 
capital stocks, while it is an increasing function of capital stocks in neighboring regions due to 
externalities across economies, which makes investments more profitable in regions surrounded 
by regions with high capital intensity (Lopez-Bazo et al. 2004). The authors conclude, that the 
initial conditions for regional growth within a region equal the ones in Mankiw et al (1992), 
while externalities across regions cause that growth to depend on the initial productivity and 
growth rates in their neighbors. As a consequence, the growth rates of two identical economies 
with identical preconditions may differ if preconditions in their neighbors differ (Lopez-Bazo 
et al., 2004). The authors argue that spillover do not accelerate the convergence rate across 
regions as they are a function of parameters within each economy, while persistent inequalities 
are intensified by more intensive knowledge diffusion among neighboring strong economies 
(Lopez-Bazo et al., 2004). In addition, Pfaffermayr (2009) points out, that knowledge and 
innovation advantages affect neighboring regions first, but become global within time due to 
spatial diffusion. 
Ertur and Koch (2007) develop a similar spatially augmented growth model based on the 
Solow-Model (Solow, 1956) with technological interdependence with similar theoretical 
assumptions as Lopez-Bazo et al. (2004). In their model, a region’s steady state real income per 
worker depends positively on the region’s saving rate and negatively on population growth. 
The same applies for savings and population growth in neighboring regions due to spatial 






5.2.2. Factor mobility spillover effects 
Both the models of Lopez-Bazo et al. (2004) and Ertur and Koch (2007) focus on knowledge 
and technological spillover as the only factors that are able to cross regional borders. Pecuniary 
production factors are still handled as closed economies, ignoring capital and labor mobility 
and other spillover that have direct impact on the regional steady state by affecting physical and 
human capital intensity as well as regional population growth (Pfaffermayr, 2012). We argue, 
that this should also be considered in analyzing spatial growth systems.  
Capello (2009) identifies three major categories of spatial spillover: Knowledge spillover, 
industry spillover and growth spillover, pointing out that cross-regional interdependencies are 
not limited to knowledge spillover. Industry spillover, that may include knowledge spillover, 
occur on firm level within related industries, if linked firms benefit from value or productivity 
gains of dynamic, usually large firms without direct compensation through input or output 
linkages (Barrios et al. 2003). Growth spillover in the most general form summarize all types 
of growth transmissions between related regions, including knowledge and industry spillover 
(Capello, 2009; Arora & Vamvakidis, 2005; Cheshire, 1995). Spatial externalities result from 
the openness and spatial as well as economical limitation of regional economic systems, which 
are not self-sufficient, but necessarily interact, inter alia, in supply and demand of goods, 
production factors and common supply chains (Capello, 2009). Thus, local economic volatility 
that affects the demand and supply of goods and production factors has a direct transmission 
channel into other regions by increasing the needs for imports from other regions, as additional 
demand cannot be fully absorbed by local supply. These pecuniary externalities may lead to 
income and GDP growth in trade-linked regions and further multiplicative effects in those 
regions as developed in the Export-Growth-Theory (North, 1955). Moreover, regions directly 




capacities and consumption demands at the place of residence directly depend on the workplace 
income per worker. 
5.2.3. Labor market mobility 
Migration between regions is modelled as exogenous in the presented neoclassical growth 
models. However, labor productivity, income per worker and labor market migration are 
strongly interwoven and migration has large impact on population growth. Therefore, 
Pfaffermayr (2012) presents an augmented Solow growth model including net-migration, based 
on the works of Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004), Sung (2010) and Braun (1993). These postulate 
(average) income differentials per worker as main driver of migration across regions, whereby 
individuals migrate towards regions with higher income and job opportunities (Barro & Sala-I-
Martin, 2004). Pfaffermayr (2012) models net immigration ξ for a set of regions 𝑦𝑁 as: 
 ξ(𝑦1 … , 𝑦𝑁) ≈ κ[(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖
∗) − ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑦𝑗
∗)𝑁𝑗=1 ] , (5.3) 
where, 𝑚𝑖𝑗 denotes the exogenous spatial weights, representing that relocations spanning 
smaller distances are more likely than large distance moves, due to financial and social 
migration costs and frictions, y* denotes steady state regional income and κ is a parameter 
reflecting the sensitivity of willingness to migrate at a given spatially weighted average 
differential income per worker (Pfaffermayr, 2012). Thus, κ is a factor of the individual 
weighting of locational utilities that result from economic incentives, natural amenities and 
cultural (manmade) residential amenities (Rodriguez-Pose & Ketterer, 2012; Wardenburg & 
Brenner, 2020). 
The question whether labor market migration has positive or negative effects on regional 
growth and convergence across regions is answered differently in the literature (Ozgen et al., 
2010; Huber & Tondl, 2012; Fratesi & Percoco, 2014). From a neoclassical perspective 




the capital-labor ratio and vice versa for emigration. On the other hand, emigration potentially 
decreases a regions human capital, with negative effects on output and labor productivity. 
Hence, Pfaffermayr and Fischer (2018) argue that migration accelerates convergence between 
high and low income regions if human capital of immigrants is not higher than that of natives. 
Given, that the income differentials result inter alia from higher average human capital in the 
immigration region, this should apply on average. However, assuming that migrants are 
particularly high-skilled seeking for additional income rewards brain-drain dynamics reduce 
the human capital of the sending region and decelerate convergence.  
Given these dependencies, an econometric model for analyzing the spatial effects in economic 
growth should consider physical and human capital growth, innovation, labor as well as income 
and migration. While the possibility of negative spatial externalities is not considered in the 
mentioned spatial growth literature, their presence in reality is likely due to brain-drain effects 
and competition between firms in neighboring regions causing productivity increases in one 
region negatively affecting other regions.  
5.2.4. Spatial VAR-models 
Flexible VAR models have their origin in Sims (1980) approach for vector-autoregressive time-
series forecasting. Their main advantage is that flexible models are able to estimate mutual 
time-lagged interaction across dynamic regional variables without making too many a priori 
restrictions. Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) adapted Sims approach for panel data VAR 
(pVAR) estimations. pVARs model economic interdependencies by estimating simultaneous 
dynamic regression models in which each variable in the system is a dependent variable, 
depending on lagged values of all variables in the system. Therefore, our starting point is a 
reduced form simultaneous dynamic first-order panel VAR estimation system in its aggregated 
form with M estimations, where M equals the number of variables in the system and i and t 




 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  A𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + εit . (5.4) 
In this basic form A represents an M*M coefficient matrix. Its values describe the relationship 
of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 to time-lagged endogenous variables in the system, while 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 represent individual 
and time-fixed effects to control for cross-sectional heterogeneity and global economic 
dynamics and trade-cycle effects (such as economic crisis) within the panel data set.  
This unrestricted model has serious shortcomings as it treats all variables as fully endogenous, 
which results in over-parametrization and biased impulse response functions (Rickman, 2010). 
To overcome this problem, the structural VAR model is used. An a-priori causal variable 
ordering that represents the causal economic structure of variables based on their assumed 
degree of endogeneity is done (Bernanke, 1986). A subsequent decomposition of the variance-
covariance matrix prevents that contemporaneous relations across variables are captured by the 
instantaneous covariance of the error term (Mitze et al., 2018). The detailed procedure is 
described in section 3. 
Since the presented structural VAR model ignores potential spatial spillover effects, it does not 
fit regional panel datasets. Beenstock and Felsenstein (2007) and Di Giacinto (2010) proposed 
ways to calculate coefficients for A that are not biased by spatial autocorrelation by including 
spatial lag variables as additional independent variables to equation (5.4): 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  μ𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝐴1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐻1𝑊𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + εit , (5.5) 
where H is an additional M*M matrix of spatial lag coefficients and W is a spatial weight 
matrix, constant over the M-estimations and over time. In general, further past times (t-2, t-3, 
…) can be included in Equation (5.5) implying the use of further coefficient matrices 
𝐴2, 𝐻2, 𝐴3, 𝐻3 and so on. To keep the presentation of our methodological extension simple and 
since only one past time is relevant in our application example, we consider only dependencies 




model (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019). Although, these models are able to correct for exogenous push-
in spillover effects, where economic growth results from developments in related regions, they 
still do not quantify these effects or integrate push-out spillover effects, since the values of H 
are ignored in the further examination. Wardenburg and Brenner (2020) present an extended 
spatial indirect SpVAR model and calculate push-in spillover effects by estimating additional 
impulse responses representing the effects of a shock in a neighboring region, based on a one-
time growth spillover into the estimated region, however, still ignoring possible later second-
order spillover. 
Canova and Cicarelli (2009) model a multi-country VAR for multiple time-series based on a 
global vector-autoregression (GVAR) approach. This approach allows for time variation in the 
estimated coefficients, but does not explicitly focus on spatial interdependencies. In a restricted 
GVAR approach Dewachter, Houssa and Torffamo (2012) model a European cross-country 
VAR which models push-out spillover for Germany under the assumption of a homogenous 
spatial lag structure. Ramajo, Marquez and Hewings (2017) follow a multiREG-SpVAR that is 
also based on GVAR methods for seventeen Spanish regions. The model estimates push-in and 
push-out spillover and explicitly allows for heterogeneity in spillover intensity across regions 
and allows to identify regions as growth generators with large outward growth spillover. 
However, this estimation technique ignores effects over time and needs to estimate individual 
regression systems for every regional unit. Thus, it is not appropriate for data sets with a large 
number of regions. 
In general, within a SpVAR approach all estimation techniques that are used in panel data 
analysis can be applied. Elhorst (2012) provides an overview of adequate estimators and their 
limitations for dynamic panel models pointing out that least-squares models including 
individual fixed effects and lagged dependent variables (OLS-FE) are biased due to the known 




moments (GMM) estimators have become the most popular alternative, providing consistent 
estimators under the assumption of strong instrumental variables. However, Kiviet (1995), 
Hsiao et al. (2002) and Binder et al. (2005) show that GMMs produce noteworthy biases if 
instruments are weak. Alternatively, transformed likelihood based estimators such as the quasi-
maximum likelihood estimator including fixed effects (QML-FE) proposed by Hsiao et al. 
(2002), and the orthogonal reparametrization approach (OPM) by Lancaster (2002) have been 
developed considering the incidental parameter problem resulting from maximum-likelihood 
estimations in dynamic panel models (see Neyman & Scott, 1948). Binder et al. (2005) and 
Pickup and Hopkins (2020) show, that this estimator outperforms classic OLS-FE, GMMs and 
the QML-FE estimators especially for small t. However, we find that these estimators face 
serious problems, if independent variables are not completely exogenous to the lagged 
dependent variables, what automatically is the case for time-lagged spatial lags of the dependent 
variable and if partially multicollinearity among independent variables is present. For the sake 
of simplicity in our application example we use OLS-FE techniques, arguing that the known 
bias is small with t=17, which is rather preferable against the unknown biases of the other 
techniques. Furthermore, our focus is not on the estimation technique but on the way in which 
push-in and push-out spillover can be considered. Our approach for dealing with spillover - 
presented in Section 3 - can be combined with all kinds of estimators. 
5.2.5. Impulse response functions 
Based on the coefficients of A𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 from (5) it is now possible to model impulse response 
functions (IRFs) that illustrate the response of a particular variable to an isolated uncorrelated 
shock in another variable in the system that includes indirect effects between variables in the 
system over time. In a non-spatial VAR this is expressed by transforming A𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 to its moving-
average form, in which 𝐴𝑇 represents the dependence on the variable values T time steps before, 




 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑢𝑡 . (5.6) 
Considering the above-mentioned problems with over-parametrization a Choleski 
decomposition of the covariance matrix is performed following Lütkepohl (2005). This 
decomposition leads to a matrix A that is premultiplied to eq. (6): 
 𝐴𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴1
∗ 𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑝
∗ 𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + ε𝑡. (5.7) 
Considering now the shock element 𝐼𝑘 which is a diagonal matrix with unit variance of the input 
variables, adding (𝐼𝑘 – A)𝑦𝑡 to (4) gives  
 𝑦𝑡 =  𝐴0
∗ 𝑦𝑡 +  𝐴1
∗𝑦𝑡−1+…+𝐴𝑝
∗ 𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + ε𝑡, (5.8) 
where 𝐴0
∗  equals 𝐼𝑘 – A and is a lower triangular matrix (Lütkepohl, 2005). Thus, this estimation 
is recursive and does not allow for instantaneous circular effects, but may contains mutual 
effects beginning from 𝑦𝑡+1. 
5.3. Econometric advancement 
In this section we present our technique for extending the presented SpVAR models to a flexible 
recursive SptpVAR that enables to estimate push-in and push-out spillover corrected impulse 
responses for a specific location and its economically connected neighbors over time.  
Taking equation (5.5) as a starting point, we follow the reasoning of Wardenburg and Brenner 
(2020) that inward spillover intensity per time step is given by the matrix of spatial lag 
coefficients (𝐻𝑊𝑦𝑖𝑡−1). This enables to calculate spatial spillover into a region i by assuming 
a shock within a neighboring region 𝑖𝑤 and multiplying it with the spatial lag matrix to get 
inward effects from an external shock into the calculated region at the next time step of the IRF 
estimation. In case of two identical economies in terms of size and structure, one could argue, 
that inward spillover effects from 𝑖𝑤 to i equal the outward spillover from i to 𝑖𝑤, which would 




for differences in size, the inward spillover effect into i is a multiple of the outward spillover to 
𝑖𝑤, where the multiplier is not known. It could be argued that the multiplier is equal to the size 
ratio of both economies. However, this relies on the assumption that spillover depend linearly 
on size. Moreover, the assumption of structural homogeneity in space would be necessary, 
which is rather unlikely to hold in reality. Economic and geographical characteristics bring 
strong heterogeneity in the ability to produce and absorb spatial externalities. For example, the 
more a country’s or region’s firms and institutions are integrated in cross-border cooperation, 
innovation systems, commuting and trade, the more is its economic development influenced by 
the development of other regions. Thus, for example, landlocked regions experience more 
spatial spillover than coastal regions or islands (Roberts & Deichmann, 2009). Moreover, the 
infrastructure and accessibility of other regions determine the ability to absorb economic growth 
and defines the amount of spillover (Durlauf & Johnson, 1995). For example, central regions 
usually possess a strong linkage to their neighboring regions. In consequence, the spatial 
dissemination of shocks strongly depends on the spatial and economic structure of the neighbors 
and is strongly heterogeneous in space, meaning that a region might be more affected by a shock 
in a neighboring region than the other way round, even if both regions are of same size. As a 
consequence, we argue that calculating outward spillover from a region as equal to inward 
spillover using spatial lag coefficients from (5.5) is not correct, although it provides a way to 
calculate a rough estimation.  
To explicitly take into account spatial heterogeneity, we model push-in and push-out spillover 
effects over time, not only for the regional unit in which the computed shock occurs, but also 
for spatio-economically linked regions. In order to keep the following calculable, we assume 
that the spatial weight matrix W contains only values of 0 and 1, meaning that we only 
distinguish between neighbors and non-neighbors, as done in most studies. Furthermore, it is 




all direct neighbor regions as a hypothetical single region iw, which influences the developments 
in the considered region i and is influenced by the shock in region i due to economic spillover. 
Assuming that this neighborhood region iw surrounds region i, we can define a second 
neighborhood region 𝑖𝑤𝑤 (with i ⊈ 𝑖𝑤𝑤) consisting of all neighbors to region 𝑖𝑤 (with i ⊈ 𝑖𝑤𝑤). 
So, 𝑖𝑤𝑤 can be called the second order neighborhood of i. In the same way further orders of 
neighborhood could be build, but in our application further orders do not matter. That might be 
different in other applications. Figure 5.1 shows an exemplary neighborhood structure and the 
theoretical dissemination of economic shocks in space. 
The neighborhoods 𝑖𝑤 and 𝑖𝑤𝑤 of each region i are combinations of original regions and have 
to be constructed in the dataset. The number of these units equals the number of regions in the 
dataset for each neighborhood , 𝑖𝑤, 𝑖𝑤𝑤,(…) since every region has one neighborhood region 
at each order of neighboring. The identification of spatially and economically linked regions is 
presented in section 5.3.2. As mentioned above, using summed neighborhood regions 
represents a simplification. However, the only more exact version would require to treat all 
regions separately, implying single regressions for each of them. Using summed neighborhood 
regions allows distinguishing regions with different surrounding settlement structure, e.g. big 







cities with their surrounding and rural regions in the periphery. By this part of the spatial 
structure and type of neighboring regions is considered. However, it means that some 
information on individual regional spillover get lost in summing up neighborhood regions. 
By calculating accurate neighborhoods instead of calculating spatially weighted lags, we can 
rewrite equation (5.5) to: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  μ𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝐴1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐻1𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑡−1 + εit , (5.9) 
where the coefficient matrix 𝐻 defines the spillover intensity from the combined neighborhood 
region 𝑖𝑤 into i. Again, as in the following, we include only the dependence on the former time 
step. Of course, further past times could be included in the same way. 
We now extend the approach and estimate the autoregressive dynamic effects within the 
combined regions 𝑖𝑤 by formulating an additional M*M autoregressive process congruent to 
equation (5.9): 
 𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖𝑤 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝐶1𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝐺1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1, + 𝐽1𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑡−1 + ε𝑖𝑤t , (5.10) 
where C is a M*M matrix of coefficients representing the autoregressive dependence within 𝑖𝑤, 
𝐺, is an additional same-size matrix with spatial coefficients representing that the values of 
𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑡 depend on time-lagged push-out spillover from region i, while the matrix J represents 
analogously push-in spillover from the remaining neighbors 𝑖𝑤𝑤. A regression equation for 
𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑡 and even more distant neighbors can be set up similar to (5.10), dependent on their own 
lagged values and lagged values of inner and outer neighbors, with corresponding coefficient 
matrices. The resulting coefficient matrices can be used to calculate spillover corrected IRFs 
for i, 𝑖𝑤 and 𝑖𝑤𝑤. This system can, in theory, be extended without spatial limits. The number of 




Of course, this technique has some difficulties. The most obvious is that individual regions are 
represented multiple times in the calculated dependent variables of (10), although in different 
combinations. Thus, regions that have identified neighborhood relations to many regions have 
a stronger impact on the calculated dependent variables than those that have only one identified 
neighbor, which affects the estimation results. Of course, this depends strongly on the chosen 
definition of neighborhood. If, e.g., neighborhood is defined based on commuting, metropolitan 
cities are linked to many regions, due to size effects and due to the higher amount of weekend-
commuter, which means that large cities impact the results of the new developed estimation 
systems stronger than other regions. However, we believe that this representation of highly 
connected regions reflects the real spatial spillover structure, because, as argued above, these 
are drivers of spatial interdependent growth due their high economic integration. 
5.3.1. Spatio-temporal IRFs 
The information provided by the coefficient matrices from the additional regression systems is 
used to extend the moving average calculation by including spatial spillover, considering that 
an initial shock at time 𝑡0 leads to spatial spillover not only once, but at every time step in which 
the effect persists. In principle the IRF values 𝑦𝑡0 to 𝑦𝑡∞ can be calculated by using the moving-
average representation as described above in Equation (5.8), but including the additional 
spillover terms from Equation (5.9) and adding similar calculations for the neighboring regions. 
For simplicity, we again only consider one past time step (p=1) and obtain after the Choleski 
decomposition analogous to Equation (5.8) for the considered region: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴0
∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝐴1
∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐻1𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑡−1 + ε𝑡. (5.11) 
The IRFs for the neighboring regions are given by 
 𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑡 ==  𝐶0
∗𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑡 +  𝐶1





 𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑡 =  𝐷0
∗𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑡 +  𝐷1
∗𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝐾1𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝐿1𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑡−1 + ε𝑡.  (5.13) 
Further neighborhoods could be considered in a similar way. 
 As each IRF needs the estimation results of the next neighbors, all IRFs must be calculated 
simultaneously. Thus, we practically need to limit the spatial expansion, because otherwise an 
infinite dimension of estimations would result. Since effect strength will decrease while 
fuzziness increases with distance, we decided to consider complete estimations up to 𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑡, 
including simplified spatial spillover from 𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑤, that are restricted to spatially depend on its 
inner neighbors, but not its outer neighbors. 
In order to show how this effects the IRFs of the considered region i, let us consider a shock 
(change) 𝑦𝑖0 in this region at time t=0 and check how this spreads through the equations 
(assuming all other values to be zero at time t=0, as done in IRF calculation). Then, at time t=1 
the values are given by (only presenting the deterministic part, to each value a stochastically 
determined value has to be added): 
 𝑦𝑖1 =  𝐴1𝐴0
∗ 𝑦𝑖0  ,          𝑦𝑖𝑤1 =  𝐺1𝐴0
∗ 𝑦𝑖0        and   𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑤1 =  0.  (5.14) 
At time t=2 spillovers come back from the neighboring regions: 
                                                   𝑦𝑖2 = (𝐴1
2 +  𝐻1𝐺1)𝐴0
∗ 𝑦𝑖0, 
   𝑦𝑖𝑤2 = (𝐶1𝐺1 + 𝐺1𝐴1)𝐴0
∗ 𝑦𝑖0     and      𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑤2 =  𝐾1𝐺1𝐴0
∗ 𝑦𝑖0. 
 (5.15) 
While after two time steps the development in region i is only influence by spillover that come 
back from the neighboring regions, after four time steps additional spillover coming back from 
second-order neighbors as well as spillover from the developments that have been triggered in 
the neighboring regions add to the developments within the region. The effects of the original 




 𝑦𝑖4 = (𝐴1
4 + 𝐻1𝐺1𝐴1
2 +  𝐻1𝐶1𝐺1𝐴1 + 𝐴1𝐻1𝐺1𝐴1 + 𝐴1
2𝐻1𝐺1 +
 𝐴1𝐻1𝐶1𝐺1 +  𝐻1𝐶1
2𝐺1 + 𝐻1𝐺1𝐻1𝐺1 +  𝐻1𝐽1𝐾1𝐺1) ∗ 𝐴0
∗ 𝑦𝑖0, 
 (5.16) 
This shows that multiple spillover effects occur that play a role for the reaction of a region to 
shocks (changes) especially in the medium run. All these effects are ignored in the approach 
that is so far used in the literature.  
In order to assess the statistical significance of the estimation results, we conduct a Monte Carlo 
simulation, in which we draw regions with all their attributed regional and neighborhood values 
over years from the original data set until the dataset reaches the same size. Regions can be 
drawn multiple times. We then estimate the developments after the shock for 500 randomly 
drawn datasets while holding the initial shock constant and calculate 95% confidence of the 
IRF values.  
We should mention that, despite being sensitive for regional heterogeneity, size effects limit 
the comparability of effects between the IRFs for i, 𝑖𝑤 and 𝑖𝑤𝑤. IRFs indicate responses in %. 
Thus, the total effects depend on the size and can be approximated by comparing the mean size 
of the accumulated economies.  
5.3.2. Neighborhood and spatial lags 
By explicitly modelling also the neighboring regions, the definitions of regional units and 
economically linked neighborhood regions become crucial for the estimation results and the 
identification of spillover. Like most regional data analysis, we are limited to the use of 
administrative regions due to data availability. These are mere containers and the spatial 
expansion of local shocks does not follow local boundaries.  
The first problem is the identification of relevant neighbors. Most spatial VARs use a binary 
Spatial-Durbin model, identifying physically bordering regions as neighbors to calculate 




not necessarily based on geographic proximity. However, based on the identified transmission 
channels, proximity seems to be an important condition for strong market relatedness and 
spatial connectivity. Moreover, it is important to identify economic linkages that lead to spatial 
spillover without immediate geographic proximity. In a metropolitan area, for example, regions 
share economic interactions with the regions core city, even without sharing an administrative 
border. Furthermore, it must be considered that economic interactions are not evenly distributed 
across neighbors and not necessarily symmetric. A shock in a large city like Berlin may generate 
larger impacts on a smaller surrounding city or region than vice versa due to size effects and 
the accompanying commuting and trade patterns. However, asymmetric spillover are 
imaginable even for regions of equal size. To identify economic linkages, the economic distance 
seems to be as relevant as the physical distance.  
In order to develop appropriate spatial-weights, we generate a binary spatial weight matrix W 
in two steps. The first step is to identify spatial proximity using a binary spatial contiguity 
matrix with 𝑊𝑖𝑗 = 1 if regions share a border, assuming that physical neighbors automatically 
share economic externalities. Various instruments can be used to identify further economic 
linkages. Ramajo et al. (2017) identify economic distance via cross-regional trade linkages. 
Since we do not have the corresponding data, we consider commuting patterns. We focus on 
outward-bound commuters, since 𝑦𝑖𝑡 depends on the economic situation at the person’s 
workplace (job-losses, wage gains), whereas economic shocks at the place of residence should 
not have impact on the workplace. To identify cross-region commuters, we use federal data, 
that display individuals that are not registered in the regions they life in. These are not 
necessarily daily commuters, but may be weekend-commuters or people that are registered and 
work in different places for other reasons. In order to take into account linkages between regions 
due to commuting, we assign to every region the commuters’ target regions, and order these by 




a share of more than 80% of the commuters is considered. These regions are added to the 
neighborhood matrix, whereby double-counts are excluded to maintain the binary matrix 
structure. 
To limit the before mentioned overrepresentation of metropolitan cities and restrict the number 
of neighbors, we use another neighborhood matrix that represents the population-weighted 
travel distance by car. If this is higher than 90 minutes, regions are not counted as economic 
neighbors. Obviously substantial economic spillover with greater distance cannot be ruled out, 
but are, in our opinion, negligible.  
The 2nd order neighborhood matrix V is identified by identifying all regions which are 
connected to a direct neighbor but are not neighbors of the region itself. A M*M matrix results 
that contains values of 1 for all 2nd order neighbors and values of 0 for all other pairs of regions. 
The same procedure is done for the 3rd order spatial weights. We further encounter problems 
with the spatial limitation of datasets here, for example country borders or coasts. In our 
analysis, non-German regions are not included as neighbors in the dataset due to different 
information bases and administrative region definition. This limits the number of neighbors 
(and higher order neighbors), but is not an essential problem for the estimation.  
Another issue is the choice of a suitable spatial scale. The smaller the chosen regional unit, the 
larger the spillover should be compared to the region size. The smaller the economy, the higher 
the need to import production factors from other regions which extends the need for spatial 
externalities. While a main concern of former studies was to lose spillover information by using 
a small regional scale, this is solved by our new approach. Furthermore, in larger regional 
scales, such as country level analysis, the within-country externalities are not recognized as 
such. In the case of negative cross-regional (but not cross-country) externalities, these would 
decrease the estimated responses and would cancel each other out on country level. Hence, 




5.3.3. Exemplary data and variables 
The paper’s exemplary empirical analysis is based on a balanced panel dataset set including 
annual data in the spatial unit of all 361 German administrative county regions in the time period 
2000 to 2017. County regions are identical to the 401 administrative counties and cities, but 
district-free cities with a population <100.000 are combined with a neighborhood region. With 
few exceptions, these cities are surrounded by just one region with which they are strongly 
connected, which could distort the results.  
The variables utilized in the SptpVAR model are based on the theoretical frameworks in Section 
2. Hence, we use the private sector investment rate as a measure of physical capital investments 
and higher education as measure for human capital. Moreover, we integrate the employment 
rate and GDP as proxy for the output (labor productivity). As in all similar studies, measuring 
the technology rate is an essential problem for adequately considering growth models in 
econometric analysis. We argue, that there is no well-suited measure, since patents – the 
commonly used indicator with its known advantages and disadvantages – do not have adequate 
autoregressive characteristics due to high fluctuations and time delays in patent recognition. 
We argue that regional technology growth should be included in the GDP measure by directly 
influencing labor productivity. Additionally, the migration rate is included as well as the 
household income to control for income as the main reason for migration. Spatial lags for every 
variable are computed as given in Section 3. All variables are used in their natural logarithm 
form. Table 5.1 outlines the use of variables and data sources.  
To verify the actual presence of spatial autocorrelation, we perform a Morans-I test on our 
database given the spatial weight matrix presented in section 3.2. The results confirm the 
existence of spatial autocorrelation among all six variables. Another necessary check for pVAR 




Table 5.1: Variable descriptions and data sources 
Acronym Variable Description Data Source 
1) INVQ Private sector physical capital industry 
investment rate in the manufacturing, mining 
and quarrying sector as share of the GDP* 
[Industry Investments in € / GDP in €] 
 
German Federal Statistical Office. 
GDP: Working Group ‘National Accounts of 
the Federal States. - ‘Arbeitskreis 
Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der 
Länder 
8) EMP Gross employment rate 
[Employed persons/Population aged 15 to 64 
years ] 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) 
Population data: German Federal Statistic 
Office 
9) EMP_UNI Higher education – Workers with a university 
degree per economically active working 
population 
[Employed persons with university 
degree/Population aged 15 to 64 years ]  
German Federal Statistical Office  
Population data: German Federal Statistic 
Office  
10) INC Mean disposable household income  
[Disposable income of private 
households/population] 
National Accounts of the Federal States 
(‘Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der 
Länder’)  
Population data: German Federal Statistic 
Office 
11) MIG Regional net migration rate 
 [(net migration – populationt-1)/populationt-1] 
Migration statistic of the federal government 
and the federal states 
Population data: German Federal Statistic 
Office 
12) GDP Nominal GDP per economically active 
working population 
[GDP in €/population aged 15 to 64 years ] 
Working Group ‘National Accounts of the 
Federal States. - ‘Arbeitskreis 
Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der 
Länder’ 
Population data: German Federal Statistic 
Office 
Remarks: *Only investments of firms with >=20 working persons are gathered. The missing investments in 
relation to measured values should not be correlated in space and time, and therefore not produce structural 
errors. 
The results suggest that unit roots are present in four of six variables, namely employment rate, 
higher education rate, GDP and income. Hence, we follow Ellhorst (2012) and subtract a time 
trend from each individual unit in the panel data for the concerned variables. Morans- I and IPS 
test results are given in the Appendix (Table A5.1 and A5.2). The summary of the used variables 




Table 5.2: Variable summary statistics 
Nr Acronym Observations Min 1.Quarter Mean 3. Quarter Max Std. Dev. 
1 INVQ 3610 -8.194 -4.335 -3.967 -3.560 -1.496 0.651 
2 EMP 3610 -1.464 -0.8845 -0.723 -0.587 0.411 0.256 
2.1 EMP_DET 3610 -1.485 -0.987 -0.830 -0.703 0.095 0.262 
3 EMP_UNI 3610 -4.710 -3.521 -3.116 -2.813 -0.948 0.595 
3.1 EMP_UNI_DET 3610 -4.773 -3.866 -3.442 -3.127 -1.253 0.595 
4 INC 3610 6.903 7.230 7.345 7.460 8.090 0.163 
4.1 INC_DET 3610 6.884 7.080 7.167 7.253 7.792 0.134 
5 MIG 3610 -.0405 -.0011 .0026 .0061 .0592 .0060 
6 GDP 3610 9.762 10.394 10.619 10.807 12.545 0.354 
6.1 GDP_DET 3610 9.656 10.164 10.372 10.535 11.784 0.352 
Note: _DET denotes detrended version of the variable. 
As outlined above we need some a priori restrictions towards the causal variable ordering to be 
able to perform the choleski decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix. The chosen order 
is as presented in Table 5.1, based on a Granger-Causality test and additional theoretical 
assumptions. Test results are given in Appendix-Table A5.3. It is assumed that the investment 
rate is the most exogenous variable and cannot be affected by other variables in the same year 
(but in the following years), while GDP is most endogenous and is contemporaneously affected 
by all other variables.  
5.4. Empirical results 
The empirical results demonstrate the functioning of our SptpVAR approach and bring some 
new empirical insights. In this section we present a brief selection of results. The approach 
provides individual impulse response functions for every pair of variables and regional 
neighborhood level (i, iw and iww). All resulting IRFs are listed in the appendix (Figure A5.1).  
Focusing on effects of shocks in the local employment rate, we find that a single shock in the 
number of jobs within a region has significant positive effects on the local net migration rates 





Figure 5.2: Responses of migration to GDP shock. Note: Estimated impulse response functions are solid lines. 
Dashed lines represent 95% coefficient intervals from Monte Carlo simulations with 500 repetitions. IRFs display 
responses to orthogonal shocks in the amount of the standard deviations of the impulse variables. Responses 
are given in % 
filled by external workers that move to the region. The results for 1st order and 2nd order 
neighbors indicate a significant negative development of net migration rates. We therefore see 
that these neighbors’ loose a share of their population to region i. Assuming that these were 
already gainfully employed before or are at least qualified enough to take on a job, these regions 
forfeit potential growth capital. This finding supports the theoretical assumptions of equation 
(5.3), that personal income is a main driver of migration. Furthermore, spatial proximity has an 
effect, most immigrants into i seem to move from neighboring or economically linked regions. 
This is an important finding for the assessment of economic policies. Secondly, we focus on 
output (GDP) responses to employment shocks, examining the validity of the spatial growth 
theories presented. In support of the Mankiw growth model (Equation (5.1)), we find that local 
labor growth has significant positive effects on the total output within the same region. 
However, this local shock has no significant effect on neighboring regions (Figure 5.3). Thus, 
based on our results, labor growth does not cause spatial externalities that impacts the neighbors 
total output in a significant way. The same applies for other variables’ responses to employment 





Figure 5.3: Responses of GDP to employment shock. Specifications equal Figure 5.2 
We also note that output per working-age population is negatively affected by migration within 
the same region (Figure 5.4). This indicates that population growth has negative effects on the 
regions productivity. Based on the presented considerations by Pfaffermayr and Fischer (2018), 
it means that the average migrant is not as productive as the existing population one year after 
moving. This explains negative effects on productivity, at least in short term. In consequence, 
the effects shown in Figure 5.4 should lead to convergence in productivity across regions. We 
do not find spatial output effects on local GDP growth.  
 




Additionally, we are interested in the spatial dissemination of output shocks. We find that GDP 
growth has on average positive, but not significant effects on its neighbors and no clear impact 
on 2nd order neighbors (Figure 5.5). Thus, we do not find clear evidence for spatial economic 
externalities within the economic output, against the hypothesis that knowledge driven output 
growth should spillover into its neighboring regions causing output growth. It appears that the 
spatial effects of output growth depend on the nature of the shocks. Assuming that knowledge 
or technology level spillover cause growth in neighboring regions, this may not be the case for 
other growth sources, explaining average positive but not significant growth spillover. 
 





Further research using the SptpVAR approach concentrating on this issue could clarify this. 
Secondly, we find significant employment growth as a result of GDP shocks (Figure 5.5). The 
effects are not causing employment growth in neighboring regions. 
 
Nevertheless, GDP growth shows spatial impact in the form of significantly positive migration 
responses within the region and in both types of neighboring regions (Figure 5.6). While it is 
obvious that economically growing regions are attractive for immigrants from other regions, 
the spatial results somehow seem to contradict the findings from Figure 5.2. 
We detect a clear difference between spillover from employment and from GDP growth. 
Employment growth in a region seems to attract people from surrounding regions into the 
region, meaning that it leads to quite local migration. In contrast, GDP growth seems to attract 
people from outside the wider neighborhood (including second order neighboring regions) into 
this neighborhood, implying long-distance migration. Both effects seem to be connected to 
suburbanism dynamics, but the latter effect (including second-order neighbors) even goes 
beyond that. 





Figure 5.7: Responses of employment to Migration shock. Specifications equal Figure 5.2 
Finally, our estimation reveals that significant effects in neighboring regions are possible, even 
if there are no significant local effects. Figure 5.7 illustrates that there is no within region 
reaction of the local employment rate to migration. However, in the direct neighborhood, the 
employment rate increases per working age population, although there is no local shock. We 
believe, that the effect is provoked by emigrants into i. If their average employment rate before 
migration was lower than those of the remaining population in 𝑖𝑤, the employment rate within 
the region increases without new jobs being created. 
5.5. Conclusion  
The paper aimed to develop a theoretical SpVAR model that extends former approaches by 
integrating spatial externalities of local economic shocks into the analysis and overcome 
problems in dealing with spatial effects in regional panel data. We presented an SptpVAR 
model that does this in a rather general approach that allows to track the spatio-temporal 
diffusion of local economic change in space as well as in time and incorporates indirect effects 
not only between variables, but also in space in the resulting IRFs. Furthermore, the proposed 




subsample of larger cities would imply that the spillover between these cities and their 
surrounding regions is examined. The functioning of the approach is shown by applying it to a 
spatial dataset for 361 German regions. 
The main advantages of the new approach are that spatial spillover effects resulting from a 
shock in one region on the surrounding or connected regions and indirect feedback spillover 
from these regions to the origin region are no longer neglected. Hence, the new approach also 
provides additional information on spatial spillover structures that are very interesting, for 
example for the evaluation of regional policy measures. However, the approach brings some 
limitations. It still relies on the use of administrative regions as spatial containers, faces 
problems at the spatial end of the data set (e.g. country borders) and generates rather large 
regions when calculating higher order neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the approach allows for 
some new interesting empirical insights. We find that positive effects in one region can cause 
positive or negative spillover in neighbors and linked regions and therefore increase or mitigate 
the total effects. Our exemplary application shows that spatial spillover are most relevant if 
migration dynamics are included in the analysis.  
We conclude that the SptpVAR has versatile application possibilities in the empirical analysis 
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Table A5.2: Moran’s I test of spatial autocorrelation 














2000 0.099 0.000 0.055 0.011 0.232 0.000 0.659 0.000 0.432 0.000 0.329 0.000 
2001 0.108 0.000 0.066 0.003 0.228 0.000 0.665 0.000 0.560 0.000 0.334 0.000 
2002 0.119 0.000 0.072 0.002 0.224 0.000 0.661 0.000 0.502 0.000 0.335 0.000 
2003 0.137 0.000 0.075 0.001 0.217 0.000 0.660 0.000 0.283 0.000 0.338 0.000 
2004 0.134 0.000 0.077 0.001 0.216 0.000 0.656 0.000 0.316 0.000 0.336 0.000 
2005 0.122 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.213 0.000 0.651 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.348 0.000 
2006 0.143 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.635 0.000 0.251 0.000 0.339 0.000 
2007 0.151 0.000 0.074 0.001 0.216 0.000 0.633 0.000 0.422 0.000 0.338 0.000 
2008 0.173 0.000 0.069 0.002 0.217 0.000 0.635 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.345 0.000 
2009 0.142 0.000 0.063 0.005 0.219 0.000 0.593 0.000 0.232 0.000 0.335 0.000 
2010 0.164 0.000 0.060 0.007 0.220 0.000 0.620 0.000 0.290 0.000 0.328 0.000 
2011 0.196 0.000 0.062 0.005 0.213 0.000 0.629 0.000 0.277 0.000 0.332 0.000 
2012 0.220 0.000 0.064 0.004 0.219 0.000 0.652 0.000 0.380 0.000 0.331 0.000 
2013 0.149 0.000 0.063 0.005 0.225 0.000 0.652 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.332 0.000 
2014 0.128 0.000 0.065 0.004 0.225 0.000 0.672 0.000 0.257 0.000 0.335 0.000 
2015 0.130 0.000 0.069 0.002 0.224 0.000 0.668 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.345 0.000 
2016 0.133 0.000 0.072 0.002 0.223 0.000 0.660 0.000 0.162 0.000 0.335 0.000 






Table A5.2: IPS unit-root test statistics 
Variable IPS-test statistic p-value 
INVQ -31.711 0.000 
EMP 39.812 1 
EMP_DET -17.622 0.000 
EMP_UNI 24.398 1 
EMP_UNI_DET -25.224 0.000 
INC 27.116 1 
INC_DET -31.393 0.000 
MIG -13.440 0.000 
GDP 32.813 1 
GDP_DET -33.162 0.000 
Note: Number of regions = 361, t= 10, test based on Im Pesaran & Shin (2003):  
H0: presence of unit roots. _DET donates detrended version of the variable.  
 
Table A5.3: Panel Granger Causality Test (lag=1) 
Note: Test as given in Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012). 
Granger Causality Test is performed for every region; Alternative hypothesis = Granger causality given for at 





GRANGER         
CAUSES 














INVQ x x 9.94 0.00 4.03 0.00 0.09 0.926 1.23 0.219 1.66 0.097 
EMP_DET 1.08 0.284 x x 9.29 0.00 18.43 0.000 8.29 0.000 8.48 0.000 
EMP_UNI_DET 1.06 0.288 -1.17 0.243 x x 7.76 0.000 4.00 0.000 2.95 0.003 
INC_DET 0.39 0.696 3.76 0.000 22.90 0.000 x x 2.74 0.006 2.819 0.005 
MIG 1.11 0.266 9.04 0.000 -1.21 0.225 1.77 0.075 x x 6.04 0.000 




Table A5.4: Core-Model regression results  
        
Dependent variable: 
                            INVQ       EMP      EMPL_UNI     INC       MIG        GDP     
plm::lag(invq, 1)           0.412***   .003***    0.007***    -0.001   -0.00003   0.002    
                           (0.012)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.0001)   (0.001)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(emp, 1)            -0.864***  0.565***  -0.049*     -0.011   0.014***  0.128***  
                            (0.255)   (0.012)    (0.026)    (0.011)   (0.003)   (0.027)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(empl_uni, 1)       -0.111   -0.015***   0.664***   -0.011**   -0.001     0.020*   
                            (0.109)   (0.005)    (0.011)    (0.005)    (0.001)   (0.012)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(inc, 1)             0.469**   0.047***   0.070***   0.701***  0.021***    0.008    
                            (0.224)   (0.010)    (0.023)    (0.010)    (0.003)   (0.024)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(mig, 1)             -0.832    0.085*     0.034      -0.005   0.153***    -0.164   
                             (1.050)  (0.048)    (0.105)    (0.047)    (0.013)   (0.113)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(gdp, 1)             0.124    0.030***    0.019*     -0.006   0.005***  0.462***  
                            (0.111)   (0.005)    (0.011)    (0.005)    (0.001)   (0.012)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spinvq, 1)          0.048*   -0.0004     0.004      -0.001    0.0001   -0.005**  
                             (0.025)    (0.001)   0.002)    (0.001)   (0.0003)   (0.003)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spemp, 1)           1.121**   0.097***   0.199***   0.010   -0.024*** -0.198***  
                             (0.498)   (0.023)   (0.050)    (0.022)    (0.006)   (0.053)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spempl_uni, 1)     -1.036***  -0.106***  -0.111***  0.036***  -0.003     0.046*   
                            (0.242)    (0.011)    (0.024)    (0.011)   (0.003)   (0.026)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spinc, 1)            0.411     0.024   -0.108***  -0.143***  -0.010** -0.124***  
                             (0.381)   (0.018)   (0.038)   (0.017)    (0.005)    (0.041)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spmig, 1)           -3.801**   0.420***  0.917***   0.013    0.189***    -0.156   
                             (1.762)   (0.081)   (0.177)    (0.079)   (0.022)    (0.189)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spgdp, 1)            0.110     0.014     0.012      -0.003   0.010***   0.059**   
                             (0.230)   (0.011)   (0.023)    (0.010)   (0.003)    (0.025)   
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                  6,137     6,137      6,137      6,137      6,137     6,137    
R2                            0.181     0.432      0.468      0.469      0.073     0.254    
Adjusted R2                   0.125     0.394      0.432      0.433      0.011     0.204    
F Statistic (df = 12; 5748)105.676***364.648***421.142*** 423.546*** 37.761***163.402***                                                                                           
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Dependent variables within region i             





Table A 5.5: 1st neighbor regression models  
        
Dependent variable: 
                           SPINVQ     SPEMP    SPEMPL_UNI   SPINC      SPMIG     SPGDP     
plm::lag(invq, 1)           0.017***   0.001**    0.002***   -0.0001    0.00003  0.002**   
                           (0.006)    (0.0003)   (0.001)    (0.0004)  (0.0001)   (0.001)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(emp, 1)             -0.164     0.001     0.031**    -0.018**  -0.007***   0.009    
                           (0.124)    (0.006)    (0.012)    (0.008)    (0.002)   (0.014)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(empl_uni, 1)       -0.058   -0.008***   -0.009*     0.002    0.003***    -0.004   
                           (0.052)    (0.003)    (0.005)    (0.003)    (0.001)   (0.006)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(inc, 1)            -0.025    -0.011**   -0.023**    0.010      0.001    0.00001   
                           (0.107)    (0.005)    (0.011)    (0.007)    (0.002)   (0.012)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(mig, 1)            0.167     0.066**    0.099**    0.070**   0.038***    -0.012   
                           (0.503)    (0.026)    (0.049)    (0.034)    (0.008)   (0.058)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(gdp, 1)             -0.014    -0.007**   -0.010**   -0.008**  0.002***    0.009    
                           (0.053)    (0.003)    (0.005)    (0.004)    (0.001)   (0.006)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spinvq, 1)        0.496***   0.001**    0.003**     -0.001   -0.00002    -0.001   
                           (0.012)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.0002)   (0.001)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spemp, 1)        -1.480***   0.532***  -0.150***  -0.059***  0.049***  0.123***  
                           (0.313)    (0.016)    (0.031)    (0.021)    (0.005)   (0.036)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spempl_uni, 1)     0.155     0.024***   0.769***   0.041***  -0.036*** 0.116***  
                           (0.145)    (0.007)    (0.014)    (0.010)    (0.002)   (0.017)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spinc, 1)          0.611***   0.032***    0.017     0.456***   -0.001     0.010    
                           (0.185)    (0.009)    (0.018)    (0.012)    (0.003)   (0.021)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spmig, 1)          -1.405     0.047      0.155*     0.034    0.311***    0.066    
                           (0.860)    (0.044)    (0.084)    (0.058)    (0.014)   (0.099)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spgdp, 1)         0.437***   0.058***   0.087***   0.063***  0.016***  0.459***  
                           (0.112)    (0.006)    (0.011)    (0.008)    (0.002)   (0.013)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp2invq, 1)       0.113***    -0.001     0.003      -0.002    0.0005*    0.0005   
                           (0.016)    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.001)   (0.0003)   (0.002)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp2emp, 1)        1.452***   0.175***   0.254***   0.133***  -0.048***  0.098**   
                           (0.344)    (0.018)    (0.034)    (0.023)    (0.005)   (0.040)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp2empl_uni, 1)  -0.987***  -0.094***  -0.100***    -0.015  0.019***  -0.069***  
                           (0.167)    (0.009)    (0.016)    (0.011)    (0.003)   (0.019)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp2inc, 1)        0.909***  -0.100***  -0.149***  -0.170*** -0.020*** -0.153***  
                           (0.280)    (0.014)    (0.028)    (0.019)    (0.004)   (0.032)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp2mig, 1)       -7.109***   0.861***   1.352***   0.523***  0.144***   0.327**   
                           (1.263)    (0.064)    (0.124)    (0.085)    (0.020)   (0.146)   
                                                                                            
plm::lag(sp2gdp, 1)         -0.058     0.014*    0.060***    -0.015   0.015***    -0.015   
                           (0.163)    (0.008)    (0.016)    (0.011)    (0.003)   (0.019)                                                                                  
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                6,137      6,137      6,137      6,137      6,137     6,137    
R2                          0.281      0.541      0.597      0.280      0.200     0.251    
Adjusted R2                 0.232      0.509      0.569      0.230      0.145     0.200    
F Statistic (df = 18; 5742)124.603***375.713*** 472.683***123.753***79.716*** 107.142*** 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes : 𝑖𝑤 variables are dependent variable                                                             






Table A5.6: 2nd neighbor models - 𝑖𝑤𝑤 is dependent variable 
 
Dependent variable: 
                           SP2INVQ    SP2EMP   SP2EMPL_UNI   SP2INC    SP2MIG     SPGDP     
plm::lag(spinvq, 1)        0.066***  -0.001***   -0.0003   -0.002*** -0.0005***   0.001    
                           (0.008)    (0.0004)   (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.0001)   (0.001)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spemp, 1)          0.371*     0.012      -0.010    -0.013   -0.013***  0.068***  
                           (0.216)    (0.011)    (0.024)    (0.014)   (0.003)    (0.024)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spempl_uni, 1)    -0.212**  -0.047***    -0.006    -0.003    0.003**  -0.044***  
                           (0.101)    (0.005)    (0.011)    (0.007)   (0.001)    (0.011)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spinc, 1)          -0.076     -0.007   -0.051***  -0.045*** -0.006***   -0.016   
                           (0.126)    (0.007)    (0.014)    (0.008)   (0.002)    (0.014)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spmig, 1)        -2.882***   0.179***   0.318***  0.276***   0.076***   0.152**   
                           (0.595)    (0.031)    (0.066)    (0.039)   (0.008)    (0.066)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(spgdp, 1)         0.253***   0.009**    0.025***  0.014***    0.001      0.014    
                           (0.078)    (0.004)    (0.009)    (0.005)   (0.001)    (0.009)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp2invq, 1)       0.475***   0.003***   0.008***  -0.002**   0.0004**    0.002    
                           (0.011)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.0002)   (0.001)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp2emp, 1)       -1.117***   0.606***    0.016     0.046**    0.005     -0.059*   
                           (0.284)    (0.015)    (0.032)    (0.019)   (0.004)    (0.032)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp2empl_uni, 1)  -0.660***   -0.011*    0.674***   0.017**  -0.018***  0.118***  
                           (0.125)    (0.007)    (0.014)    (0.008)   (0.002)    (0.014)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp2inc, 1)        0.424**    -0.018*    -0.054**  0.344***   0.018*** -0.126***  
                           (0.204)    (0.011)    (0.023)    (0.014)   (0.003)    (0.023)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp2mig, 1)         -0.022    0.310***   0.264**    -0.090    0.357***    -0.120   
                           (0.924)    (0.048)    (0.103)    (0.061)   (0.013)    (0.103)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp2gdp, 1)        0.424***   0.060***   0.128***  0.078***   0.013***  0.425***  
                           (0.120)    (0.006)    (0.013)    (0.008)   (0.002)    (0.013)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp3invq, 1)       0.049***   -0.0004    0.005***  -0.002**   -0.0004*    -0.002   
                           (0.014)    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.001)   (0.0002)   (0.002)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp3emp, 1)        1.674***   0.132***   0.197***  0.114***  -0.019***  -0.066**  
                           (0.302)    (0.016)    (0.034)    (0.020)   (0.004)    (0.034)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp3empl_uni, 1)  -0.870***  -0.066***  -0.074***  -0.028***  0.011***    0.017    
                           (0.130)    (0.007)    (0.014)    (0.009)   (0.002)    (0.014)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp3inc, 1)        -0.447*   -0.083***  -0.124***  -0.197*** -0.026*** -0.145***  
                           (0.246)    (0.013)    (0.027)    (0.016)   (0.003)    (0.027)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp3mig, 1)       -4.735***   0.796***   1.003***   -0.110    0.146***    0.155    
                           (1.105)    (0.058)    (0.123)    (0.073)   (0.015)    (0.123)   
                                                                                             
plm::lag(sp3gdp, 1)         0.029     0.017**    0.061***  0.042***    0.001    0.076***  
                           (0.133)    (0.007)    (0.015)    (0.009)   (0.002)    (0.015)                                                                                           
________________________________________________________________________________________
__ 
Observations                6,137      6,137      6,137      6,137     6,137      6,137    
R2                          0.318      0.610      0.558      0.227     0.302      0.245    
Adjusted R2                 0.271      0.584      0.527      0.174     0.255      0.193    
F Statistic (df = 18; 5742)148.668*** 499.556***402.046*** 93.532***138.280***103.239*** 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 










6. General Conclusions 
This thesis consists of four stand-alone research papers that examine the effects of public 
regional policies on regional living conditions using spatial vector autoregressive methods. The 
thesis contributes to the existing literature by emphasizing multidimensional outcomes of 
regional policy measures that are not limited to effects on economic growth, while using well-
grounded theory. Moreover, it contributes to the development of appropriate spatial 
econometric research designs in the analysis of regional policy effects. This combination of 
spatial econometric methods and socioeconomic research questions and variables has rarely 
been found in policy evaluation studies so far. 
The analyses carried out in this thesis show that the reduction of regional inequalities and 
promotion of spatially equivalent living conditions is an important topic in regional science and 
economic geography due to its economic, social and political implications. Socioeconomic 
trends such as demographic change and the new geography of jobs are leading to increasing 
disparities. As a result, dynamic metropolitan areas with economic strength, young populations 
and high levels of attractiveness and opportunities are emerging, while structurally weak and 
more rural areas are being left behind by this development. As shown in section 1, the 
discussion about regional disparities cannot be reduced to economic disparities, since they 
determine individual quality of life and life chances, making regional redistributive policies 
social policies by economic means (Iammarino et al., 2019). Thus, by maintaining more equal 
opportunities, improving individual life perspectives and life chances, and safeguarding 
democratic stability, efficacious regional policies are powerful political instruments in spatial 
economic and social development. These outcomes justify policies aimed at spatial equity, even 




Table 6.1: Summary of key research findings – Section 2 to 4 
Title: How to improve the quality of life in peripheral and lagging regions by policy measures? 
Examining the effects of two different policies in Germany 
Policies:  
 
Fiscal equalization  
scheme & GRW 
Key findings: 
Equalization scheme grants have significant 
positive effects on net migration rates. This is 
particularly the case for regions with low 
endogenous fiscal capacity and persons under 50 
years of age. 
GRW subsidies have almost no impact on 
regional net migration rates. 
Regional level: German labor market 
regions 
Main indicators: Net migration rates 
  
Title: Measuring the regional, multifaceted, direct and indirect Effects of European Cohesion 
Policies  
Policies:  ERDF, ESF & Cohesion 
fund 
Key findings: 
ERDF funding has positive effects on regional 
GDP, employment and household income 
growth. Effects are stronger in less developed 
regions. 
No robust effects are found for ESF and 
Cohesion Fund. Migration rates are not affected 
by any of the policies. 
Regional level: EU28, NUTS-2  
Main indicators: GDP, Employment rates 
Household Incomes 
Migration rates 
Title: Who benefits from structural investment policy? An empirical analysis of the German structural 
fund GRW on regional wage structures 
Policy:  GRW Industry & 
Infrastructure schemes 
Key findings: 
GRW industry subsidies lead to growth in wages 
above the median wages in West-Germany and 
growth in all wages except 90th percentile in the 
East. 
Infrastructure subsidies have no effects on wages 
in the West, but lead to robust growth of wages 
at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile in the East. 
Positive effects are found in the service sector, 
but not in the industrial sector. 
Regional level: German county districts and 
independent cities  
Main indicators: Wages at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th 




However, based on the findings of the research conducted, it is not possible to draw 
unambiguous conclusions about the efficacy of policy instruments on the outcome variables 
examined in sections 2 to 4. The empirical findings suggest, that policies have multiple effects 
on regional migration rates and wages, suggesting that they can be effective in increasing the 
quality of life and material living standards in subsidized regions, but the presence and strength 
of effects are highly dependent on the policies modes of action, regional socioeconomic 
preconditions and the regional outcome variables studied. This indicates that the policies under 
investigation in this thesis have different transmission channels and that a closer look into the 
findings is needed to draw more general conclusions. Table 6.1 provides an overview on the 
key findings from the research conducted in section 2 to 4. 
Section 5 has a different approach than the other papers und therefore has an exceptional 
position in this thesis. It builds upon the methodological progress of spatially indirect responses 
to variable shocks presented in section 2 by presenting a method that allows to estimate 
additional IRFs that account not only for within-region interdependencies between variables, 
but also for cross-regional interdependencies through spatial spillovers in an extended vector-
autoregressive system. This paper does not primarily aim to measure the effectiveness of a 
particular policy, but to improve the SpVAR methodology, since the method has been found to 









Table 6.2: Summary of key research findings – Section 5 
Title: Analyzing the spatio-temporal diffusion of economic change –Advanced statistical approach 
and exemplary application 
Policy:  
- Key findings: 
Extension of the SpVAR approach to SptpVARs 
improves the approach and brings new insights by 
capturing all spatio-temporal dynamics. For example: 
employment growth leads to regional growth of net 
migration rates, but declining net migration rates in 
linked regions of 1st and 2nd dimension. This brings 
additional information in the assessment of policy 
effects. 









6.1 Overall findings and policy implications 
The research findings presented in Table 6.1 allow conclusions on the general efficacy of 
regional policies in different regional and institutional settings that can be of high interest to 
policy makers. In this section, more general conclusions will be drawn along the initial research 
questions provided in section 1. 
1. How can individual well-being and the dynamic development of multidimensional regional 
inequalities be measured in a suitable way beyond economic parameters? 
As presented in section 1, the use of self-reported measures of well-being or indices generated 
by political institutions or the researcher itself can introduce significant biases in assessing the 
impact of regional policy measures on the quality of life. Section 1 and 2 show why finding 
appropriate measures of quality of life is a very challenging issue. Additional difficulties arise 
from the problem of finding reliable datasets that are dynamic enough to represent policy 
effects. 
The main solution in this thesis is to build upon regional changes in net migration rates as a 




2, regional net migration rates provide valuable information about the appeal of regions to 
individuals. This is what Faggian et al. (2012) refer to as people “voting by their feet” for the 
attractiveness of regions. Policy interventions that create new regional amenities or improve 
existing ones should have positive effects on net migration rates. Moreover, using changes in 
net migration rates allows for individual weighting of regional amenities that improve people’s 
individually perceived quality of life. This makes the indicator more attractive than other 
conceivable indicators. This solution works well in the context of this thesis and brings useful 
information for policy analysis, although it should be noted that it is a rather general indicator 
that definitely has shortcomings. However, as outlined in the thesis, the advantages outweigh 
the disadvantages. 
In addition, wages, as used in section 4, are an appealing indicator to assess the material benefits 
that people derive from policy subsidies. It allows for more accurate statements about people’s 
welfare growth than regional GDP development does. Most importantly, examining different 
quantiles of the wage distribution makes it possible to examine the intra-regional distributional 
effects, which allows to draw conclusions about the social effects of the policy. Since the 
econometric method chosen allows the evaluation of both socioeconomic and variable factors, 
the combination of these elements provides important information for policy evaluation. 
Of course, the use of other indicators is also possible. However, they must be dynamic, of 
reliable data quality, and have the desired explanatory power. Recent publications (e.g. Ferrara 
et al., 2020) show that other approaches bring additional information into the discussion. An 
improved data accessibility may lead to an increase in other indicators capable of measuring 
new dimensions of regional policy outcomes in the future.  




2. Which policy measures are proving particularly effective to reduce dimensions of regional 
inequalities? 
3. Are there differences in the regional effects between those policy measures that directly 
affect public institutions and the municipal budget (e.g. formula-allocations in fiscal 
equalizations) and those that directly support private actors (e.g. structural funds)? 
The findings suggest that all policies examined are capable of supporting a more balanced 
spatial development. All of them, GRW, fiscal equalization and European Cohesion Policies 
show some positive regional outcomes, but no universal efficacy. It can be concluded that the 
existence of policy effects is not self-evident, but depends on a variety of factors and on the 
effects intended by policymakers. 
To increase the regional quality of life, fiscal equalization seems to be the most appropriate 
among the policies studied in this thesis. With its particular efficiency in regions with low 
endogenous fiscal capacities, it seems to support the experienced regional amenities and to be 
a useful policy to prevent out-migration from structurally weak regions. This would help to 
reduce the negative regional consequences resulting from long-term outmigration and thus 
break a potential negative spiral of regional development, by, for example, making public and 
private investments in infrastructure and housing more worthwhile again. An explanation for 
the effects found is that equalization grants give regional actors the largest freedom in the use 
of the grants and are therefore better tailored to regional needs and because it offers extended 
financial securities compared to GRW and Cohesion subsidies, which are disbursed only once 
to a specific project. The latter policies do not appear to have an impact on regional net 
migration and non-economic amenities. However, many studies emphasize the economic 
growth effects from structural funds, implying that they are useful in this sense (e.g. Eberle 
Mitze et al., 2019; Alecke et al., 2013 for GRW; Crescenzi & Guia, 2020; Fiaschi et al., 2018; 




the ERDF has positive effects on economic growth and household income growth. Section 4 
proves that GRW can support material living standards by increasing wages and that subsidies 
to projects co-financed by public actors (infrastructure scheme) are also more effective to 
increase wages in East-Germany than subsidies to private actors (industry subsidies). This 
supports the conclusion that increasing the public budget is a promising method to increase 
regional living conditions. 
Both material living standards and non-economic amenities are important for the development 
of living conditions and individual opportunities and capabilities in the regions. This thesis 
shows that economic growth and perceived quality of life are not directly related, since fiscal 
equalization reveals effects on regional net migrations without promoting economic growth, 
while the opposite is observed for GRW and the ERDF subsidies. Thus, economic growth does 
not seem to be the most important factor for perceived quality of life, which again shows how 
important it is to assess new regional dimensions of policy outcomes. 
Several policy implications can be derived from this. First, unconditional policy grants appear 
to be more effective in promoting non-material living conditions and creating regional 
amenities than earmarked single-payment subsidies. This presence of particularly positive 
effects of fiscal equalization on migration rates suggests that financial freedoms in the public 
budget are an important factor that allows governments to address individual problems and 
promote endogenous regional development potentials without the pressure of economic 
efficiency. Regional quality of life seems to depend to some extent on public financial 
resources. This is an important finding as many regions, especially those that are structurally 
weak, face financial challenges and limited public budgets. In Germany, municipal debt is 
widespread, and severely affected municipalities are not allowed to invest in potential 





Thus, the first policy implication for ensuring a more balanced spatial development is that 
policies should increase the financial freedom of municipalities and their abilities to act. This 
does not mean that other policy settings cannot be effective. However, the findings suggest that 
they are effective only in some cases. Thus, the second implication is: policy design and subsidy 
payment should be more flexible, allow for the freest possible use and be individually tailored 
to regional preconditions and needs in order to increase their efficacy and to achieve the 
intended results. Rather rigid policy designs appear to be less suitable to the individual needs 
of the regions.  
4. Are there regional differences in the effectiveness of funds, for example between rural and 
urban areas? Can regional factors be identified that have a particular (positive or negative) 
influence on the impact of policy measures in the selected areas of life (e.g. population 
density, demographics or economic strength)? 
Although, it is found that all policies can have positive effects, all three research papers on 
policy effectiveness indicate a high degree of conditionality in the effects. In all cases, the 
policies had significant and stronger effects in regions that are economically weaker than others 
in the area covered by the policy. This can be found for net migration rates, which stronger 
responses to equalization grants in East Germany and in regions with low fiscal capacities than 
in the other regions. ERDF effects are found to be stronger in less developed regions in the EU, 
while any significant effects found for the Social Fund are also limited to Eastern Europe. Wage 
effects of the GRW policy are almost limited to East-Germany. This pattern indicates that 
policy effects seem to be considerably stronger in regions that have higher needs for regional 
policy interventions. In contrast, subsidies for economically strong regions seem to be less 
effective. Due to the policy design, eligibility of funds in the economically strongest regions is 
not possible (GRW & Cohesion Fund) or severely limited (ERDF & ESF), while almost all 




be concentrated even more on structurally weak regions, as this is where the greatest 
effectiveness could be found and where the need for policy interventions to ensure spatially 
balanced development is the highest. 
Another, more general policy implication results from section 5. Policy makers and evaluators 
must also consider spatially indirect policy effects. The thesis shows by adding on 
econometrical methods that positive effects in the funded region can have negative effects in 
neighboring regions. This may result in a zero-sum effect or even in a negative effect, because 
the neighboring regions becomes in need for stronger policy interventions as well, which then 
could trigger negative effects in the initially successfully funded region. Policy analysis should 
pay more attention to this problem.  
6.2 Limitations and research outlook. 
A real-world research setting always entails limitations that must be considered when 
evaluating the research findings. The underlying research highlights that multidimensional 
regional policy outcomes are not easy to assess. There are several reasons for this. 
First, there are methodological constraints. The time lag between a subsidy and its effects in a 
region is unknown and depends on the type of the subsidy or the associated project. In any case, 
our tests show that the explanatory effect of the models is best when a lag of one year between 
funding and outcome measurement is used (two in the additional estimation case for ESIF 
funds.). However, this estimation strategy does not account for effects that unfold their effects 
later in time (e.g., infrastructure projects that have a long construction period, or indirect effects 
that occur over time, such as long-term effects due to productivity gains). The SpVAr models 
allow these indirect effects to be included as accurately as possible, but there will still be effects 




A second problem arises from the complexity of regional outcomes. SpVAR models assume 
the completeness of all relevant variables in the system in order to mitigate potential bias from 
variables that are not included in the model. This is obviously impossible in complex spatial 
interaction system and could affect the results. However, the variables used in the empirical 
research have been carefully selected and grounded in theoretical considerations, so that it 
seems very unlikely that there are influencing factors that would completely change the results. 
Moreover, the key results presented in this thesis prove to be robust, supporting this assumption. 
Nevertheless, the causality of the estimated relationships in the SpVAR system should be 
interpreted cautiously, even though the impulse response functions can be claimed as causal 
effects in theory (Di Giacinto, 2010) 
Another limitation results from the dynamic panel models underlying the SpVAR estimations. 
Much care has been taken to carefully estimate reliable models, but no econometric system is 
perfect, especially when it comes to dynamic panel data models. It is explained, why all 
commonly used dynamic panel models that include fixed-effects have shortcomings that may 
bias the results. However, a careful check of the robustness of the results as it is done in the 
empirical research papers seems to be a good way to mitigate potential biases rather than using 
models that ignore individual or time constant effects in the models.  
Sections 2 and 5 improve the spatial econometric methods used and provide complementary 
insights by estimating additional spatial IRFs. This helps to overcome the shortcoming of 
incorrect spatial spillover estimation that is presented in detail in section 5. This can be an 
advantage for future policy analyses using SpVAR methods. The developed method can be 
easily tailored to other indicators, policies, regional levels and estimation techniques. New 
panel data estimators such as transformed likelihood estimators could be a way to improve the 
known shortcomings from fixed-effect estimators (Pickup & Hopkins, 2020). Unfortunately, 




Assessing other policies might be useful, as there are important policies at the international 
level (such as the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development) or even within Germany 
(e.g. the Urban Development Fund) whose effects have not yet been analyzed in this context. 
The heterogeneous findings in this thesis suggest that different results can be expected for other 
policies as well. Moreover, the research on fiscal equalization schemes is still very sparse 
compared to structural funds, despite the enormous financial volume of the schemes. Our 
research suggests, however, that equalization schemes appear to be appropriate to support the 
goal of spatially equivalent living conditions. Future research could take this finding as an 
opportunity to focus more on these kinds of unconditional policy measures.  
In addition, some information might get lost due to data structure. First the regional level of the 
included variables has implications for the results and for spatial spillover effects. Section 2 
explains why using a large regional scale can be a shortcoming for estimating differentiated 
policy outcomes. Moreover, it is explained above why time is an important factor. The use of 
annual intervals in the panel data may be too inflexible to correctly assess policy impacts. 
Shorter time intervals might be better for in depths analysis. Thus, SpVARs with aggregated 
regional variables are appropriate to estimate overall policy effects, but have shortcomings in 
identifying regional transmission channels, which, based on our results, seem to rely on 
individual regional factors. 
It should be noted that the indicators used in this thesis also have shortcomings. These are 
discussed in detail, particularly with regard to the migration indicator. However, it appears that 
there is a need for studies focusing on non-economic indicators to measure regional quality of 
life and living standards beyond GDP policy outcomes, as exemplified by recent publications 
by Ferarra et al. (2020) or the European initiative for a Social Progress Indicator (Annoni & 
Bolsi, 2020). The social and economic trends described in this thesis suggest that the analysis 




At the same time, the amount of accessible data is growing, which will allow future studies to 
focus on new outcome dimensions and explore new questions beyond measuring GDP effects. 
These studies could also assess regional sustainability goals. These are of great interest for 
future regional, economic and social development and have found their way into regional 
growth models (Nordhaus, 2018) and Cohesion Policy goals (European Commission, 2019).  
As a final point, the results obtained from the research papers indicate a high degree of regional 
conditionality in policy efficacy. In order to get closer to actual regional transmission channels 
that promote the efficacy of redistributive policies, the factors that influence this conditionality 
need to be examined in more detail. While this thesis focuses primarily on economic 
conditionality, there might be other relevant factors such as the quality of government and local 
institutions that define the absorptive capacities of regions (Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015; 
Fratesi & Wishlade, 2017). Finding these factors would help to develop and improve regional 
policies that are specifically tailored to regional needs. 
6.3 Final remarks 
Structurally weak regions are more than just peripheral spaces with a lack of economic strength 
and jobs. They are home to many people, the place of their families and friends and local 
communities. Thus, home regions have an important function for people. I personally believe 
that in an increasingly globalized world, the region, the county or city will still play an important 
role for people, due to local characteristics such as local languages, customs or dishes that can 
provide a sense of stability and orientation in the modern world and, with other obligations and 
frictions, are the reason why the place of residence is not simply interchangeable for many 
people. Moreover, these regions contribute to social and cultural diversity and are therefore 




This thesis aimed to investigate whether regional policies can support this goal and affect the 
people’s daily life by helping to make life in the regions more livable and to increase their 
individual perspectives, chances or wages. With regard to the theoretical considerations and 
empirical findings, the thesis is able to contribute to the discussion about regional living 
conditions and regional policy effects and perhaps even to policy making by providing 
empirical policy implications. The thesis shows that regional policies can contribute to future 
spatially balanced regional development in various context.  
Policymakers have to be open to new ideas, keep an eye on economic and social trends and 
have to design flexible policies in order to meet the needs of the municipalities and population 
and unfold their effects in the regions. The introductory quote from the German coalition 
agreement and the ongoing revisions to the European Cohesion Policies illustrate that policy 
designs will evolve in the future. If empirical research such as this thesis can contribute to this, 
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